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History

Independent Internationalism and Nationalistic Pragmatism: The United States and México
Relations during the 1920s.
Chairperson: Michael S. Mayer

During the 1920s, relations between the United States and Mexico revealed the extent to
which the U.S. actively engaged in foreign affairs and demonstrated the process by which
México defined a new era of its international relations while facing a reconstruction in internal
politics. Decades ago, William Appleman Williams refuted the stereotype of American
isolationism, arguing that the administrations of Presidents Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover
engaged in diplomacy, even where they conducted diplomacy through public silence and
backstage negotiations. Later, Joan Hoff defined American foreign policy as independent
internationalism, characterized by an amalgamation of ideological and economic considerations.
On the Mexican side, presidents, Obregón, Elías Calles, and Portes Gil, approached diplomacy
with a nationalistic pragmatism that recognized the need for new rules governing the
participation of foreigners in the economy and in religious matters. Despite their seemingly
draconian nature, these new rules left room for negotiations.
Three main issues influenced U.S.-Mexican relations. The rights of American oil
companies in México were settled in 1923 through the Bucareli Agreements. In 1927, when a
new Petroleum law was enacted, American Ambassador Dwight Morrow conducted the
negotiations which lead the Mexican Supreme Court to eliminate the provisions that placed time
limits on foreign concessions, and the Mexican Congress invalidated the retroactivity of such
laws. A second point of contention was the Church-State controversy in México. American
Catholics demanded direct U.S. intervention, but Coolidge instructed Morrow to work with
representatives of the Catholic Church and the Mexican State to achieve a solution that allowed
each to function while respecting the other’s field of influence. The successful conclusion of the
religious dispute in Mexico allowed Coolidge to avoid the insertion of a potentially poisonous
issue into the 1928 presidential elections.
These events demonstrated that the U. S. was anything but isolationist in the 1920s. The
religious controversy offered an example of how domestic determinants influenced foreign
policy and, at the same time, demonstrated how foreign policy could enter the American
domestic political arena. The American intervention in the religious conflict of the 1920s shaped
United States-México relations for the rest of the 20th Century.
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INTRODUCTION
During the 1920s, in the aftermath of World War I, leaders around the world looked to
rearrange their internal affairs and their approach to diplomacy. In this period, both the United
States and México emerged from different kinds of armed conflict - the United States from WWI
and México from an internal revolution. During this period, relations between the United States
and México revealed the extent to which the U.S. actively engaged in foreign affairs. This
refutes not only the old stereotype of American ‘isolationism” in the 1920s, but also exemplifies
that American foreign policy during those years was characterized by what the historian Joan
Hoff called “independent internationalism.” 1
Many years ago, William Appleman Williams pointed out that “Americans have come to
think of the 1920s as the nation’s lost weekend in international affairs, as a period when the
United States disregarded its world responsibilities by getting inebriated on the home made gin
of isolationism” 2 Williams, however, argued that the administrations of Presidents Warren
Gamaliel Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Clark Hoover actively pursued American
economic interests all over the world.
In 1971, Joan Hoff also rejected the idea that American foreign policy during the 1920s
was isolationist. Hoff used the term “independent internationalism” to define American foreign
policy between 1920 and 1933. For Hoff, independent internationalism referred not to a
philosophy of foreign policy but to a pragmatic method for conducting foreign affairs. Its
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implicit assumption was that the United States should cooperate on an international scale when it
could not, or did not want, to solve a particular diplomatic problem through unilateral action. 3
For México, the 1920s were not only years of reconstruction in internal politics, but also
a period in which the country redefined its international relations. Mexican Presidents Álvaro
Obregón Salido, Plutarco Elías Calles and Emilio Portes Gil approached diplomacy and internal
conflicts with what can be called nationalistic pragmatism. They understood the country was
coming out of a civil war and engaged in a process of economic and political reconstruction.
The Mexican presidents did not try to ban the participation of foreigners in that process; rather
they tried to set new rules. Despite the seemingly draconian nature of these new rules, Mexican
leaders left room for negotiation. The Mexican authorities always kept open the channels of
communication while searching for a resolution to the disputes that arose from the
implementation of their policies. Among the many issues that influenced U.S. relations with
México in the 1920s, three were the most significant. One related to the oil rights affecting
American companies, another was the domestic armed rebellions in México, and a third was an
internal religious conflict, in which the United States government played a key role in finding a
solution.
In order to provide a framework for relations between México and the United States
during the 1920s, especially the years from 1926 to 1929, it is necessary to consider the historical
background from the first years after the Europeans discovered America up to moment the
Mexican Constitution of 1917 was enacted. Thus, the first chapter begins with the moment the
Spaniards set a foot in what is now known as Latin America. It then moves on to consider how
Spanish kings and Pope Alexander VI established the rules that influenced events during the next
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four hundred years. The initial step came when Pope Alexander VI published the Papal Bulls
Inter Caetera and Eximae Devotionis on May 4, 1493. On the basis of that, Spain gained and
consolidated concessions and privileges over the new territories as the sole beneficiary of the
exploitation of natural resources and trade. In 1508, Pope Julius II, through the publication of
the Papal Bull, Universalis Ecclesiae, conceded to the Kings of Spain the right of universal
patronage over the Catholic Church in the Indies. The patronage allowed the Spanish King to
exercise powers over the Church, including control over administrating those revenues resulting
from religious services. As a consequence of the latter, the Kings of Spain constituted the Royal
Patronage of Indies, by which the Spanish Crown was able to administer not only the wealth of
the Catholic Church in newly acquired lands but also to intervene directly in the nomination of
Church officials in the different Viceroyalties. The Church benefited from the monopoly of
religious faith and the acquisition of real estate properties, while the Kings could exercise power
without worrying about resistance from the Church or a political rebellion.
That situation prevailed for three centuries up to 1808, when France invaded Spain. After
overthrowing Ferdinand VII, Napoleon Bonaparte appointed his brother, Joseph, king. In New
Spain, Creoles (those born in New Spain from Spanish parents) rejected the French ruler and
demanded the return of Ferdinand VII to the Spanish throne. Two years later, in 1810, the
turmoil in Spain provided a perfect excuse to demand independence in the region now known as
Latin America. The original proposal for independence called for freedom from Spain, but for
México to continue under the rule of Ferdinand VII with the Creoles taking political leadership.
Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, a Catholic priest, headed a revolt, which additionally considered
some social and economic changes, such as the end of slavery and better working conditions for
the Mexican natives. In the case of México, it took eleven years to achieve independence from
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Spain in 1821. Independence, however, did not completely change México’s internal
arrangements. Catholicism prevailed as the official religion in the newly independent country.
In addition, a dispute arose over the way the Royal Patronage of Indies would operate. The new
civilian rulers claimed that all the privileges exercised by the King over the Church under the
Patronage must be transferred to them. The Church, however, rejected the proposal, arguing that
it was a concession made by the Pope to the King, and, consequently the new government in
México had to negotiate a similar agreement.
From 1821 to 1857, Catholicism prevailed as the official religion in México, which
banned all other creeds. Even the appearance of freemasonry rites, the Scottish and the York, in
the early years of the republic did not change that situation. The law required foreigners coming
to the country to respect the official religion and not to perform any public act related to any
other faith. From 1824 to 1857, Liberals and Conservatives battled for dominance in México.
Liberals were professional people and intellectuals, advocates of democracy, and supporters of
federalism; Conservatives came “from the landed aristocracy, the military and the clergy; [they
favored a centralist government], supported monarchism, or even a restoration of Spanish
authority under a liberal constitution” 4 In 1825, when the United States intervened for the first
time in Mexico’s domestic policy, Joel Roberts Poinset, the American Minister to México,
favored the liberals. 5
In spite of the struggle between the liberals and conservatives, the Catholic Church
remained the official religion in México recognized by every Constitution enacted during those
years. In addition, members of the Catholic hierarchy played an active role in the political events
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of the country. In 1847, during the Mexican War, President James Polk met the Bishops of New
York and Missouri to ask for their intervention with the Mexican prelates to help the American
troops. He hoped that the Mexican prelates would deny any economic support to the Mexican
government and convince the Mexican people not to resist the presence of foreigners in their
country. Although, he obtained an agreement from the Mexican prelates, President Polk sent
Moses Y. Beach as confidential agent to Mexico to assure the support of Catholic Priests, who
provided it, though not necessarily for free. According to Beach’s report, he provided the
Mexican Catholic priests with some financial support for their activities against the government
of Antonio López de Santa Anna during the Mexican War. 6
A dispute between Church and State took shape when the Catholic hierarchy disagreed
with a series of reforms related to religion enacted by the Mexican government during the 1850s.
Those reforms deprived the Catholic religion of its status as the only and official religion; other
religions were allowed to offer religious services in México. The historian Deborah J. Baldwin
has noted that “the 1857 Constitution legalized Protestantism, which until then had been banned,
and though important seeds of the Protestant movement can be found earlier, the systematic
implantation begins at this date.” 7 New laws also prohibited religious organizations, churches,
or priests from owning land or buildings and established the separation of Church and State in
matters related to education, registration of births, marriages, and cemeteries.
In spite of the opposition of the Catholic hierarchy, the laws prevailed. Consequently,
when the French invaded México in the early 1860s, the Catholic Church supported the French.
Later, the Catholic hierarchy of México tried to negotiate with Maximilian of Hapsburg, the
6
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Austrian Emperor, who headed the invasion. The hierarchy offered support in exchange for a
return to the old status quo, which recognized Catholicism as the country’s official religion.
When Maximilian rejected the proposals, the Catholic Church withdrew its support.
After the Mexican forces defeated the French Army and Maximilian in 1867, the
Austrian Emperor was executed, and President Benito Juárez García returned to México City,
where he reinstalled his government. Juárez’s primary concern was to rebuild the country, and,
in an attempt at reconciliation, he relaxed the application of the rules related to religion. Juárez
himself attended mass every Sunday, although he made it clear that he did so as a private citizen
and not as the President of México. His successor, Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada, however,
returned to a hard line policy toward the Church, applying the provisions established under the
Constitution of 1857. The Church shifted its support to the rebellion of Porfirio Díaz Mori, who
ousted Lerdo in 1876.
When Díaz came to power, things started to change. Díaz’s dictatorship, which lasted
from 1877 to 1911, was characterized by the way he related to foreign powers. He linked
Mexican economic development to foreign investment coming primarily from the U.S. and also
from Europe. As foreign investors devoted capital, mainly to the railroad and oil sector, the
participation of Mexican investors became marginal. In the end, Díaz’s policies resulted in an
unequal distribution of income that produced social unrest. At the same time, the Catholic
Church and the Mexican government developed a modus vivendi that allowed each to operate
without interfering with the activities of the other. By not enforcing the dispositions related to
religion written in the 1857 Constitution, Díaz was able to keep the country at peace. This
situation prevailed up to 1910, when the Mexican Revolution began, and its leader, Francisco I.
Madero González, made some statements about agrarian and educational reforms that the Church
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considered contrary to their interests. Agrarian reform would affect holdings that had been
clandestinely acquired or retained by the Church. In the case of education, the clerics feared that
the educational facilities they had established throughout the country could be taken by the
government. The U.S. Ambassador to México, Henry Lane Wilson, reported to Washington that
he saw the Catholic Church increasingly worried about the proposals made by the revolutionary
leader. 8
With the Diaz regime shaking in May 1911, Catholic hierarchy supported laymen who
founded the National Catholic Party (PCN), which gave them an avenue to participate openly in
politics for the first time. During the 1912 elections, the PCN’s candidates won the governorship
in the States of México, Querétaro, Jalisco, and Zacatecas; they won 29 seats in the XXVI
Legislature, four seats in the Senate, and the Mayor’s office in the capital cities of several states.
When the Mexican Revolution began to settle down, a new constitution was enacted in
1917, which included a series of policies related to religion. The new constitution provided for
education without religious content, freedom of religion, and prohibition against the Church or
its members owning property. Further, only Mexicans by birth could enter the priesthood, and
they had to register in order to practice their profession. These dispositions were similar to the
ones already established under the Mexican Constitution of 1857.
At the beginning of the 1920s, México’s new leaders faced not only the problems of
rebuilding the country but also of how to approach diplomatic relations with international
powers. In that venue, the second chapter deals with two issues: One, the reaction of laymen
and the Catholic hierarchy inside México once the government enforced the religious
dispositions contained in the Constitution and another, Mexican president Alvaro Obregón
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struggled to gain diplomatic recognition from the U.S. Religious conflict ignited during the
early 1920s, Obregón tried to impose some restrictions on religious activities in public places.
The provisions of Article 24 of the Mexican Constitution clearly stated that everyone was free to
embrace the religion of their choice, but it required that every religious act of public worship be
conducted inside Church buildings, which always would be under the supervision of the
government.
Obregón was in a weak position internationally; the U.S. refused to extend diplomatic
recognition to him because of a dispute about the retroactivity of Article 27 of the Mexican
Constitution, which affected American property rights over subsoil and agrarian matters. The
article stated that “all contracts and concessions made by former governments [since 1876]
which shall have resulted in the monopoly of lands, waters, and natural resources of the nation
by a single individual or corporation are declared subject to revision, and the Executive is
authorized to declare those null and void which seriously prejudice the public interest.” 9
Obregon’s failure to gain diplomatic recognition from the United States prevented him from
taking strong measures against the Church. To engage in conflicts with two international
powers at the same time would be risky. Obregón therefore decided to postpone the
enforcement of religious dispositions and devoted his efforts toward resolving the conflict with
the U.S. government. Obregón received diplomatic recognition from the U.S. Government after
both governments signed what in the U.S. was known as the General Claims Convention and in
México as the Bucareli Agreements, in August 1923. According to the agreements, the
Mexican government would not enforce Article 27 retroactively, and any dispute would be
settled through international tribunals.

9
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When Obregon’s term, which started in 1920, neared its end in 1924, things did not look
very promising for the members of the Catholic Church. Several factors influenced the
developing conflict between the Mexican government and the Catholic Church. One was the
appointment of James Rockwell Sheffield as the U.S. Ambassador to México. Another was the
attitude of the incoming Mexican president, Plutarco Elías Calles, toward the Catholic Church.
Yet another was the development of a schismatic movement inside the Catholic Church. In
February 1925, Joaquín Pérez, a Catholic priest, calling himself the Patriarch, founded La
Iglesia Ortodoxa Católica Mexicana, an organization independent from Rome. In spite of
Pérez’s efforts, the new church failed to attract national support, but the friction between the
Catholic hierarchy and President Elías Calles grew, because the Church accused him of
supporting Pérez, a claim never attested.
At the time the religious conflict erupted, the conflict with American oil companies
working in México seemed to have been settled by the Bucareli Agreements of 1923. The issue
flared up again, however, in 1925, when President Elías Calles sent to Congress a proposal for
the enactment of the Petroleum Laws. Those laws restricted ownership of subsoil rights by
American citizens or companies to a period of eighty years. The dispute developed mainly
around the retroactivity of the law, since it was not clear how it would affect those American
companies that already had participated in the oil business in México. The announcement of this
measure angered Ambassador Sheffield, who took diplomatic relations to the verge of rupture.
The Mexican Government even accused the United States of preparing an invasion of México in
1927. The allegations derived from information found in some documents taken from the U.S.
Embassy in México with the complicity of people working in the Embassy. Later, those
documents were taken to the Mexican Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Labor. They finally
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ended on the Mexican President’s desk. Those documents “contained official correspondence
between the Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg and Ambassador Sheffield, consular dispatches,
reports of military attaché and some forgeries” 10 It provided President Elías Calles with an
opportunity to play politics at domestic and diplomatic level.
According to Emilio Portes Gil, then Governor of Tamaulipas and later Interim President
of México, President Elías Calles explained him the existence of those documents and the threat
of an American invasion to Mexico. 11 Elías Calles clearly instructed Portes Gil that in case of it
happened, he must be ready to blow up all the oil wells in the Northern State of Tamaulipas.
Also, Portes Gil mentioned that President Elías Calles sent a telegram to President Coolidge
notifying the American president that he (Coolidge) would receive the documents and should
read them before taking any action. American officials concluded that some of those documents
were forgeries while others were sufficiently ambiguous to allow President Elías Calles to
believe that an American military intervention in México was possible. In spite of that, both
governments in the end agreed to resolve the problem, and the removal of Ambassador Sheffield
from his post eased the way for a resolution.
On July 14, 1926, President Elías Calles decided to enforce the Constitution’s provisions
related to religion and made some changes to the Penal Code that established punishments for
those who disobeyed the rules related to religious worship. He added a requirement that every
priest had to register in the office of the city government in which he resided. Priests who
refused to register would be fined or imprisoned. The Catholic hierarchy opposed such measures
and met the President in an effort to reestablish the old modus vivendi developed during the Díaz
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years. They got a negative answer, and the regulations which took effect on August 1 of that
year prevailed.
Even before the regulations went into effect, eight Archbishops and twenty nine Bishops
published a Pastoral Letter on July 25, 1926. The letter denounced the Mexican government’s
actions and ordered all priests in charge of the churches to suspend religious services. It also
called on Catholics to launch a nation-wide economic boycott. The plan for Catholics to refrain
from purchasing anything but the necessities of life got under way at the end of July.
On August 21, the Catholic hierarchy met by first time with President Elías Calles,
hoping that he would reverse the measures he had implemented. The results of the meeting did
not fulfill priests’ expectations, and they decided to implement additional measures to express
their disagreement with the Mexican Government. In addition to the economic boycott already
under way, an armed revolt began in late August and early September, 1926. Groups of
Catholics took up arms in what would later be known as the Revolución Cristera, a rebellion that
provoked serious divisions not only in Mexico but also in other countries.
The third chapter will reconsider the orthodox view, which has presented the religious
conflict in México as primarily a domestic problem between the Church and the Mexican
government in which the United States intervened, in a most unwelcome fashion for the
members of the Cristero rebellion. This assertion, however, is not totally true. During the first
half of 1926, some foreign priests were expelled from México, including the newly named
Apostolic Delegate, Archbishop George J. Carauna. On the basis of these actions, Mexican
Catholics, both inside and outside the country, began an intense campaign to oppose the new
laws. Stories about the eviction of foreign priests from México and the closing of schools under
the direction of the Catholic Church were circulated abroad, mainly by the expelled priests and
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by Mexican Catholics who traveled to the U.S. looking for support as well as by the Knights of
Columbus.
Not all, however, objected to the Mexican government’s new policies. While Catholics
emphasized they were living a nightmare, members of other religions felt differently. Americanborn Protestant ministers living in México, like Rev. William Evans Thomas, Pastor of Union
Church “pointed out the law must be enforced as written and that therefore it is impossible for
American-born preachers to function any longer without violating the fundamental and
regulatory law.” 12 That law prohibited foreigner priests to exercise their duties in México. He
therefore peacefully left the country. Even the American Ambassador, James Sheffield, reported
in April 1926 no more than a few cases of problems for American citizens involved in religious
activities. He found no situation in which foreigners were persecuted by the Mexican
Government.
In the international arena, those backing the Catholics and opposing the Mexican
government tried to set the tone of the discussion. Mexican clerics and Catholic laymen received
support from Pope Pius XI on July 3, 1926, when he addressed the students of the Pius LatinAmerican School in Rome. In that speech, he condemned the Mexican government because of
its allegedly anti-religious policy. Mexican priests tried to obtain help not only inside México
and from the Church but also to involve American Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy in the
United States. The Catholic hierarchy in México and in the U.S. as well as its followers
demanded an open foreign intervention, especially from the Pope with his moral power, and the
United States with its army.
As the religious conflict in México got worse, external forces, led by the Pope himself
and the American Catholic hierarchy, intervened openly in the problem. In November 1926,
12

“Bishops of Mexico Discusses Peace Plan to Offer to Calles,” New York Times, August 18, 1926, 1.

12

Pope Pius XI, published his Encyclical, Iniquis Afflictisque, in which he denounced the measures
implemented by the Mexican Government. Later, on December 12, the American Catholic
Hierarchy published a Pastoral Letter that also expressed disapproval of what was happening in
Mexico and compared it to a democratic country like the United States, where such laws could
never be implemented.
Various groups inside the U.S. responded differently to events in México. On one side,
ministers or members of non-Catholic religions, liberals and politicians disagreed with the
Catholic Church. For them, the actions of the Mexican government were legal and proper.
Another group, made up of some politicians, some members of the judiciary, the Catholic
hierarchy, Catholic organizations, and Catholics in general, believed that the Mexican
government was committing an outrageous violation of freedom, and they publicly demanded
that the U.S. government intervene. Organizations supporting that position included the Knights
of Columbus, the National Catholic Welfare Council, and the National Council of Catholic
Women.
Various Catholic constituencies, especially members of the Knights of Columbus,
requested from the American press more intense coverage of the religious conflict in Mexico.
The New York Times did cover the story extensively, not necessarily because of such demands
but because of its commitment to cover foreign affairs. This press coverage also derived from
the fact that members of the Mexican Foreign Service, especially Arturo M. Elías, the Mexican
Consul in New York, and religious organizations in general actively spread news and openly
expressed their opinions about the conflict. In addition, a debate took place in the pages of
various publications. Some, like The Nation and The New Republic, tried to present opinions for
and against the Catholic Church’s positions; others, like The Christian Century and The
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Christian Science Monitor, provided the opinions of members of Protestant Churches; while
Commonweal, a Catholic journal, demanded more extensive coverage of the issue, defended the
Church, and attacked the position of the Mexican government.
Within the United States, the first organization publicly to demand stronger measures
against the Mexican government was the Knights of Columbus, a group of Catholic laymen.
Early in August 1926, at their annual meeting, they demanded that the American government
directly intervene to resolve the religious conflict in México. Later in the month, James A.
Flaherty, the Knight’s leader, met with Secretary of State Frank Kellogg. At the beginning of
September, Flaherty met with President Coolidge. The Knights received a response from
Coolidge indicating that the religious conflict was a domestic problem of México, and
consequently the American government intended to keep a “hands off” policy.
The activities of the Knights, however, never stopped. Before the meeting with
Coolidge, they had explicitly said that: “we hereby authorize our Supreme Board of Directors to
asses our membership to the extent of $1,000,000 for a campaign of education, to the end that the
politics of Soviet Russia shall be eliminated from the philosophy of American life and the ideals
of liberty of conscience and democratic freedom may extend to our afflicted fellow human
beings beyond the Río Grande.” 13
Coolidge’s initial response might have seemed to support the myth that American
foreign policy of the 1920s was characterized by isolationism. That, however, would be a
misconception. As events unfolded in México, the U.S. played an active role, and American
actions had the personal seal of Coolidge. He preferred, however, to play the game of diplomacy
behind closed doors, far away from strident public positions that did not always contribute to
achieving results. The noted historian William Appleman Williams, wrote, “The key to
13
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understanding American diplomacy of the 1920s is the realization it was based on this coming of
age of the Open Door Policy. It represented indeed, synthesis of the Open Door Notes, the
Monroe Doctrine and Washington’s Farewell Address.” 14 In other words, American diplomacy
rested on the notion that all nations should have equal commercial and industrial rights when
trading. Countries should always respect the spheres of influence of the main powers. The U.S.
would avoid formal alliances. This approach could be called diplomacy by economic
persuasion, where public silence and backstage negotiations played a key role. Or as Joan Hoff
pointed out, American foreign policy during those years was characterized by a course of
independent internationalism which allowed “businessmen and government officials began to
forge modern American diplomacy based on the amalgamation of ideological and economic
considerations.” 15
President Coolidge moved cautiously, but firmly, working with representatives of the
Catholic Church and the Mexican State. His goal was to achieve a solution that in no sense
looked like a victory or a defeat for either of the parties involved in the conflict but allowed each
to develop its functions while respecting the other’s field of influence. At the same time,
Coolidge sought always to protect American interests.
Chapter fourth will analyze how Coolidge’s approach to diplomacy also helped to
neutralize a domestic problem in the United States. In 1927, the religious issue invaded the
American political arena, because of the possibility that a Catholic, New York’s governor Alfred
Emmanuel Smith, would become the Democratic nominee for the presidency of the U.S. Many
members of Protestant Churches opposed the prospect. Throughout the presidential campaign of
1928 in the United States, some groups of Catholics, Protestants, and the KKK took outrageous
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positions. However, the silent diplomacy pursued by President Coolidge, based on not taking
any side related to the religious conflict in Mexico, helped to avoid injecting a potentially
poisonous issue into the federal elections. In the end, religion did not become the determining
issue in the final result.
A fifth chapter will cover the unofficial intervention of the United States government to
resolve the religious conflict in México. The U.S. managed to help resolve the religious conflict
in México while working officially to end the problems related to the enactment of the Petroleum
Laws. The first shift in the nature of diplomatic relations between the two countries came on
October 1927, when President Coolidge sent Dwight Whitney Morrow as American Ambassador
to Mexico. Some questioned the nomination, because Morrow came from the financial world
rather than the diplomatic corps, but Morrow soon demonstrated his diplomatic skills. Even
before he left the United States, he met unofficially with the American Catholic hierarchy and
discussed the religious conflict in México. He received a warm welcome in Mexico and, in
contrast to the attitude of President Elías Calles toward former U.S. Ambassador Sheffield, the
Mexican President and Morrow quickly established a warm relationship.
From the beginning, an open dialogue between Elías Calles and Morrow developed, and
negotiations about the oil problem and the religious conflict moved into new stages. In
November 1927, the Mexican Supreme Court eliminated the provision in the Petroleum Laws
that placed time limits on foreign concessions. A month later, the Mexican Congress invalidated
the retroactivity of such laws and recognized the validity of foreign concessions on which the
concessionaries had made positive acts toward improvement prior to 1917. In this way, the
Mexican State avoided a source of conflict with the U.S. Moreover, the companies had been
suffering the consequences from a decline in oil production that cut their revenues, and this
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meant a reduction in tax revenues for the Mexican government. Consequently, President Elías
Calles and Ambassador Morrow, two pragmatists, found a solution to the problem.
With one difficulty solved, Morrow not only worked with the Mexican President but also
continued his behind-the-scenes negotiations with the Catholic hierarchy in the U.S. in order to
reach a solution to the religious conflict. By March 1928, he had convinced President Elías
Calles to meet with Reverend John Joseph Burke, who belonged to the Saint Vincent de Paul
Congregation and, after serving as the General Secretary of the National Catholic War Council,
had become the head of the National Catholic Welfare Council. Burke was named as official
envoy of Archbishop Peter Fumasoni-Biondi, the Papal Delegate to México (who was stationed
in the United States).
In April 1928, President Elías Calles and Reverend Burke, accompanied by William
Frederick Montavon, the Legal Advisor of the National Catholic Welfare Council, met secretly
and unofficially on the East Coast of México. By the end of a six-hour meeting, movement
towards an agreement was already under way. However, Reverend Burke explained to President
Elías Calles, he needed to notify the Mexican prelates exiled in San Antonio, Texas, in order to
get a final agreement.
When Burke explained the proposal to the Mexican priests, they agreed and asked for a
meeting between their leader, Archbishop Leopoldo Ruiz y Flores, and President Elías Calles.
This meeting took place during the summer of 1928, and, with that, the settlement was almost
completed. It remained necessary, however, to consult Rome and México. Rome agreed, but the
Mexican prelates and the leaders of the armed Catholic movement did not want a political
solution. They wanted either the surrender of the Mexican Government or to continue fighting.
In the end, the Pope agreed to wait for a while to try to convince the Mexican prelates.
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When a Catholic fanatic assassinated the newly elected President, Álvaro Obregón, on
July 17, 1928, the prospects for an immediate solution evaporated. Ambassador Morrow
reported to Washington that the nearly concluded agreement would need to wait at least another
year. Among other things, President Elías Calles preferred to leave the agreement in the hands
of the incoming president. Ambassador Morrow, however, continued his unofficial efforts to
convince both parties to reach an agreement. As soon as the interim President, Emilio Portes
Gil, came to office, on December 1, 1928, Morrow took up the matter with him. At the same
time, he continued to work very closely with the Catholic hierarchy in the United States.
By early 1929, the Catholic hierarchy had convinced Pope Pius XI that it was necessary
to end the religious conflict in México. The Pope decided to leave the negotiations on the hands
of the American Catholic Hierarchy. Mexican priests would play a secondary role on the
agreements negotiated by the Mexican government and the unofficial intervention of the
American Ambassador in México.
In May 1929, everything was set in order to arrive at a resolution of the conflict. On June
2, in Washington, Archbishop Ruiz y Flores announced through the American press that the
Church was ready to settle the conflict. Days later, the members of the Mexican Catholic
hierarchy met with President Portes Gil and agreed to a solution.
The main points of the agreement, reached on June 21, 1929, were: the Mexican
government denied any intention of destroying the identity of the Catholic Church and
consequently agreed to allow the Catholic hierarchy to designate those priests who would
register in compliance with Mexican laws; religious lessons would be banned in all schools, but
teachings about the Catholic faith would be allowed inside the churches; and finally, the
Mexican authorities recognized the Church’s right to petition for the enactment or repeal of laws.
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In the end, a problem that the American government initially considered only a Mexican
domestic issue required the intervention of external forces in order to reach a solution. However,
at the same time, it was necessary that those intervening in the negotiations did so unofficially.
Neither officials of the Mexican and American governments nor the Catholic priests officially
claimed at any point to conduct negotiations in the name of the institutions they represented.
Even the official announcement of the agreement was written on a couple of white sheets of
paper signed by the Mexican President only as E. Portes Gil.
These negotiations and the final agreement began a new era not only for relations
between the Catholic Church and the Mexican State but also between the United States and
Mexico. From then on, the spheres of activities for the Church were well established, and, as far
as they engaged in their activities without interfering with governmental policies, there was no
problem. As for the relations between the United States and México, in spite of all the
disagreements, each government respected the other, and they resolved their differences without
going to extremes. That agreement allowed them to set the stage for future relations based on
working quietly and behind close doors when necessary to resolve public disagreements.
The way the conflict ended was a good example of how, in spite of all the disagreements,
a channel of communication between U.S. and Mexican governments and the Church’s
representatives always remained open and the parties found a solution. The Church and State in
Mexico learned how to deal with their differences without repeating the mistakes that led them to
an armed confrontation. From then on, they always found a way to settle disputes.
In the case of the U.S., the management of this problem showed how domestic politics
shaped foreign policy. In particular, it revealed the operation of various lobbies that influenced
U.S. foreign policy. It was necessary to deal with pressures coming from Catholics and

19

Protestants; each group had a different point of view of how to manage the religious conflict in
México. Simultaneously, the episode demonstrated how matters of foreign policy influenced
domestic politics. Finally, it demonstrated the potential for a foreign policy issue to become a
domestic political matter. Any effort to support either side in the Mexican conflict would have
had political consequences in the presidential elections of 1928. The best way to avoid this was
to work behind closed doors, without official representation of those involved. In the end, this
diplomacy produced a settlement acceptable to both Catholics and Protestants in the U.S.
American diplomacy also achieved its goal of stability in México without obvious or heavy
handed intervention. This episode in American history set a good example both of well managed
diplomacy and the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy.
In a larger sense, the U.S. intervention in México demonstrated how the U. S. was
anything but isolationist in the 1920s. The U.S. had a variety of interests in México and pursued
them actively. Although it chose not to be directly involved, the Coolidge administration used
other avenues to achieve its desired result.
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Chapter One
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The relations of the Mexican state with foreign powers cannot be explain without first
providing an account of events since Europeans arrived on the American continent at the end of
the 15th century. The actions taken then by the Pope and the Kings of Spain defined the relations
between the inhabitants of the new world and foreign powers for the next four hundred years.
By the early 20th century, Mexican independence from Spain had been achieved a century
earlier. The Catholic Church remained a powerful organization with great influence over the
Mexican population. The United States represented the main power with which México had to
deal. A brief account of events during the preceding four centuries will help to clarify how the
U.S.-México relations and the religious conflict of the 1920s escalated to crises.

Colonial Years
Once Columbus set foot on the American Continent in 1492, a dispute arose between
Don Manuel, King of Portugal and Ferdinand and Isabella, the Catholic rulers of Spain. The
Spanish Kings were favored in the dispute by Pope Alexander VI, a Spanish born under the
name of Rodrigo Lazol y Borja. Alexander VI published the Bulls 16 Inter Caetera and Eximae
Devotionis, on May 4, 1493. 17 The former assigned the Kings of Spain to serve as apostolic
vicars with authority over spiritual matters in the newly discovery lands. Eximae Devotionis
granted to Spain all of the concessions and rights that had been granted formerly to the King of
Portugal in his overseas possessions.
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Later, Pope Julius II, Giuliano Della Rovere, published the Bull Universalis Ecclesiae on
July 28, 1508, conceding universal patronage in the Indies to the Spanish Crown. The Royal
Patronage of Indies allowed the Spanish kings to manage the revenues from the ecclesiastical
services and the wealth acquired by the Church. It also authorized the Spanish kings to build
churches and to appoint new Church officials. 18
In spite of those restrictions, the Church accumulated considerable wealth, acting as the
main source of financing for the landlords. When the borrowers did not fulfill their obligations
to pay on time, the lands became Church’s properties through mortmain. 19 In 1796, more than
half of the 33,387 buildings in México City belonged to the Church. According to the nineteen
century German scientist and explorer Alexander Von Humboldt, the Church owned real estate
properties valued at 260 million pesos in 1800. 20

The Independence Movement
The independence movement began in 1810 and México achieved its independence by
1821. Spanish dominion was characterized by exploitation of the natural resources and
economic disparity among the inhabitants of the Viceroyalties. Divisions emerged not only
because of economic position but also because of ancestry. Peninsulares, Spanish by birth,
openly discriminated against the Creoles, whom they considered as inferiors and excluded from
high ranking positions in the government. Not surprisingly, Creoles started the uprising for
independence in the Viceroyalties.
18
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An additional element behind the independence movements in America emerged when
Napoleon put his brother, Joseph, on the Spanish throne. The Creoles in America, as well as the
Spaniards in Spain, rejected him as an imposter. Since Spain no longer had a government, the
colonists argued, sovereignty reverted to the people, and this became an argument for
independence. 21
In New Spain, Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla headed a group of prominent Creoles that
started the independence movement on September 16, 1810. Creoles demanded the restitution of
Ferdinand VII to the Spanish throne. When Hidalgo issued a call to arms however, “it was not
the local notables who rallied, but rather the long- suffering mixed bloods and Indians.” 22
Consequently, the independence movement became a popular revolt.
In his journey to the Northern Region, Hidalgo and the main leaders of the movement
were captured by members of the Royal Army in Acatita de Baján, Coahuila. They were taken
to the city of Chihuahua, the capital of the state with the same name, where after a trail they were
condemned to execution. After Hidalgo’s execution, his successor, Ignacio López Rayón,
established the Supreme National American Assembly in August 1811. López Rayón proposed
a first draft of a Constitution, titled Elementos Constitucionales, which declared America, now
known as Latin American nations, free and independent from any other nation but recognized
the authority of Ferdinand VII, established Catholicism as the only religion, and acknowledged
the rights and privileges of the Catholic priests. 23 In 1813, José María Morelos y Pavón, a priest
and former disciple of Hidalgo, took over the movement’s leadership. He wrote a document
entitled Sentimientos de la Nación. Besides sharing López Rayón’s proposals about religion, the
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text recognized December 12 as the day to commemorate the Virgin of Guadalupe, 24 and
established tithes and primicias 25 as the only duties Catholics should pay to the Church. On the
basis of that document, the Constitución de Apatzingán was written by Morelos and his
advocates, and published on October 22, 1814. It recognized Catholicism as the only faith and
provided that foreigners living in the country that favored the nation’s freedom and followed the
Catholic faith could acquire the Mexican citizenship. The first step to select members of
Congress involved the voting of citizens living near a parish, calling it Parish Electoral Boards.
To become voters, citizens had to attend a mass. Once the ballots were cast and a Representative
was selected, he had to attend a solemn Te Deum accompanied by the members of the Parish
Electoral Board. 26
Morelos, however, knew that besides enacting laws, help from other countries was
necessary to achieve independence. On July 14, 1815, Morelos and two other members of the
independent movement, José María Linaga and Remigio de Yarza, sent a letter to President
James Madison asking for the U.S. support. After praying for the protection of Heaven and
emphasizing their decision to die rather to again bear the yoke of slavery, Morelos and his
advocates stated that they
relied on the powerful aid of the United States, which as they
wisely guided us by their example would favor us with their
generous assistance signing treaties of friendship and alliance
in which good faith would preside and where the reciprocal
interests of both nations would be remembered.27
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There was no official answer to that request. Months later, in November 1815, Morelos
was captured and executed, and the fight for independence would last for six more years.
By 1821, “independence from Spain was no longer a radical or even a liberal cause.
Now it devolved into a conservative goal, a mean of upholding traditional values and social
codes.” 28 Considering that, the Chief Commander of the Royal Army in the South Region,
Agustín de Iturbide y Arámburu prepared a plan for independence. In order to achieve power,
Iturbide recognized that he had to reach an accord with the leaders of the independence
movement, other members of the Royal Army, the Catholic hierarchy and the Viceroy. Iturbide
(a Creole) set a plan to negotiate with Vicente Guerrero Saldaña (a Mestizo, someone of mixed
Spanish and Indian ancestry) acting as the last leader of the independence movement. As a
result, on February 24, 1821, Guerrero and Iturbide agreed to the so called Plan de Iguala. The
Plan recognized Catholicism as the official faith, retaining prerogatives for the priests, and
required that Ferdinand VII, or a member of his family to be named, as the ruler of México. 29
The fusion of the Royal and the Independent Armies resulted in the so called Army of the
Three Guarantees. The guarantees referred to: “religion (the Catholic faith as the official creed);
independence (presumably a monarchy); and union (fair treatment for Creoles and Peninsulares
alike).” 30 It represented the end of the armed revolt.
Iturbide and the last Viceroy of New Spain, Juan O’Donojú signed the Tratados de
Córdoba on August 24, 1821. Spain recognized México as an independent and sovereign nation,
under the terms established by the Plan de Iguala. 31
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Mexican independence was officially declared on September 27, 1821. With Iturbide as
president, a Junta Gubernativa acted as the first government of independent México. A Te
Deum and a misa de gracia followed Iturbide’s inauguration. 32 Later, a Constituent Congress
was convened on February 24, 1822.

After the Achievement of Independence
Even with an independent government ruling México, Catholicism continued to be the
only officially recognized religion. At the same time, relations between the government
authorities and religious hierarchy were characterized by an increasing level of tension, mainly
over who would control the Royal Patronage. The Church argued the Mexican authorities
needed to engage in negotiations with the Pope to settle new rules.
With the support of the Church, Iturbide declared himself Emperor. He was crowned on
July 25, 1822. Iturbide demanded control over Patronage, which involved him in a dispute with
his political enemies and the powerful Church. During the next months, a series of revolts
against Iturbide developed. Congress explicitly declared its opposition to Iturbide, who first
arrested some deputies and later dissolved the legislature. Those measures did not end
opposition, and the provinces rose in revolt against him. At that point, members of the Church
abandoned Iturbide. With no support, Iturbide had no other choice but to resign his “throne” on
March 19, 1823.
The advent of a civilian government represented a major change for the Catholic Church
accustomed to dealing with monarchs. Archbishop Pedro José de Fonte, in the name of the
prelates, announced in 1823 that:
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(1) With the winning of independence the Patronage which
had been conceded by the Pope to the Kings of Spain, came to
an end; (2) to exercise the Patronage, it was necessary for the
Mexican government to receive the same concession from the
Pope; and (3) in the meantime the provision of ecclesiastical
places belonged by right of devolution in each diocese to the
respective ordinary acting with the canons 33

The dispositions to establish a federalist system of government written under the
Constitution of 1824 divided politicians into two groups. Liberals favored freedom and
demanded to take power away from the Church, and Conservatives supported public order and
religion. 34
The Liberals’ ideological leader, Jose María Luis Mora demanded a government based on
the principles of republicanism and democracy organized as a federation; according to the
Liberals, the government needed to have superior strength to any other entity in the country. 35
On the Conservatives’ side, Lucas Alamán, advocated a centralist government headed by an
oligarchy, a return to a monarchy, maintenance of the traditional privileges of the well to do,
preservation of the Catholic faith, and opposition to the federalism or any system derived from
the popular vote. 36 Alamán argued that the problems in México derived from the United States
policy (established under the Monroe Doctrine which Alamán correctly defined as an instrument
to displace European influence over Latin American nations) and the struggle between the two
rites of Freemasonry, the Scottish and the York.
The Scots wanted aristocratic control of the government, while the Yorks wanted a
republican and proletarian government. 37 Behind the Yorks was the U.S. Minister in México
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Joel Roberts Poinsett. Poinsett wanted a Constitution for Mexico similar to that of the United
States. Poinsett’s efforts did not materialize in changes to the already enacted laws; the Mexican
Constitution of 1824 prevailed, and Catholicism remained as the official faith. 38
Trying to enforce equality before the law, Vice-president Valentín Gómez Farías,
appointed by Congress on April 1833 to substitute López de Santa Anna as President, made
some reforms ending the privileges of army officials and the Church. Among those measures
were secularization of the Church-missions in the Alta and Baja California, prohibition of
charging for services provided by the church, elimination of tithes, and secularization of
educational institutions. The Catholic hierarchy considered those reforms an insult and the
struggle reached a peak when members of the Army rebelled against such proceedings. 39 López
de Santa Anna the official president with license, returned to power in 1834, revoking those
reforms. It must be mentioned that López de Santa Anna occupied the presidency of México
eleven times between 1833 and 1855, accounting for a period of five years and ten months. The
reason of such disparity was that once in power, when a problem aroused López de Santa Anna
alleged illness or tiredness and asked Congress for a license, or he was overthrown by his
political rivals. He would wait in his hacienda or in exile until a group of advocates asked him to
return to power. It happened in 1834 when responding to pressures from the Church, he returned
to the presidency for a second time.
In early 1835, a new Congress, dominated by Conservatives, convened. In July, they
decided to open discussions for a new constitution. While the struggle between Liberals and
Conservatives continued in the Mexican Congress, the war with Texas exploded in 1836. López
de Santa Anna went into that war with an ill equipped army and a divided country. Texas
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achieved its independence as a consequence, and López de Santa Anna embarked on his career
as a symbol of embarrassment for the Mexicans. At the end of 1836, Congress approved a new
constitution.
Meanwhile the Catholic Church tried to adjust to the new situation. Pope Gregory XVI,
Barlolomeo Alberto Cappellari, officially recognized Mexican independence on November 29,
1836. A month later, responding to pressures from the Vatican, Spain did the same 40
From 1837 to 1854, the country engaged in a series of internal and external conflicts,
among them a war with the United States. Some members of the Church played a key role in the
conflict. Taking into account the strong influence of the Catholic Church over the Mexican
population, President James K. Polk met on May 19 and 20 of 1846, with John Hughes, Bishop
of New York, and Peter Richard Kenrick, Bishop of Missouri, to ask for their help. Polk assured
them the American government had no plans to restrict or attack Catholicism in México. The
American President also expressed his intentions to engage some Catholic priests as chaplains of
the U.S. Army. Bishop Hughes responded positively to Polk’s idea and added that he personally
knew the Archbishop of México and was willing to visit México if the U.S. Government thought
it useful. After visiting the Secretary of War, Bishop Kenrick went to inform President Polk that
the number of priests to accompany the army would be determined by the Bishop himself. Polk
agreed and expressed Kenricks’s decision would give confidence to the Mexican priests in order
to obtain their help. 41
Polk knew that spiritual matters needed some tangible support. He named Moses Y.
Beach as Confidential Agent of the United States to Mexico to take care of direct negotiations
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with the Church. The results were expressed in Beach’s report of June 4th, 1847, sent to
Secretary of State James Buchanan, in which he wrote:
…The leading Bishops were in actual treaty with General
[López de] Santa Anna when I arrived, [but] I did not hesitate
to pledge the good faith of our Government for the protection
of the Church in its freedom; … I found little difficulty in
persuading the Bishops to Puebla, Guadalupe and Michoacán,
through [the] representative the Superior of the Orders of
St. Vincent de Paul, to refuse all aid…in the prosecution of the
war. They also promised to dispose their friends in Congress
to advocate peace at the proper moment. When the
Government resolved to raise money on the Church property,
I urged them to an organized resistance…At the moment
of General Scott’s debarcation at Veracruz they made the most
important diversion in his favor by raising the civil war at the
capital, at Puebla, and in a degree at Michoacán…On the
tenth day of this rebellion, I was informed that forty thousand
dollars would be required of the clergy to carry in another
week and that it would be paid if the importance of the crisis
justified the outlay...42

The Constitution of 1857, the French, the Church, and President Juárez García
Once the War ended in 1847 and México lost half of its territory, struggles continued in
the country for another seven years. Beginning in1854, a new generation of Liberals started to
fight for reforms to separate the State from the Church. It all began when the Revolución de
Ayutla deposed López de Santa Anna from the presidency. After winning, Liberals enacted the
so called Plan de Ayutla which provided for an interim president and called for a Constitutional
Congress. Meanwhile Ignacio Comonfort Ríos was designated as interim President of México.
Then, a series of legal reforms got underway. Promoted by Benito Juárez García, then Minister
of Justice, the Ley Juárez appeared on November 23, 1855. This decree suppressed all special
courts except the military and the ecclesiastical; and these were deprived of all jurisdictions over
civil suits. Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, the Minister of Finance, sponsored the Ley Lerdo published
on June 25, 1856. According to that Ley, the Church could no longer hold more than a third of
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the total land in the country without any productive use. Ley Lerdo did not imply any restrictions
about the Church ownership of temples, convents, clerical residences, and educational and
charitable institutions.
The Catholic hierarchy, however, demanded a return to the Constitution of 1824, pointing
out that any modification would require the Papal approval. 43 On December 15, 1856, in his
Allocution Nunquam fore Pope Pius IX, Giovanni Maria Mastai Ferreti, criticized those reforms
which opposed the authority of the Holy See and demanded that they be declared null and void.
In spite of those opinions, Congress enacted a new Constitution on February 5, 1857. 44 It
established the separation of the State and the Church, ended the Catholicism’s status as the
official creed, and allowed government to define the rules for religious worship.
Another law, supported by José María Iglesias and known as Ley Iglesias, was enacted on
April 11, 1857. It limited the fees for the performance of ecclesiastical services and prohibited
government coercion in the collection of parochial subventions. 45
With the election of the acting president, Ignacio Comonfort to the presidency, a major
problem arose. He considered impossible to govern México, because those measures limiting
the power of the Church ran against popular opinion. He also objected to the power invested in
Congress which, according to him, bypassed the authority of the president.
On May 1857, Comonfort sent Ezequiel Montes, the Minister of Justice, to negotiate an
agreement with the Holy See. In July, the Papal Minister of State told Montes that the Pope
agreed to the measures imposed under the Ley Juárez and Ley Lerdo, and demanded the
restoration of the rights for the Church to acquire property as well as the political rights of
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priests. The talks continued until December, when an internal revolt in Mexico led to the
overthrow of Comonfort on January 11, 1858.
As a consequence, two governments claimed to rule the country. One was headed by the
Conservative Felix María Zuloaga, and another was under the leadership of the legal Vicepresident, Benito Juárez García, who demanded his place as a substitute president according to
the laws of succession. The Three Years War broke out in 1858 and ended in January 1861 after
the Liberal Army defeated the Conservatives.
The cause of that conflict was the enactment by President Juárez of the so called Leyes
de Reforma. These laws established separation of Church and State, creation of the Civil
Register, recognition of marriage as a civil contract, concealment of the intervention of the
clergy in the management of cemeteries, suppression of convents, extinction of all religious
congregations, nationalization of Church property, protection of the law for all religious beliefs
on a plane of perfect equality, prohibition of public officials participating in acts of religion. The
Catholic hierarchy considered these measures in violation of the principle of the Church’s
superiority over any other institution. On December 8, 1864, Pope Pius IX condemned those
measures in his encyclical, Syllabus of Modern Errors. 46
Conservatives realized they did not have a strong figure to oppose Juarez García. They
turned to Europe for an alternative. In 1862, a group of them went to Europe looking for a
foreign monarch who could come to México to reign and establish a government strong enough
to oppose Juárez. They found one in Maximilian of Habsburg, a member of the family of Carlos
V, who reigned in Spain during the conquest in 1521. The Conservatives signed an agreement
with Napoleon III to create a French-backed monarchy in México. This would provide French
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backing to stop American territorial expansionism. According to the agreement, “Maximilian
would have [French] military support until the new Mexican Empire became stable; …it
assumed [because of the Pope’s approval of the scheme] that he would restore the Church the
properties taken under the Mexican Reform”. 47 The Conservatives believed the future belonged
to them.
Maximilian arrived in Mexico City on June 12, 1864. The same day, the Archbishops of
México and Michoacán and the Bishops of Puebla, Oaxaca, Caradro, Querétaro, Zamora,
Tulancingo, Chiapas, Veracruz, and Chilapa published a Pastoral Letter. The bishops demanded
the recognition of Catholicism as the only faith and the restoration of all the prerogatives which
in the past the Church enjoyed. 48 They did not know that Maximilian, a liberal himself, “had
decided to govern against the conservatives and the Church” 49 It took six months before
Maximilian met with the Papal Nuncio, Monsignor Pietro Francesco Meglia.
Maximilian believed that the best way to deal with the Church was through a Concordat,
and had already sent a letter to Pope Pius IX. Maximilian thought that the Concordat would
allow the revival of the Royal Patronage. It would permit the participation of the State in the
internal life of religious order. The priests would get a salary from the government, take care of
the civil register and could be subject to civil tribunals. The Concordat would eliminate tithes
and prohibit the Church from buying or selling properties. It would establish the prevalence of
religious freedom and consequently the cemeteries owned by the Church could be used by
members of other religions. 50 The Catholic hierarchy, however, rejected that plan and worked
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with a group of Conservatives to defeat Maximilian’s proposal. In early September of 1865,
Maximilian received a letter from Rome in which the Pope rejected the Concordat and any
suggestion diminishing the clerical prerogatives.
Maximilian found himself in a weak position when the French Army started leaving the
country. The French government tired of the high cost for supporting the French Army in
México. The American Civil War had ended, and the U.S. Government could help the Mexican
Liberals to get rid of the invaders. The U.S. Government did not grant diplomatic recognition to
Maximilian. Members of the Church turned increasingly against Maximilian. In addition, the
Liberal Army, under the direction of President Juárez García, increased in strength. Maximilian
had no other choice but to return to his alliance with the Conservatives. He found himself
without supporters, because the Church no longer supported him and the Conservatives did not
trust him. This ultimately led to his defeat and execution in 1867.
Once Juárez returned to México City, in 1867, he had so many problems to solve in order
to organize the country that he preferred to adopt a more relaxed position toward religion. Juárez
kept Holy Week and the commemoration of the Virgin of Guadalupe as official celebrations. As
a citizen, he accompanied his wife to mass every Sunday. From 1867 to 1872, “the Catholics,
and the Church, enjoyed a state of benevolence derived from the government’s support to
religious tolerance” 51 This situation, however, did not prevail for long.
Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada, who succeeded Juarez upon the latter’s death in 1872, made a
shift in the conciliatory policy. He implemented a series of legal measures, such as the Ley
Orgánica de la Reforma, by which the Leyes de Reforma became part of the Mexican
Constitution. Also, the President ordered the expulsion from Mexico of the Jesuits as well as
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the Sisters of St. Vincent de Paul. As a consequence, the Archbishops of México, Michoacán,
and Guadalajara wrote a Pastoral Letter pointing out the errors of the Law. They instructed
Catholics how to resist against the authorities. As a result, an important segment of the
population, and unofficially the members of the Church, gave strong support to the political
revolt headed by Porfirio Díaz Mori under the Plan de Tuxtepec. Díaz won the elections in
December of 1876 and became President of Mexico.

Under the Dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz Mori
Díaz Mori believed that the only way to modernize the country would be through the
participation of foreigners in the economy, especially in industry, communications, and the oil
industry. Initially, the foreign capital came through American investments, mainly in railroads
and oil production. This trend gradually shifted as investments from Europe, especially from
England, France, and Germany, started to compete with American capital. Personally, Díaz
Mori, who as the general in chief of the Liberal Army defeated the Imperial forces nine times,
became an advocate of the French way of life. He tried to reduce the influence of the United
States, something he found hard to do, considering the geographical position of México. At the
same time, a group close to Díaz Mori, the so called Los Científicos garnered most of the wealth
and political power. Conscious of that economic disparity, Díaz Mori tried to consolidate his
alliance with the Catholic Church from the first’s days of his ascension to power.
On January 15, 1877, Díaz Mori announced a more conciliatory policy toward religion.
As a consequence, Pope Leon XIII, Gioacchino VincenzoRaffaele Luigi Pecci, sent a letter to the
Mexican Government. The Pope regretted the interruption of amicable relations between
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México and the Holy See, and asked for a correction of the Liberal’s past mistakes. 52 The
Mexican government did not provide an official answer, but the Catholic Church and the
Mexican government developed a modus vivendi which allowed each to work without interfering
with the activities of the other.
Two events would represent a shift in the relation between the Church and the Mexican
State. One happened when, previous to his fourth election in 1892, Díaz submitted to Congress a
proposal for reforms in the constitution. He asked Congress to consider unlimited reelection for
the presidency. Dominated by Diaz’s advocates, Congress had no objection. The other factor
was the development of social Catholicism established under the encyclical Rerum Novarum,
which Pope Leo XIII published in May 15, 1891. 53 In it the Pope supported the rights of labor
unions but rejected socialism and affirmed private property.
Those incidents marked the beginning of an open participation by the Church in political
and social issues. In Mexican politics, two Catholic newspapers, La Voz de México and El País,
supported Díaz’s reelection. These papers also published some criticism of the local
governments. The Church also questioned the power gained by Los Científicos, many of whom
got their wealth by the acquisition of properties formerly belonging to the Church. On social
issues, between 1903 and 1909, the Church organized four National Catholic Congresses in
which the main topics were the creation of the Raiffeiseissen Banks to finance small business, the
Indians’ problems, activities of social a character, and measures to provide employment as well
as to create unions for Catholic workers. 54
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During those years, a French Jesuit, Bernard Bergoend, responded to a request from a
group of Catholics from Guadalajara. He developed a project for the creation of a socio-political
Catholic organization which would work to fight against poverty and injustice. Catholics
considered that political action would be the only way to reverse such conditions. 55 The
Catholic hierarchy, however, decided to wait for a while to join the political arena openly. After
all “thanks to la política de reconciliación, it is estimated that between 1874 and 1910, the value
of the ecclesiastical property increased from 50 million pesos to double that amount” 56 In
addition to that economic power, an estimated 99% of a total population of 15 million was
considered Catholic.
The Church unofficially supported Díaz against the challenger Francisco I. Madero
González during the 1910 presidential elections. Catholics, however, began to reconsider their
support for Díaz as soon as problems derived from the elections started to arouse.

From the Start of the Mexican Revolution in 1910 to the Constitution of 1917
The clergy, however, had some doubts about Madero González. Madero issued his
positions on the Plan de San Luis, which formed the basis of his political program against Díaz
Mori in 1910. In it, he put forward agrarian reform and educational issues. The clergy
considered them socialistic. Further, agrarian reform would affect the holdings which had been
acquired or retained clandestinely by the Church. Educational reform caused the clergy to fear
for the educational facilities they had established during the years before. Considering that,
Catholics decided to participate openly in politics.
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Madero González protested his questionable defeat in the 1910 elections, and Díaz Mori
ordered his imprisonment. Once released, Madero González went to San Antonio Texas where
he and his followers planned to start an armed movement to overthrown Díaz’s government.
Denouncing the misery to which the government had brought the people and asking for
democracy, Madero González and his advocates began the Mexican Revolution on November
20, 1910. With the Mexican Revolution already under way, the National Catholic Party (PCN)
became a reality on May 3, 1911, just eight days before Díaz Mori resigned the presidency. Díaz
resigned because popular discontent increased to such levels that Díaz thought the only way to
stop the rebellion would be through his withdrawal. The PCN’s main goal was to find solutions
that conformed to Christianity for the agricultural, industrial and labor problems. The Party
advocated freedom of teaching, free suffrage, single terms for elected officials at all levels, and
life term for the elected judiciary. 57
After Díaz Mori departure, the interim president Francisco León de la Barra called
elections. Madero became the presidential candidate under the flag of the Progressive
Constitutional Party. Putting aside its reservation about Madero and acting pragmatically, the
Catholic Party recommended that Madero consider adding in his ballot León de la Barra as a
candidate for the Vice-presidency. Madero rejected the proposal. The PCN nonetheless on
August 18, 1911, endorsed Madero’s candidacy for the presidency. Madero accepted the Party’s
support, promised to respect the rights and liberties of the Catholics. At the same time, he said
that he would not interfere with specific functions of the Legislative branch.
Madero won a sweeping victory in the elections of October 1911. Before long,
however, members of the PCN became disillusioned and started to attack Madero. Catholics
were afraid about the future due to the way Madero handled political problems. On July 11,
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1911, the US Ambassador to México Henry Lane Wilson wrote to Secretary of State
Philander Chase Knox: “the Roman Catholic Church and the party which takes its name have
become violently antagonistic to Madero and are busily engaged throughout the Republic in
aspersing his motives, decrying his policies, and censuring the weakness and vacillation
which is supposed to characterize his direction of affairs”. 58 In spite of that, Madero avoided
enacting measures against religious freedom or suppressing participation of Catholics in
politics.
Madero called federal elections in 1912 which produced unexpected results. The
candidates under the flag of the PCN won the governorship in the States of México, Querétaro,
Jalisco, and Zacatecas; 29 of its members were elected to the XXVI Legislature and, four to the
Senate. The PCN also controlled the mayor’s office in the capital of several states around the
country. Those results contradicted Henry Lane Wilson’s assertion that: “the so-called Catholic
Party [was] a nebulous political organization, apparently without direction, and not wholly
submissive to leadership…the Roman Catholic Church as a political organization [did] not exist
in Mexico” 59 Future events provided further proof that Wilson’s statement had nothing to do
with reality.
Although Madero González did not show any signs of anti-Catholicism, the Church
concluded that the right time had arrived for a return to the old times. When Victoriano Huerta
overthrew and assassinated President Madero, on February 1913, not a single editorial in the
Catholic newspapers criticized the coup, arguing that to do so would be to throw fuel on the
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flames. Some members of the National Catholic Party, among them [León] De la Barra and
Federico Gamboa, became Ministers in Huerta’s government. 60
Some historians have stated that the silence of the Catholic papers derived from a loan
submitted by the Church to Huerta. Alfonso Toro wrote it was for 10 million pesos. 61 Robert E.
Quirk, taking as his source the Catholic newspapers, affirmed the loan was for 25,000 pesos. 62
Others like Francis C. Kelley did not agree with that assertion. He argued that not only did the
Mexican clergy give no support of any kind whatever to Huerta, but that he censored the
Catholic Party organ, arrested its editor, and drove the party leader from the country. 63
A rebellion against Huerta’s coup d’état developed under the leadership of Venustiano
Carranza Garza, Governor of the State of Coahuila. The Catholic hierarchy took Huerta’s side.
The prelates published a pastoral letter condemning those rebelling against the “legitimate
government” and preventing Catholics from participating in such rebellion. Consequently the
revolutionaries considered the Catholic priests as their enemies.
Huerta had the sympathy and support of Henry Lane Wilson, who considered him “a
devoted Roman Catholic, a believer in the Diaz régime and policies…and a sincere patriot.” 64
President Woodrow Wilson, however, did not share that opinion. His administration never
extended diplomatic recognition to Huerta’s government. Wilson even sent American troops to
invade the city of Veracruz, on the East Coast of México, but the results were not as expected.
The intervention aroused Mexican nationalism, and Huerta gained support among the population.
President Wilson finally decided to withdraw the troops and supported Carranza Garza in his
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efforts to get rid of Huerta. The Constitutional Army defeated Huerta and expelled him from the
presidency in July 1914.
Meanwhile, the Archbishops of Guadalajara and Monterrey, had sent on June 26, a
message to Cardozo de Oliveira, head of the Brazilian Delegation in México. They asked for
protection in case the revolutionaries headed by Carranza entered Mexico City. They also
solicited Oliveira to request that the American Government intercede on their behalf to assure
that the revolutionaries afforded them full protection in their persons and property. 65 On June
30, Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan cabled the Brazilian Minister to Mexico:
“Department will be pleased to have you furnish shelter to Bishops if in your opinion such action
is necessary to preserve their lives. It has also been pleased to instruct American Consul
General, Monterey, to request Constitutionalist Chief [Carranza Garza] to afford full protection
to persons and properties of Bishops.” 66 Nevertheless, the Mexican authorities arrested one
hundred priests and jailed them on July 21, 1914, although the priests were liberated without any
charges. In early August, the Minister of the Interior, Manuel Aguirre Berlanga met with all
foreign priests in México, notifying them that they must leave the country within five days. 67
Expelled with them were a number of Mexican priests and members of the Catholic hierarchy.
Most of these exiled Mexican priests went to the U.S. looking for support from the
American Catholic hierarchy. On August 18, 1914, Cardinal James Gibbons of Baltimore sent a
letter to President Wilson, in which he pointed out that, in spite of his efforts to calm the feelings
of the Catholics in México, he almost daily received letters from Mexico complaining of the
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bitter persecution of the Church by the Constitutionalists. After mentioning how the priests were
unable to return to their cities because of that persecution, Gibbons said: “I feel quite sure that
just one word from you to the Constitutionalist leaders would have a great effect and would
relieve the sad condition of affairs. I would be exceedingly grateful to you if you would let me
know if something could not be done in this matter” 68 President Wilson answered, on August
21, saying it was not true that a word from him could change revolutionaries’ behavior. Wilson
thought that it would be necessary to wait until passions in México subsided. 69
The struggle between members of the Constitutional Army and the Church continued.
The Catholic Church attempted to generate support in the U.S. by sending several documents to
American priests, who published them. Those actions represented an antecedent of what would
come a few years later during the Cristero revolt.
Carranza Garza continued implementing a series of measures to limit the Church’s
activities. First, he issued a decree enforcing the Reform Laws on December 12, 1914. Second,
the Laws for Divorce appeared on December 25, 1914, and, third, an amendment to the Civil
Code allowing total divorce came out on January 29, 1915. These measures constituted the first
steps in a long series of changes. At the end of 1916, now in power, the revolutionaries called a
Constitutional Congress in order to write and enact a new Federal Constitution.
A new Constitution was enacted on February 5, 1917. It set new guidelines for relations
between the Church and the State under articles 3, 5, 20, 24, 27 and 130. Article 3 provided for
free education without religious content. Article 5 prohibited monastic orders and monastic
vows. Article 24 declared that everyone was free to embrace the religion of his choice. Every
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religious act of public worship, however, must take place inside Church buildings, which always
would be under the supervision of the federal government. Article 27 decreed that all real estate,
buildings, and temples previously owned by the Churches belonged to the Mexican State It
also forbade religious corporations or institutions, or their ministers or their dependents, to
supervise, direct, or administrate private or public charitable institutions. Article 130 banned
Congress from enacting laws establishing or prohibiting religions and denied juridical
personality to religious institutions. In addition, it provided that priests be considered as any
other professional. The number of priests in each locality would be determined by the respective
State governments. Further, only Mexicans by birth could perform the duties of priests, and
priests were forbidden to participate in politics. Finally, article 130 requested a special permit
from the government in order to open a new temple.
On February 27, 1917, the Mexican Episcopate published a document condemning the
new law. According to it, the Church denied participating in the coup d’état against Madero or
providing support to Huerta’s government, and expressed opposition to the measures enacted
related to religion. Additionally, in April, the Episcopate issued a message to the clerics
reminding them of the guidelines of the Latin-American Plenary Council that recommended
parents avoid sending their children to non-Catholic schools. 70
Other voices also expressed their disagreement with the Mexican Constitution. After
returning from exile, the Archbishop of Guadalajara, Francisco Orozco Jiménez published a
Pastoral Letter on June 4, 1917. In it, he criticized those measures related to religion written in
the constitution, emphasizing, that the revolutionaries had as their goal the enslavement of the
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Church and its members. 71 On June 15, Pope Benedict XV, Giacomo Della Chiesa, sent a letter
to the Mexican Archbishops and Bishops expressing his sympathy with the document they
published on February 27. The Pope criticized the Constitution and encouraged them to continue
to defend Catholicism against all such dispositions. 72
American Catholics responded to the Pope’s call. An assembly of the American
Federation of Catholic Societies in Kansas City adopted a resolution in 1917 condemning the
Mexican Constitution. The American bishops meeting in Washington drew up a similar letter of
protest and considered first sending it to President Wilson, but they did do not so because
Cardinal Gibbons figured that the president was more focused on war in Europe. 73 In the end,
American priests silenced their voices because they did not find enough support among
American public opinion. “Americans looked to Europe and their men in battle, to personal
casualties and deaths, and what had once been so important in México no longer seemed to
matter.” 74 The initial protests, however, had some impact south of the border.
Acting as a pragmatic politician, President Carranza Garza took into account internal and
external opposition and delayed the full implementation of those dispositions relating to the
Church. Tensions between the state and the Church nonetheless continued to increase. The
Church never abandoned its battle to return to a situation similar to that before the enactment of
the Constitution of 1857. In Jalisco, Archbishop Orozco Jiménez continued working to build a
solid opposition to the Mexican government that would explode years later in an armed
rebellion.
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Once President Carranza’s term came to an end, in 1919, he tried to continue exercising
power by imposing a successor. He considered Ignacio Bonilla, the Mexican Ambassador to
Washington, as the best suited for that mission. As soon as Carranza Garza provided some hints
about Bonilla’s candidacy, Álvaro Obregón Salido - the architect of Carranza’s military success expressed his opposition. Obregón Salido, together with Governor of the State of Sonora Adolfo
de la Huerta Marcor, and Secretary of Labor under Carranza’s regime, Plutarco Elías Calles,
openly rebelled against their former leader and issued the Plan de Agua Prieta on April 23, 1920.
The excuse was a dispute between the Central Government and the State of Sonora over the
water rights of the Río Sonora; the Plan declared that Carranza no longer held the Mexican
Presidency.
With Obregón Salido taking leadership of the rebellion, things did not look very
promising for Carranza Garza, who fled to Veracruz where he planned to establish his
government. Carranza Garza was killed by enemy forces while traveling on May 18, 1920. Six
days later, Congress appointed De la Huerta Marcor as an interim president. De la Huerta called
elections on September 1, 1920, and Obregón obtained the victory.
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Chapter Two
RELIGION AND DIPLOMACY: ONE STEP AT A TIME
When Obregón Salido ascended to power on December 1, 1920, he faced two difficult
issues. One was the desire of the Catholic Church to return to the old times of privileges and
political power. Another was the refusal of the U.S. government to grant diplomatic recognition
to his government unless Obregón guaranteed respect for American properties and investments
in México.
From the beginning of his term, President Obregón Salido publicly denied any
permission to organize religious events outside the churches. On January 1922, the League for
the Defense of Religion Liberty, with the support of the Apostolic Delegate Monsignor Ernesto
Filippi, disobeyed that disposition by organizing to erect a monument to King Christ in the
Cubilete Hill, located in the central State of Guanajuato. In what represented an open challenge
to the Mexican laws, the official inauguration of the monument took place on January 11 with a
great participation of Catholic believers. The Mexican government responded by ordering
Monsignor Filippi expelled from the country. The statue was erected anyway and became a
symbol for the Catholics. Relations between the Church and State, from then on, became very
tense.
President Obregón Salido refrained from imposing harsh measures against the Church,
other than those already mentioned, because his government faced a weak position
internationally. He chose not to engage in an open battle against two powerful international
entities, one with superior economic and military strength and the other with the support of the
Pope as well as influence over the consciences of the majority of the Mexican population.
Consolidating his government required taking one step at a time.
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Obregón’s Struggle for Diplomatic Recognition
The American Government refused to recognize Obregón’s government because of a
dispute about the retroactivity of Article 27 of the Constitution related to property rights on
subsoil affecting the oil industry and agrarian matters. Even when “Article 14 specifically stated
that the provisions of the Constitution were not retroactive,” 75 Article 27 authorized the
Executive to review all contracts and concessions on natural resources, waters and lands issued
by former governments since 1876. President Warren Gamaliel Harding approved a proposal
prepared by the U.S. Department of State which he submitted to President Obregón on May 27,
1921 through George Thomas Summerlin, U.S. chargé d’ affaires in México. The proposal
offered diplomatic recognition to President Obregón’s government if he agreed to sign a treaty
that guaranteed American property rights in México acquired before May 1, 1917. It also
restored to American citizens or private enterprises the rights or interests of which they may have
been deprived in Mexico without compensation since January 1, 1910, and demanded
compensation for damages to those properties. 76
President Obregón Salido responded by writing a personal and informal letter to
President Harding, which he sent through Elmer Dover, a mutual friend, on June 11, 1921. In it,
Obregón asked Harding why he demanded a treaty to assure that México would fulfill its
international obligations before extending diplomatic recognition to the Mexican government.
Obregón argued that
nevertheless, the non-retroactive and non-confiscatory
reglementation [sic] of Article 27 of the Constitution is
something which is in the political atmosphere of Mexico.
Apart from the political guarantees which the Constitution
75
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gives to these principles, the agreement of the executive and
legislative powers with respect thereto, has been already
shown in diverse forms and occasions, and there is no reason
for believing that the judicial power will adopt different views.
With respect to the damages caused by our internal war, the
Executive has prepared a law, soon to be promulgated,
which will establish as a fact a mixed claims commission, just
as effective in its operation as if it originated in an
international treaty. With respect to the service of the debt,
there are two convincing proofs of the good disposition of
Mexico… the invitation extended to the international
committee of bankers, presided over by Mr. Lamont, and the
banking house of Speyer (that an arrangement has still to be
made is because of their fault in not having accepted it), and
the recent decree laying additional export taxes on petroleum,
precisely with a view to the payment of the debt. 77

For Obregón “it [was] unnecessary to demand of Mexico the signature of a treaty upon
matters already settled in a spontaneous manner, and which [he] as President [could not] enter
into because the law [did] not permit [him]… to conclude treaties contrary to the laws of [his]
country.” 78
President Harding replied to President Obregón, on July 21, 1921. After assuring
Obregón that he wanted to reestablish relations between U.S. and México, Harding offered the
reasons why the U.S. government did not extend diplomatic recognition to Obregón’s
government. Harding argued that U.S.-México relations during the last decade had been far
from satisfactory, and “the U.S. Government felt that its duty to its citizens demanded a more
definitive understanding as to the intention of the regime which succeeded it with regard to the
protection of the interests of American citizens in Mexico” 79 At the end, President Harding
stated that if México signed that treaty, the U.S. would immediately give diplomatic recognition.

77

United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1921 Volume II
“General Obregón to President Harding” [Translation] June 11, 1921, File 812.00/26059 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1936), 418.
78
Ibid., 418.
79
United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1921 Volume II
“The Under Secretary of State (Fletcher) to the Chargé in Mexico Summerlin [Enclosure] President Harding to
General Obregón,” July 21, 1921, File 812.00/251141/2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1936), 420.

48

On June 16, before receiving Harding’s answer, the Mexican President had already
enacted a decree imposing an additional tax on petroleum exports. The American oil companies
operating in México openly protested to the Mexican Ministry of Finance. They awaited a final
decision from the Mexican Supreme Court related to the judicial inquiry presented by The Texas
Oil Company appealing the retroactivity of Article 27.
After analyzing the treaty, President Obregón declared during his first Address to
Congress on September 1, 1921, that the three main issues concerning the rights of foreigners in
México were the resumption of payments on the public foreign debt, a fair resolution through
Mixed Claim Commissions to cover the payments of such damages resulting from the
revolutionary movement, and an interpretation of the non-retroactivity of Article 27. Obregón
said that a program implemented by the Mexican government had resolved all of these issues.
Therefore, referring to the treaty proposed by the U.S. government, Obregón alleged it was
unnecessary to include those conditions in a treaty. Further, he maintained that to do so would
demean México because diplomatic relations were suspended and a treaty under such conditions
would imply that the Mexican government needed to be coerced into such actions. To the
contrary, Obregón pointed out the Mexican Supreme Court had reached a decision denying the
retroactivity of Article 27. 80 Obregón, however, did not mention his unofficial contacts with
President Harding looking for an agreement. Obregón liked to play -international politics behind
close doors o through third party involvements, a procedure which is described in following
pages.
Obregón also failed to mention that a decline in the oil production during 1921 had
affected the government revenues resulting in “estimates of funds required by the Mexican
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government ranged anywhere from $50, 000,000 to $100, 000, 000.” 81 As a result of the
decline in oil production, on August 18, the President of the Standard Oil and Chairman of the
Oil Executives Committee, Walter Clark Teagle, informed U.S. Secretary of State Charles Evans
Hughes of the intention of the Committee to visit México in order to get an agreement with
Mexican authorities about the tax levied on oil. 82 He mentioned the possibility that the Mexican
government would ask a group of oil men for a loan. Hughes answered that, according to his
understanding, “the Department understand from Mr. Lamont [Thomas William Lamont,
chairman of the International Committee of Bankers on México] the matter [of the loan] had
already been discussed between your Committee and the bankers interested, and [the
Department] is inclined to agree with the suggestion that negotiations for a loan, if undertaken,
should be entirely independent of your negotiations with respect to taxation.” 83 With that
recommendation in mind, the representatives of five oil companies went to México and engaged
in negotiations with the Minister of Finance, Adolfo de la Huerta Marcor.
On September 3, an agreement was reached. According to its terms, the oil companies
agreed to pay the Mexican government the production taxes, Mexican authorities ended the
embargos pending against the oil companies which will agreed to dismiss their amparo 84
proceedings against officials of the Mexican government. Not mentioned in the text was the
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issuing of bonds by the Mexican government in order to pay sixty percent of the exportation
imposts. 85
The initial optimism about the agreement would not last long; during the month of
December, Mexican bonds found no buyers in the market. In the meantime, several events took
place leading to future accords immediately and during the next year. Obregón’s words about
the Supreme Court’s decision became a reality on September 26 when a final decision, related to
the inquiry presented by the Texas Oil Company, was reached. It struck down retroactivity but
the decision appear[ed] to confirm the validity of the
Executive Decrees of July 31, August 8th and 12th, 1918,
establishing certain taxes and prescribing certain rules for the
exploitation of petroleum, by virtue of the extraordinary
powers in financial matters conferred on the Executive by the
Congress; and states that the fourth paragraph of Article
XXVII of the Constitution, in so far as it relates to petroleum
and all hydro-carbons, solid, liquid or gaseous, is not
retroactive as regards rights legitimately acquired prior to
May 1, 1917. 86

One step had been taken but the point of destination was far away.

Financial Matters: De la Huerta-Lamont Agreement
Lamont visited México on October to discuss with De la Huerta Marcor “the restoration
of Mexico’s credit and the resumption of payments on the debt. The meetings resulted in a
failure because Lamont refused to participate in the so-called bond purchase plan and De la
Huerta considered the plan presented by Lamont for the restoration of Mexico’s credit and the
resumptions of payments on the debt, too onerous and too humiliating. ” 87 In spite of that,
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during the next year and a half, members of both governments continued working in search of a
solution. The U.S. government asked for the signing of a treaty and the creation of a mixed
claim commission, but the Mexican government rejected both propositions.
In January 1922, negotiations between the bankers and the Mexican authorities resumed.
During the next five months, different proposals came under scrutiny from both sides. The
bankers doubted the ability of the Mexican government to support the bonds in the open market,
and the Mexican authorities continued to ask the banks for a loan. At the same time, the
Mexican authorities assured potential buyers that the country was able to pay the premium to
holders of Mexican securities. At the end of May, De la Huerta Marcor traveled to New York to
meet the members of the International Committee of Bankers on México. Conferences lasted
from June 2 to 16, resulting with the signing of the De la Huerta –Lamont Agreement, in which
the Mexican government recognized an external debt over $500,000,000. The Mexican
government also recognized interest arrearages of $280,000,000, but all interest accruing was
canceled. Repayment of the adjusted debt would begin in 1928, with payments spread over forty
years. Payments of current interest, for the period from 1923 to 1928, would also begin in the
latter year, part in cash and part in 3 percent government scrip. Up to this point, the agreement
looked like a good financial deal, but there was something else. As a guarantee of payment, the
government agreed to turn over to the International Committee of Bankers for a five year period
all export taxes on petroleum, the net earnings of the National railways, and all the proceeds of a
tax of 10 per cent on the gross receipts of the railways. México also agreed to return the
National Railways of México to private ownership. 88 The Agreement represented a
questionable short term solution because of the heavy burden imposed on government finances
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while transferring problems to future administrations. The agreement had nothing to do with
achieving nationalistic victories as De la Huerta’s supporters tried to claim. It represented an
example of how Obregón played politics in order to obtain diplomatic recognition for his
government.

The General Claims Convention or Bucareli Agreements and the Diplomatic Recognition
During the following months, the Mexican Foreign Minister, Alberto J. Pani and Hughes
continued exchanging informal notes and proposals through George Thomas Summerlin. They
searched for a settlement that allowed both parties to start formal negotiations to end the dispute.
Those negotiations, however, constituted just part of the picture. Back-channels
negotiations continued. For example, on March 7, 1923, Secretary Hughes sent a telegram to
Summerlin. Hughes mentioned that on February 27, General James A. Ryan, the representative
of the Texas Oil Company in México, had informed him President Obregón Salido “would be
pleased to see the problems between the United States and Mexico discussed by a commission to
be made up of representatives of the two countries.” 89 In the same telegram Hughes stated that
“at a subsequent meeting, on March 5, he mentioned to General Ryan that President Harding was
favorably disposed towards the suggestion, and …ready to name two representatives of the
United States to confer with two representatives of Mexico for the purpose of discussing the
questions now existing between the two nations.” 90 Hughes instructed Summerlin to continue
the negotiations with the Mexican government, which Summerlin did. Coincidently enough, on
March 9, The New York Times reported that Senator William Edgar Borah, Republican of Idaho,
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had announced his formal support for the diplomatic recognition of the Mexican government. 91
Later Summerlin received a letter from Pani in which the Mexican Minister expressed his
satisfaction with the change of procedure presented by the American government. After that
Pani engaged in a long analysis of each point contained in the agreement reached on September
3, 1921 by De la Huerta Marcor and the representatives of the oil companies. Pani explained
what the Mexican government had done during this period, and offered some proposals relating
to those matters pending. 92
What General Ryan told Secretary Hughes provided an example of how President
Obregón Salido played his cards. In one way, he used personal and informal routes, which did
not necessarily mean a formal proposal but offered enough for a third party to take into official
circles in the US. In this case, the results came out with an unofficial answer setting the basis
for continuing the negotiations. Once Obregón Salido knew about the results of his informal
suggestions, he tried to appear as the one replying to a proposition. President Obregón Salido
sent a letter to General Ryan on April 9, 1923. It read: “considering your proposal that both
governments [México and the U.S.] named representatives to discuss about the differences, once
I analyzed that, and taking into account President Harding accepted your suggestion, my
government agreed to appoint two representatives, expecting the President of the United States to
do the same in order to start talks to end our differences.” 93 Obregón Salido suggested that the
conference take place in México City.
Thus, the Mexican and American governments finally agreed to work together in search
of a solution. The Mexican government selected Ramon Ross and Fernando González Roa,
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while the American government appointed Charles Beecher Warren and John Barton Payne as
their respective representatives to what in the U.S. became known as the General Claims
Convention and in México as the Bucareli Agreements. The negotiations started on May 14,
1923, ending three months and a day later. The content of this agreement established rules to
cover claims on both countries developed during recent years, abrogated the retroactivity of
Article 27, and set the basis for future understanding between the countries.
After that, Obregón’s government got diplomatic recognition from the U.S. On August
31, The State Department formally recognized Obregón’s Government. 94 The next day, during
the opening ceremony of the Thirtieth Congress, President Obregón announced the resumption
of diplomatic relations with the U.S. 95
Following those events, Adolfo de la Huerta Marcor resigned his post as Minister of
Finances over his disagreement with the way the president had solved political conflicts in the
States of San Luis Potosí and Nuevo León. 96 In the former, the presidents asked the Federal
Senate to disolve state’s powers and avoid recognizing the victory of either of the two candidates
for governorship. One of the candidates was Jorge Prieto Laurens an important leader of the
Cooperative National Party (PNC), the party which later supported De la Huerta’s candidacy for
the presidency. 97 In the case of Nuevo León, a dispute arose between the candidates for
governorship, one of whom was Aaron Saenz. An interim governor was appointed in both cases
ending the conflict. De la Huerta considered those actions a flagrant violation of the dispositions
established under the Mexican Constitution. In his Memoirs, written in 1958, De la Huerta
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Marcor explained that he resigned because of his discrepancies with the content of the Bucareli
Agreements.
After De la Huerta left his post, Obregón named Alberto J. Pani as Minister of Finance.
Pani found Mexican finances on the verge of exhaustion. On October 16, the government
announced that the deficit had reached an amount of 90 million pesos, and there was no source to
cover it. In the same statement, the Mexican government recognized that the revenues coming
from the oil taxes already compromised under the De la Huerta - Lamont Agreement, had been
diverted for other purposes. The country faced a financial default.98
On December 19, the Bucareli Agreements went into the Mexican Senate for their
approval. Some Senators, among them Francisco Field Jurado, considered the Agreements
meant a surrender of national sovereignty. It contravened the prevailing Agrarian Law
establishing that for similar cases the payments must be done in parts and not in a single
exhibition as the Bucareli Agreements stated in the case of properties belonging to foreigners.
The disagreements reached such level of bitterness that Field Jurado, was assassinated. Finally,
in January 1924, the Mexican Senate approved the Bucareli Agreements by a vote of 28 in favor
and 14 against. At the same time, the U.S. Senate advised ratification of the General Claims
Convention, something that President Coolidge did on February 4. After ratifications were
exchanged in México City, the Agreements were proclaimed on February 23, 1924. The
agreements represented another step toward the consolidation of Obregón’s government. He had
also, however, to subdue an internal rebellion already under way.
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De la Huerta Revolution
At the moment of the presidential succession, Alvaro Obregón Salido sponsored Plutarco
Elías Calles as the candidate. Adolfo de la Huerta Marcor disagreed with that decision and
stated that Obregón “turning himself into the political leader of [Elías] Calles’ unpopular
candidacy with the idea of assuring for himself later on a re-election.” 99 Putting aside past
alliances with Obregón and Elías Calles, De la Huerta concluded that, if he wanted political
power, the only route available was to take the arms against the Mexican government. De la
Huerta knew that the political machine was controlled by his former allies, and it would be
impossible to defeat them in the election. On October 18, 1923, De la Huerta announced his
candidacy for the presidency of México under the flag of the National Cooperative Party. On
October 29, in a press conference, he denied all charges accusing him of mismanagement of the
treasury funds; he dismissed them as part of the political campaign against his candidacy. De la
Huerta repeatedly attacked his successor, but he never provided statistical data supporting his
performance as Minister of Finances. 100
On December 6, 1923, with the support of almost thirty thousand men, De la Huerta and
his followers started the so called Delahuertista Revolution. The political principles of the
revolt appeared in the Plan de Veracruz; according to it, Obregón did not respect the popular
sovereignty of the states or the independence of legislative power, leaving no other choice but to
take the arms and overthrown his government to impose the return to democracy. In his
proclamation, De la Huerta never mentioned anything related to the Bucareli Agreements as a
point of disagreement with the Mexican president.
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Once the rebellion started, the U.S. government supported the legally recognized
government of Obregón. The U.S. denied the rebels the sale of weapons and ammunitions. In
addition, the Secretary of State, on December 29, sent a telegram to George T. Summerlin
announcing that
the Department has today given following statement to the
press: the Mexican Government has presented a request to
this Government to sell it a limited quantity of war material.
This Government has expressed its willingness to make the
sale, in view of the relations between this Government and
the Mexican Government, which was formally, recognized
last September, and of the importance of the maintenance of
stability and orderly constitutional procedure in the
neighboring Republic. 101

As soon as the note was published, the members of the rebellion in México protested.
Without any legal support, the rebels had constituted a fictitious government and even named
representatives abroad. One of them, Enrique Seldner, called himself the General Consul of the
Provisional Government of Mexico in New York. He claimed to be in charge of the interests of
that Government in the United States. He sent a note to the Secretary of State, protesting the sale
of weapons to Obregón’s government. Seldner argued that the rebels already exercised
dominion over most of the Mexican territory and in the near future the whole country would
come under their control. Therefore, the action mentioned in the press release could “disturb
those friendly and neighborly feelings and sentiments which should exist between the
Government and people of Mexico and those of the United States, which the Government of the
undersigned is so anxious to sustain and to cultivate.” 102 Seldner’s words had no weight, and
realpolitik prevailed.
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The U.S. administration decided that it would permit sales of weapons only to the
officially recognized government of México. To that end, President Coolidge issued
Proclamation No.1083 of January 7, 1924, prohibiting the Exportation of Arms or Munitions of
War to Mexico except to the officially recognized government. 103
At the beginning of hostilities, the Mexican government showed some mercy toward the
rebels. As things progressed, however, the level of ferocity increased on both sides. President
Obregón decided to return to the battlefield. He had been the only general who never lost a
battle during the Mexican Revolution. Under Obregón’s leadership, the government’s army
defeated the rebels in the West region during February 1924 and ended the rebellion. Once
beaten, De la Huerta left the country and went into exile in the United States. México paid a
heavy price in order to shut down the rebellion. Besides the seven thousand lives lost, among
them some valuable generals, the rebellion put a heavy burden on the finances of the Mexican
State. Alberto J. Pani “stated that the rebellion cost the government not less than 70 million
pesos, including the loss of tax revenue.” 104 Now, with less than a year to the end of his term,
Obregón had accomplished two important goals. First, he obtained diplomatic recognition from
the U.S. and second, he had consolidated his political power and defeated the revolt of his former
ally, De la Huerta. He faced the upcoming presidential elections at the peak of his political
power. These accomplishments, however, did not mean the end of his problems.
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At the Peak of his Political Power, Obregón Salido Transferred the Presidency to Elías
Calles
In spite of his success, Obregón continued to face other challenges mainly because of the
Catholic Church’s political activism. The Mexican Bishops planned to organize a Eucharistic
Congress in México City in 1924. They wanted to consecrate México City to the Sacred Heart
of Christ. The Government threatened to take legal action against them and those attending the
ceremonies because the event represented a violation of the Mexican Constitution. Reason
prevailed, and the Catholics decided not to press any further. They even canceled a planned
pilgrimage to the Guadalupe Basilica.
With that problem solved momentarily, elections took place in July 1924, and Elías
Calles emerged as the winner. After that, Obregón was able to pass on the presidency to Elías
Calles on December 1, 1924 under apparent political calm.
Before Elías Calles assumed power, two events, apparently isolated from each other, took
place, both of which would influence his presidency. In October, James Rockwell Sheffield
replaced Charles B. Warren as the U.S. Ambassador in México. The second event was a speech
of Elías Calles given before his election in which he, by implication, attacked the Catholic
Church.
My enemies say that I am an enemy of religion and of divine
worship and that I have no respect for religious creeds… I am
a liberal of such ample spirit that my intellect inclines me to
accept all creeds and to grant them justice, for I consider them
good because of the moral program contained in them. I am an
enemy of the priest caste with regards its position as a
privileged one and not as an evangelical mission. I am an
enemy of the priest politician, of the priest intriguer, of the
priest exploiter, of the priest who seeks to keep out people in
ignorance, of the priest who is allied with the hacendado to prey
upon the laborer, of the priest who joins with the industrial
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proprietor to exploit the worker… 105

No wonder that at the beginning of the Elías Calles’ presidency religious tensions
increased. The trigger took place in México City in La Soledad Church on February 21, 1925.
On that day, a group of armed men belonging to La Iglesia Ortodoxa Católica Mexicana, or the
Schismatic Church, arrived at the church in the middle of a mass and announced in that they
were taking possession of the building. They requested the worshipers and the priest to leave the
place immediately. Later, another group headed by Father Joaquín Pérez showed up. Father
Pérez had founded that organization in February 1925. He declared this Church would be
independent from Rome, the Pope, or the Vatican. He also proclaimed members were free to
interpret Holy documents and the liturgy the way they wanted. Spanish was established as
official language of worship of the Church. Further, “the wine used in the Mass was replaced by
mescal” 106 Finally, that Church allowed the priests to marry and raise families. It looked like
the Schismatic Church tried to create a division among the clerics similar to the one prevailing in
France after the Constitution of the Clergy was enacted in July 12, 1790, and the priests divided
between refractory and constitutionals.
Immediately, Catholics accused President Elías Calles not only of supporting this
movement but also of allowing the development in México of other religions, particularly
Protestantism. According to the Catholics, those were heretical sects. In spite of its efforts, the
Schismatic Church attracted just a few followers. The alleged support of the Mexican
government for the Schismatic Church and Protestant denominations was never proven, but the
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level of tension increased. On April 7, 1925, former President Obregón wrote a letter to
President Elías Calles. In it, Obregón warned Elías Calles against providing any help to the
Schismatic Church. Obregón believed that if the Schismatic succeeded, the country would be
divided between two Catholic parties, the national party and the one supported by Rome.
Consequently, it made no sense to create this disjunctive where the winner would be the clerisy,
national or traditional. 107 As the religious conflict began to unfold, so, too, did another problem
affecting U.S.-México relations.

The Oil Became an Issue, Again
Towards the end of Elias Calles’ first year in power, the Mexican Congress enacted a
new Petroleum Law, which became effective on January 1, 1926. In spite of assurances from
Mexican officials, some of the modifications aroused severe criticism from oil producers. The
law established that the oil was a property of the nation. Those companies operating or
exploiting the Mexican subsoil before May 1917 and those engaged in a positive act indicating
future actions in oil production would have to ask the Mexican Government to obtain a
concession for 50 years. Perpetual rights no longer prevailed. Those companies participating in
the oil industry would have a period of twelve months, until January 1927, to ask for a new
concession substituting for the previous one. In cases where the request was not granted, the
concession became null and void. Another provision contained in the Law referred to the
supremacy of the Mexican laws in those cases where foreigners owning property in México
sought protection under the laws of their country of origin. This meant that the Calvo Clause
would become part of any further concession approved by the Mexican Government in favor of
foreigners. Under the “provision, derived from the concept of the nineteenth-century
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Argentinean diplomat, Carlos Calvo, foreigners owning property or making contracts were
considered to have renounced any rights to call for diplomatic protection.” 108
The conflict began when President Elías Calles announced that he would submit a bill
proposing some changes to the legislation related to ownership of land in his message to
Congress on September 1, 1925. The proposal meant modifications affecting the property rights
of those lands where oil production took place.
As a consequence, U.S. Embassy in México began consultations with the Department of
State. The embassy provided Washington with almost day to day reports of what went on in the
Mexican Congress related to the enactment of those changes in the Petroleum Law. On October
10, Ambassador Sheffield sent a telegram to Frank Billings Kellogg, who had succeeded Charles
E. Hughes as Secretary of Sate in January 1925. Sheffield informed Kellogg that, according to
the press, the Mexican Senate Committee had approved modifications to Article 27 of the
Mexican Constitution. The ambassador proposed to send a diplomatic note to protest those
actions. Kellogg answered it was not the right time to do so. He thought that if the Mexican
government decided to proceed in that way, the note would not stop the enactment of the law.
He also pointed out that if the bill got approved as proposed, a protest from the U.S. government
would make it difficult for the Mexican government later to engage in negotiations in order to
modify it without getting into a great debate with Mexican public opinion. Kellogg
recommended that the ambassador ask for a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and get
a clear idea about the bill. Kellogg instructed Sheffield to discuss specifically those points
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referring to the length of concessions, land rights, nationality of landholders, and most
importantly subsoil deposits. 109
Sheffield followed the instructions of Secretary Kellogg. Once the meeting took place,
Sheffield reported to the Secretary that the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aarón Sáenz,
assured him that the general purpose of the proposed law was to obviate complications with
foreign governments, and it had no intent to affect the rights of use of subsoil products. The
Ambassador agreed it was not necessary to send a note. He mentioned that he observed a
positive change in the attitude of the Mexican government during recent days. 110 Trying to
avoid false steps, Sheffield frequently asked Kellogg how to approach the current situation in
México. On November 13, in an aide-memoire, the Secretary of State again instructed the
ambassador to meet with the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs and present him an aidememoir. Sheffield did this on November 17. According to the aide-memoire, the U.S.
government asked the Mexican authorities to sign a Treaty of Amity and Commerce, appealing
to the friendly relations prevailing between the two governments. Secretary Kellogg wanted to
start negotiations immediately. 111 The ambassador proceeded as instructed but got no immediate
response from the Mexican authorities. Three days later, the American Ambassador expressed
his worries in a telegram to the Kellogg, because “according to the local press, [the Mexican]
Foreign Office reports that it has received nothing in the nature of a protest against the bill to
regulate section 1 of Article 27. Anxiety is expressed by several of my colleagues including
those of France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, as well as by interested American
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citizens.” 112 The American Ambassador thought it would come to a situation where the Mexican
Government could later claim the U.S. government never made any representation regarding
those modifications in the law. Again Secretary Kellogg wrote an aide-memorie to the
Ambassador Sheffield instructing him on how to approach the Mexican authorities. Kellogg told
Sheffield to ask for a response to the note of November 17. 113
Throughout the crisis, Sheffield did a poor job of informing Washington about events.
On November 27, Sheffield, again acting on the basis of news published in the press, sent a
message to the Secretary of State mentioning that the modifications to the law had been
approved by the Mexican Congress. He attached a copy of a press clipping from El Universal,
the daily newspaper published in México City, and again asked for instructions regarding how to
approach the Mexican government. 114 Significantly it appeared that Ambassador Sheffield’s
main source of information about the legislative process in Mexico was the local press. Every
time Sheffield sent a note or a telegram to the Secretary of State asking for instructions or
reporting the latest happenings in the Mexican Congress, his message began with sentences like
“according to the local press...” or “enclosing you will find a copy of what the press
published…” These limited sources of information indicated that his personal relations with
Mexican authorities did not extend beyond the formalities or in some cases, not even that.
Sheffield also needed to ask for permission from Washington before taking any step. Sheffield’s
attitude helped to explain future events.
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Another example of the lack of communication between the American Ambassador and
the Mexican Government was the attitude of the Mexican Ambassador to Washington, Manuel
C. Tellez. On November 30, 1925, Tellez sent the answer provided by Minister Sáenz to
Secretary Kellogg’s note of November 17 directly to Kellogg. In his reply, the Mexican Minister
of Foreign Affairs established that, after submitting the mentioned communication to President
Elías Calles, he analyzed it and concluded there was no reason to worry about a deterioration of
the U.S.-México relations. The Mexican government had intended to fulfill all the obligations
imposed upon it by international law. Minister Sáenz pointed out that the legislation in process
of enactment had as its main goal the elimination of vague language contained in previous
legislation. It followed the same procedures relating to foreigners established by the enactment
of the Constitution of 1917. Sáenz assured Kellogg that in the modifications to Section 1 of
Article 27, already approved by the Chamber of Deputies and under discussion in the Senate, the
rights of foreigners had been respected. In what looked like a clear reference to the position of
Ambassador Sheffield, the Mexican Minister said: “I should regret if you were misinformed in
this regard and, without any wish to assume the part of adviser, I take the liberty to call your
attention to the very human fact that individuals and capital are generally opposed to any
innovation, even though such innovation does not mean any invasion of their rights." 115
After that note, the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent another reply to Secretary
Kellogg, explaining how the new legislation did not either alter existing law affecting property
rights or contravene those agreements reached in 1923 as a result of the Bucareli Agreements.
The Mexican functionary pointed out that the law resembled prevailing laws in the States of
Illinois and Arizona relating foreigners’ rights of ownership. The exchange of diplomatic notes
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and personal meetings intensified during December 1925. Each government tried to convince
the other but finally the changes to the law were made.
During the year of 1926, Secretary Kellogg and Minister Sáenz continued to exchange
diplomatic notes relating to the Petroleum Law. The tone prevailing in the written interactions
reflected mutual respect. In spite of the differences, diplomatic channels always remained open.
Meanwhile, the oil producers embarked on a campaign in the United States to convince public
opinion of the wrongdoings of the Mexican Government. The oil producers accused the
Mexican government of trying to confiscate their previously acquired rights. One of the visible
heads of that campaign was Guy Stevens, the Director of the Association of Producers of
Petroleum in México. During 1926 and 1927, Stevens addressed a series of lectures to different
groups; those lectures appeared later in a book called Current Controversies with Mexico. 116 In
that book, Stevens related the oil companies’ dissatisfaction with the requirement established by
the Mexican government for new concessions.
On December 26, 1926, Secretary Kellogg in a telegram to Ambassador Sheffield stated:
“I understand some of the companies have asked for an extension of time for filing applications
for confirmatory concessions for purpose of taking up negotiations with a view to adjusting all
the questions in dispute between them and the Mexican Government.” 117 Sheffield replied that,
according to his understanding, up to that day, none of the important oil companies had
requested such a thing. Meanwhile, Stevens sent to the Secretary of State a copy of the message
he had sent to the Mexican Government on December 27, in which he declared that the
petroleum companies “can not safely accept confirmatory concession under the present law…
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the companies respectfully suggest the advisability of prolonging the period allowed by Article
15 of the law in order that modifications there in may be made effective which will harmonize
the language of the law with the expressed intention of your Government.” 118
President Elías Calles responded in a note, submitted through the Minister of Industry
and Commerce, Luis N. Morones. In the note, the president ratified his position in favor of the
law, which he saw as an instrument not only to guarantee the interests of the industry but also as
a tool for assuring the development of it. 119 President Elías Calles knew that confrontation with
the oil producers could not go farther, considering 40% of governmental income came from the
oil tax. This did not mean, however, that he would go and surrender his position to the oil
companies. As a consummate politician, President Elías Calles had, together with former
President Obregón, started the process of negotiations looking for a solution to the oil
controversy. First, Aarón Sáenz declared that México would be willing to consider arbitration as
a way to solve the oil controversy. As soon as Obregón knew about it, he sent two letters, dated
on January 12 and 17, 1927 to the Mexican President. 120 In each, Obregón openly opposed
such step. He considered direct negotiations with the companies still open and argued that
arbitration would be a severe set back for the Mexican sovereignty. Further, it represented a
dangerous precedent for the future enactment of domestic laws. Obregón also mentioned that
Mr. Shoup, President of Southern Pacific [Paul Shoup was then Executive Vice-President of
Southern Pacific; he would become president of the company in 1929] had offered his personal
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intervention looking for a meeting in San Francisco with the representatives of the oil companies
and Obregón himself.
As soon as President Elías Calles got the letter, he answered it, making clear that Saenz’s
position derived from a strategy to keep a door open. Elías Calles agreed with Obregón about
the participation of a third party in the negotiations. Elías Calles considered direct negotiations
the more suitable alternative. He also recognized the legal situation at that point became very
tight. Due to the enacted legislation, the Mexican government was unable to extend for a new
term the registration procedure. He mentioned the only available alternative resided in judicial
procedures. Most of the companies which did not conform to the legal dispositions already went
asking for an amparo. The companies argued the disposition contained in the Petroleum Law
were contrary to Mexican Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article 27 of the Constitution.
That argument represented an open door for a solution coming from the Court. In spite of all
this, President Calles approved Obregón’s trip to San Francisco. 121
On February 5, on his way to San Francisco, Obregón sent a telegram from Los Angeles
to the Mexican president. In it, Obregón reported that, when the representatives from the oil
companies were ready to travel, they had received some suggestions from the Casa Redonda,
(the under cover name used by the Mexican politicians then to name the White House). On the
basis of that and some information he got in several meetings he held with important people
there, Obregón concluded, without offering any hard evidence of his assertions, that the Papal
shadow had interfered with the negotiations, and the Catholics had tried to obstruct a possible
agreement about the oil conflict because a solution would end the support they had, since the
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State Department would not have any reason to continue with its demanding policy toward
México. 122

Religion Something More than Boiling, Erupting
Following the enactment of the Petroleum Law, President Elías Calles decided, in
February 1926, to enforce the dispositions written in the Constitution of 1917 related to religious
matters. This engaged the country in a deeper division resulting in an armed confrontation.
After implementing the dispositions related to religion written in article 130 of the
constitution, the Mexican government requested foreign born ministers to leave the country
immediately. During 1926, out of a total of one hundred priests residing in México City, 59
faced deportation. Sixty percent of the 360 priests conducting religious activities in Mexico had
to leave the country, while the rest remained in hiding. The Episcopal and Methodist Churches
decided not to challenge the government, so they were not molested and continued in Mexico.
Members of the Catholic Church in México and their allies outside the country engaged in a
campaign in order to stop these procedures. The Catholic hierarchy and its followers considered
these procedures as an assault against the rights of the individual, the Church, and its members.
The Mexican government responded that its main goal was to encourage the ordination of
Mexicans by birth as priests, because they must be in charge of the churches and the teaching of
Catholic beliefs.
On February 4, 1926, Archbishop Mora y Del Río made a statement in the name of the
clergy to El Universal. He established that the doctrine of the Church was unchangeable,
because it was divinely revealed truth. Consequently the Catholic priests ratified their opposition
to the religious dispositions written in the Constitution of 1917. Mora y Del Río pointed out that
122

Ibid., Foja 377, 26.

70

any change would be considered disloyal to their Faith and Religion. 123 He later denied making
the statement.
The Catholic hierarchy in México tried to get foreigners involved in the religious conflict.
Pope Pius XI, Ambrogio Damiano Achille Ratti, took a very active role denouncing the measures
implemented by the Mexican government. In the United States, the Knights of Columbus and
members of the American Catholic hierarchy explicitly demanded the intervention of the U.S.
government in the conflict already underway in México.
On July 3, 1926 the Church hierarchy opened “holy fire” against the Mexican
Government. Pope Pius XI addressed a speech to the students of the Pius Latin American
School condemning the Mexican government because of its policy. The next day, the Foreign
Office of the Vatican sent a letter to all diplomats from countries that recognized the Vatican as
well as to every member of the Church representing it in other countries condemning Elías
Calles’ policies and denouncing him as an enemy of the Catholic Religion.
On July 14, 1926, in response, President Elías Calles wrote a series of reforms into the
Penal Code, establishing punishments for those who disobeyed the rules related to religious
worship and the behavior of priests as citizens. Those regulations established that every priest
must register at the office of the city government closest to where they reside. This would be
effective on August 1 of that year. In response, the Mexican Catholic hierarchy supported the
call made by the National League for the Defense of Religious Liberty in Mexico asking the
population for an economic boycott of all domestic goods. They expected the support from
Rome, “the Pope, however, refused to countenance such a plan of action. He recommended
instead public prayers and seeking of peaceful means to settle the difficulty. August 1, was
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designated by the Holy Father as the date for special prayers through the world for the cessation
of Mexico’s government’s persecution of Catholics”. 124
On July 25, eight archbishops and twenty nine bishops signed a pastoral letter, with Papal
approval, in which they ordered that all religious services be suspended after July 31. Although
the priests would not conduct services, congregations could gather in the churches, and lay
Catholics maintained the buildings. The government decided, however, to take control of the
buildings, since they were the Nation’s property.
On August 16, 1926, prior to a formal meeting to be held on the 21st between the Catholic
hierarchy and President Elías Calles, the hierarchy sent a letter to the president. In the letter, the
priests tried to justify their actions in terms of their inability to carry on their ministry under the
current laws. The prelates pointed out how authorities in the past had not seen fit to enforce the
requirements. In practice, a situation of mutual tolerance existed which did not disturb the public
peace and permitted the Church a relative liberty to live and exercise its function. 125 In the same
document, the prelates argued that in order to fulfill their ministry, it was necessary to have
liberties. Among them were those of conscience, thought, worship, instruction, association, and
the press. They further required recognition of their status as a legal entity. That request showed
the double standards under which the Church operated. The priests forgot the content of a
couple of papal encyclicals. One, Mirari Vos On Liberalism and Religious Indifferentism,
written by Gregory XVI on August 15, 1832, prohibited the liberty of free thinking.
…We consider another abundant source of the evils with
which the Church is afflicted at present: indifferentism. This
perverse opinion is spread on all sides by the fraud of the
wicked who claim that it is possible to obtain the eternal
salvation of the soul by the profession of any kind of religion,
as long as morality is maintained … This shameful font of
indifferentism gives rise to that absurd and erroneous
124
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proposition which claims that liberty of conscience must be
maintained for everyone. It spreads ruin in sacred and civil
affairs, though some repeat over and over again with the
greatest impudence that some advantage accrues to religion
from it. But the death of the soul is worse than freedom of
error… 126

Another, Pascendi Dominici Gregis On the Doctrine of the Modernists, issued by Pius X,
Giuseppe Melchiorne Sarto, in 1907, approved censorship of writings that disagreed with
Church’s positions, mentioning that:

…All those who have obtained an apostolic faculty to read
and keep forbidden books, are not thereby authorized to read
and keep books and periodicals forbidden by the local
Ordinaries unless the apostolic faculty expressly concedes
permission to read and keep books condemned by anyone
whomsoever…It is not enough to hinder the reading and the
sale of bad books -- it is also necessary to prevent them from
being published. Hence, let the Bishops use the utmost
strictness in granting permission to print…. 127

The Catholic hierarchy met with President Elías Calles on August 21. At the meeting,
the bishops repeated the requests already printed in the letter of August 16. They justified their
position on the basis of religious faith. The Mexican president countered with a legalistic
approach, recommending that the prelates take their proposals for changes in the law to
Congress. Until the legislative branch approved those changes, the president added, they had no
other alternative but to obey the laws. If they did so, they would encounter no problem carrying
out their religious activities. The priests, however, wanted either a surrender of the Mexican
State or nothing. 128
During the meeting between the Mexican President and the bishops, Pascual Díaz
Barreto, Bishop of Tabasco, denied that the Church made any request to foreigners for help in
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order to solve the problem. Also, he referred President Elías Calles’ interview with the
American press in which the president mentioned that the register of priests had statistical
purposes. If that were the case, the clerics did not have any trouble with the register. The
president expressed his hope that Diaz’s assurances were in fact the case, because, according to
the information he had received Catholic priests had looked actively for support outside the
country in an effort to exercise pressure on the Mexican government to reverse the measures.
The president also mentioned the active role of Pope Pius XI and how some priests
around the country had been encouraging the population into rebellion against the government.
Díaz Barreto explained that the latter derived from passions already aroused on both sides and
promised to call the priests and reprimand them for such behavior.
Leopoldo Ruiz y Flores, Bishop of Michoacán, argued the government had prohibited
the free exercise of religious services. President Elías Calles asked the bishop how this was the
case. Ruiz y Flores answered it was because the priests needed to meet legal dispositions
forbidden by their religious beliefs. Beliefs, the president countered, were not above the law.
Later the bishop proposed a referendum, like in the U.S., he said, on whether or not those laws
should remain in effect. The president considered such a possibility totally unacceptable, since
that procedure had not been established in the Mexican Laws.
Referring to the Pope’s participation in the religious conflict in Mexico, Bishop Ruiz y
Flores argued that the Church represented an international institution and then proceeded to
make a comparison to union workers from Chicago or New York helping Mexican workers. He
saw no reason to deny the Holy See the right to intervene in this conflict. The president stated
the Mexican government did not accept any opinion about México’s internal laws coming from
the Pope. The bishop referred to a similar conflict between William I of Germany and Pope Leo
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XIII. The president said that any discussion about history would turn out badly for the Church
considering its past behavior in México.
Once the bishops failed to obtain what they demanded, they proceeded “unofficially” to
encourage Catholics to take up arms and rebel against the government. In response to the arrest
of some national priests and the eviction from the country of foreign clerics, an armed movement
began in late August and early September of 1926. At the end of October, the Revolución
Cristera was under way on ten states of the West-Central Region. The rebels claimed to be
fighting in the name of the Holy Sacred Heart of Jesus. Priests were the moral leaders of their
communities. Through them, and its importance in the everyday lives of its citizens, the Church
had succeeded in promoting a rebellion
In subsequent years, the Catholic hierarchy denied any involvement in supporting the
armed conflict. Some evidence, however, contradicts that. In April 1927, The New York Times
published an article signed by T.R. Ybarra, reporting that “Archbishop Orozco y Jimenez is the
heart and soul of the invisible regiment of Roman Catholics arrayed against [Elías] Calles. Plenty
of people in México believed…that the doughty Archbishop had joined the rebels of Jalisco and
was directing the military operations against [Elías] Calles.” 129 In 1964, one of the leaders of the
Revolución Cristera, Miguel Palomar y Vizcarra declared to historians James W. Wilkie and
Edna Monzón de Wilkie that the Mexican Bishops took an active role behind the scenes during
the armed movement. Palomar stated that the armed movement had the approval of and support
of the Catholic hierarchy, mainly from Archbishop Ruiz y Flores and Bishop Díaz Barreto.
When the historians asked Palomar about the Pope’s involvement in the armed conflict, Palomar
answered that the armed movement had pontifical approval but denied that the Catholic priests
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participated directly in the armed rebellion. Palomar also claimed he had in his possession
enough documentary evidence to support that assertion, although he declined to provide it. 130
With Catholics in open rebellion and the representatives of the oil companies demanding
changes in legislation, the situation at the end of 1926 did not provide peaceful prospects for the
future. Coincidently enough, both the Catholics and the representatives of the oil companies had
been demanding that the U.S. government intervene to solve their problems with the Mexican
government. President Coolidge clearly stated a “hands off” policy asserting that the religious
conflict was a domestic issue of Mexico. At the same time, he kept open diplomatic channels,
looking for a solution to the problem. Coolidge was looking for stability in México not only to
protect American lives and interests there, but he also tried to prevent a major conflict in the
neighboring country. The political, economical and social consequences of such clash could hit
the United States sooner or later. Other people in both governments, however, took diplomatic
relations into shaky grounds.

The Rules of Diplomacy Defied
Over the years, legends have developed relating to U.S.-Mexican relations during the first
months of 1927. On the Mexican side, the story goes that México lived those days on the verge
of an American invasion. According to American sources, such an issue never came under
consideration.
Ambassador Sheffield’s time as U.S. Ambassador in México was characterized by tense
relations with the Mexican authorities. The Ambassador seemed oblivious to the need for
developing a close relationship with the political actors in the country where he served.
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Sheffield put such a distance between himself and the Mexican authorities that his main source
of information about the events in México was the daily press. He tried to take a hard line with
respect to the oil problem. He might have been better served by taking the initiative, making
proposals, and negotiating with the Mexican authorities. In the end, Sheffield’s mission ended in
an embarrassment for himself and his country.
While Sheffield attempted to portray the Mexican government as irrational and an
advocate of bolshevism, something happened in the embassy headquarters behind the
ambassador’s back. Miguel R. Avila, a Mexican American private investigator, was spying for
both sides. He supplied information about the Mexican government to the American Embassy,
acting as a confidential informant while at the same time he had established a spy web inside the
American Embassy. Daily, without the knowledge of the ambassador; some documents had
been carefully selected and taken away. Avila had the complicity of William L. Copeland, a
member of the office of the Military Attaché, Lieutenant Colonel Edward Davis. The papers
were passed first to the Ministry of Commerce, Luís N. Morones, who took later to the Mexican
President. According to one of these documents, on February 8, 1927, Major Joseph F. Cheston
arrived to México. Cheston was assigned to the Military Attaché’s office in the embassy. The
next day after his arrival Cheston met with Ambassador Sheffield. During the meeting Cheston
assured Sheffield that President Coolidge planned to invade México. According to Cheston’s
information, in such action would participate some Mexican generals. Toward that end, General
Pablo González had been called to Washington, a move with which Sheffield did not agree
because of his personal dislike of the general. 131
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After obtaining the information from the U.S. Embassy, Elías Calles preferred to present
himself as a politician who did not want to embarrass his neighbor. Elías Calles therefore made
arrangements to get the documents to President Coolidge. Elías Calles invited a journalist from
The New York Evening Post, George Barr Baker, to Mexico to report about the Southern Pacific
Railroad. In Mexico, Baker interviewed several members of Elías Calles’s cabinet and met the
president himself. Before leaving the country, Baker received from the President all the
packages containing the documents with the instruction that such information should be
delivered directly to President Coolidge. Those packages contained, according to the historian
James J. Horn, “copies of about 350 documents [including] official correspondence between the
ambassador and the Secretary of State, consular dispatches, reports of the military attaché, and
apparently some forgeries.” 132 Once the documents arrived in the Oval Office, President
Coolidge sent them to the Intelligence Division for analysis to determine the authenticity of the
information contained. On February 24, the Intelligence Division reported to the State
Department that some of the documents were authentic copies of telegrams and notes exchanged
between the American Embassy in México with the State Department and Consular Offices, as
well as between the State Department and its Military Attaché. The report also mentioned that in
some other cases the documents represented forgeries written with a clear purpose of creating
difficulties between the American and Mexican governments. 133
On February 28, Secretary Kellogg sent a request to Minister Saenz through the
American Embassy asking for an explanation of how the Mexican Government got those
documents. Sáenz’s answered with a simple statement: “As an expression of good will, the
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Mexican President will send a personal representative to explain every detail about them to
President Coolidge.” 134 The lack of official information led others to speculate about the events.
In spite of the stories that circulated surrounding these events, neither the American nor
the Mexican press had hard evidence to provide. On February 25, 1927, The New York Times
reported that Ambassador Sheffield declined to talk about a rumor coming from Washington,
that documents and cable dispatches had been stolen from the American Embassy in México
City. 135 On March 2, another story in the Times reported a note not related to oil law but
“regarded as of considerable importance on a phase of Mexican-American relations which State
Department officials absolutely refused to disclose has been sent to the [Elías] Calles
Government by Secretary Kellogg” 136 The note referred to the already mentioned
communication sent to Minister Sáenz.
The lack of verifiable information about the content of the documents provided fertile
ground for speculation, especially when President Elías Calles recalled the Mexican Ambassador
to Washington, Manuel C. Tellez, for consultations. In spite of a denial from the Foreign Office,
a rumor spread that Tellez had been considered as persona non-grata by the Washington
government. The Times assured to readers that Tellez had no option but to leave the country. 137
After the meeting with President Elías Calles, Tellez returned to Washington and asked for an
appointment with President Coolidge. Speaking on behalf of the Mexican president, the
ambassador “explained that the papers had come to him unsolicited [which was not true] during
the course of the last two years. When President Elías Calles realized that some of them
pertained to current issues, he informed President Coolidge, eschewing official channels because
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they appeared to be responsible for the situation.” 138 Tellez relayed Elías Calles’s concern that
some people wanted to destroy the amicable relations between both countries.
Despite the fact that some of the documents were forgeries, some of them represented a
real embarrassment not only for the Ambassador but for his country as well. Horn provided an
example quoting Lieutenant Colonel Edward Davis’s Report No. 1297, December 31, 1926,
entitled “A concise review of the year 1926 in México.” In the report, the Military Attaché
wrote: “That the white man is somewhat disliked is natural but if the Mexican people are ever so
fortunate as to be blessed with American intervention and administration this alleged bitter
hatred of Americans will be proved a fake of the thinnest type…” 139 In no way did this reflect
the policy of the Coolidge administration toward México. At the very least, that report indicated
that the ambassador paid too little attention to what went on under his responsibility.
On March 28, the American press reported that the stolen documents were forgeries. 140
Without knowing who had stolen the documents, the press speculated that “students of the
mystery in Mexico City hold the opinion that if the thefts and forgeries are finally cleared up it
will be found that several well-known radicals in the United States and their associates here [in
México] will be revealed as conspirators who were plotting against the peace and security of
both countries.” 141 Another hypothesis held that “a gang of international crooks” could be
responsible for such actions. 142
In spite of the American denial, years after the events described above, some political
actors on the Mexican side remained convinced that the possibility of an invasion of Mexico had
existed. According to Emilio Portes Gil, President Elías Calles mentioned to him the existence
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of those documents and the threat of an American invasion to Mexico. 143 Elías Calles clearly
instructed Portes Gil to be prepared to blow up all the oil wells in the Northern State of
Tamaulipas, where Portes Gil was governor, in case of an invasion. Portes Gil also asserted that
President Elías Calles sent a telegram to President Coolidge advising the American president in
advance that he would receive the documents and urging him to read them before taking any
action. In the end, American officials concluded that some of those documents were forgeries.
Others, however, were written in such an ambiguous way that President Elías Calles believed an
American military intervention in México was possible.
Paradoxically, the interception of those documents represented the turning point towards
a solution for the prevailing problems between México and the United States. Ambassador
Sheffield resigned his post in July1927, not necessarily because of the documents but due to his
performance as a whole. In October, Dwight W. Morrow arrived as his replacement. For some,
Morrow’s appointment represented the imminent arrival of American marines in México.
Events proved the contrary. As a result of Morrow’s approach, problems relating to oil and to
the Church would enter new stages and move toward a resolution. Several events, however,
needed to take place before that resolution.
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Chapter Three
RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA
The religious conflict in México has been analyzed mainly from a Catholic perspective
which made sense considering that 99% of the Mexican population during the 1920s was
Catholic. Among several books written about the topic, two of them studied the conflict from
that perspective: La Cristiada, 144 written by Jean Meyer and published in three volumes, and
American Catholics and the Mexican Revolution 1924-1936, 145 by Mathew A. Redinger. Meyer
devoted the second volume exclusively to study the conflict as a struggle between the State and
the Church while in the other volumes provided an extensive analysis of the armed conflict and
all the events surrounding it. Meyer offered a perspective sympathetic toward the Catholic
Church, representing it as a victim of government intolerance. In his analysis of the foreign
intervention, Meyer mainly focused on the participation of American Catholics priests during
negotiations to conclude the conflict. Redinger also considered the perspective of a foreign
intervention through the participation of American Catholics. In Redinger’s analysis, American
Catholics, priests and laymen, represented the leading voices searching for a solution.
Other authors, however, wrote on how members of other religions participated in the
process to settle the disputes. Among those were a Mexican journalist and Methodist layman
Gonzalo Baez Camargo who, together with a British Anglican layman Kenneth G. Grubb, wrote
Religion in the Republic of Mexico. Baez and Grubb analyzed the role of the Protestant churches
in México up to the 1930s. 146 They focused mainly on the activities of Protestants over the
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years, devoting less than five pages to the religious conflict from 1926 to 1929. The authors
proclaimed the final settlement as a victory for Mexico’s civilian rulers. In Chaos in Mexico:
The Conflict of Church and State, 147 a Pastor of the Congressional Church, Charles S.
MacFarland analyzed the problems related to Church-State relations up to 1935. He devoted a
chapter to the Protestant churches in Mexico and examined the role of members of that religion
during the conflict. McFarland did not, however, even mention the struggle between members of
different faiths within the U.S. during the years of the Mexican conflict. In 1971, historian
Sinclair Snow published an article titled “Protestant versus Catholic: U.S. Reaction to the
Mexican Church-State Conflict of 1926-29.” 148 In it, he analyzed how members of each faith
approached the conflict from a different perspective. He concluded that the final agreement of
1929 represented a victory for the State over the Church.
Any analysis of the behavior and participation of the American Catholics and the
American Catholic hierarchy in the Mexican conflict must begin first by analyzing the actions of
Pope Pius XI. This issue had been treated by Jean Meyer in his book, La Cristiada: 2. - El
Conflicto entre la Iglesia y el Estado 1926-1929, 149 and Redinger in American Catholics and the
Mexican Revolution. Neither, however, analyzed the content of two important documents
published at the end of 1926, the Encyclical Iniquis Afflictisque written by Pope Pius XI and a
Pastoral Letter signed by the American Catholic hierarchy. Meyer emphasized the
consequences of the Pastoral Letter signed by the Mexican prelates on July 26, 1926, and tried to
portray the Pope as a figure seeking restraint and civility. However, the documents do not
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support that portrayal. The Pope encouraged members of the Church and Catholic laymen to
disobey the legal dispositions regarding to religion and to take action against the Mexican
authorities. In early 2008, Meyer published La Cruzada por México: Los Católicos de Estados
Unidos y la Cuestión Religiosa en México. 150 In it, Meyer did a very well documented analysis
about the direct involvement of the American Catholic hierarchy and the American Catholics in
Mexico’s religious conflicts from 1914 to 1938. Meyer, however, avoided again mentioning
how Popes Benedict XV and Pius XI’s actions set the course of action for American Catholics
involvement in the Mexican quarrels.

The Pope and his Soldiers
The participation of Pope Pius XI in the religious conflict in México followed a
gradualist approach. He initially encouraged Catholics to mobilize peacefully against the
Mexican authorities. Later, the Pope supported those who fought to preserve the faith in México.
On February 2, 1926, the Pope addressed a Pastoral Letter to Mexican Bishops, in which he
suggested restraint and peaceful measures against unjust laws enacted by Mexican authorities. 151
Later in early July, the Pope addressed a speech to the students of the Pius Latin-American
School condemning the Mexican government’s policy toward Catholics. At the end of that
month, on July 26, 1926, Pius XI approved the content of the Pastoral Letter signed by the
Mexican Catholic hierarchy ordering to suspend religious services.
During the next two months, relations between the Mexican authorities and the Catholic
Church deteriorated, and opinions prevailing on both sides moved to the extremes. On October
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18, 1926, the Pope met with a group of hard line Mexican Bishops headed by José María
González y Valencia, Archbishop of Durango. He was accompanied by Monsignor Emeterio
Valverde y Téllez, Bishop of León, and Monsignor Gerardo Méndez Del Río, Bishop of
Tehuantepec. After hearing the Mexican prelates present their version of events in México, The
Pope he decided that he had no other choice but a direct confrontation with the Mexican
government.
The Pope did not go into this crusade alone. Besides the Mexican Catholic hierarchy he
could count on two organizations working inside the United States, the National Catholic
Welfare Conference (NCWC), an organization of American priests, and the Knights of
Columbus (K of C), a group of Catholic laymen. Both played a key role during the Mexican
religious conflict.
On American soil, the NCWC represented the most important organization within the
Catholic Church. It acted as “a permanent staff and liaison agent, [and involved itself in] such
matters as education, journalism, legislation, and social work.” 152 The origins of the NCWC
went back to April 1919, when Pope Benedict XV gave his approval for its founding as a
substitute for the National Catholic War Council, which coordinated the Catholics’ relief efforts
during World War I. The new organization pursued the same goals of its predecessor, while
looking out for the interests of the Church. In September 1919, an administration committee
made up of American bishops became responsible for the direct management of the NCWC.
The creation of the NCWC, however, faced the hostility of some members of the Church.
The Bishop of Brooklyn, Charles E. McDonnell opposed the newly created organization,
because, in his opinion, the operations of the NCWC went beyond what the Pope’s letter had
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envisioned and were therefore detrimental to the authority of the bishops in their respective
dioceses. Bishop McDonnell found an ally in the Secretary of the Consistorian Congregation,
Cayetan Cardinal De Lai who convinced the Pope that the NCWC was a risky experiment. Pope
Benedict XV offered to make a decree of dissolution, but he died on January 22, 1922, before
signing the decree. Although it meant a set back for those opposing the NCWC, that did not end
the story. Priests who opposed the creation of the NCWC convinced Pope Pius XI, elected on
February 6, 1922, to issue a decree of dissolution. Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic,
those in favor of the organization still expected the Pope’s support. At the end of March, news
announcing the Pope’s decision to dissolve the NCWC was known in the U.S. The
Administrative Committee of the National Catholic Welfare Conference called for an emergency
meeting on April 6. Members of the Committee agreed to send a cable to the Pope asking to
withhold the publication of the decree in the Acta Sanctae Sedis, 153 something the Pope agreed to
do. After the meeting, Bishop Joseph Schrembs of Cleveland traveled to Rome to negotiations,
which ultimately resulted in a decree of approval issued by the Sacred Consistorial
Congregation 154 on June 22, 1922. 155 A powerful organization had been born and it would take
the leading voice against those trying to make changes affecting the traditional role of the
Catholic Church within and outside of the United States.
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In addition, laymen participated in some organizations spreading and defending
Catholicism. The Knights of Columbus became the most important outside the official structure
of the Catholic Church because of its large membership and economic power. Father Michael J.
McGivney created this organization on March 29, 1882, in New Haven, Connecticut, initially as
a mutual beneficial society. McGivney tried to offer an alternative to Catholics excluded from
labor unions and other organizations that provided social services. From 1884 to 1928, the
Knights of Columbus’ membership grew from 460 to 700,000 people within the US. By 1928,
The Knights of Columbus had developed into a “kind of Catholic Free Masonry designed to
combat Protestant Free Masonry and to maintain effective social contact among Catholic men.
With the guidance of the Episcopate, this society [performed] great services, especially of a
material kind, and [was] plainly suited to the country.” 156 Their actions would become very
important under the leadership of Pope Pius XI.
On November 11, 1926, Pope Pius XI published the encyclical Iniquis Afflictisque. This
signaled the official move against the Mexican Government. In the encyclical, the Holy See
condemned those measures established by the Mexican Constitution of 1917. The Pope
supported those actions implemented by Catholic organizations defending against despotic
power contrary to the rights of the Church and injurious to Catholics in México. For the Pope,
coercing priests to register represented an ignominious act. Priests, he mentioned, “are put on
the level of professional men and of laborers but with this important difference, that they must be
not only Mexicans by birth and cannot exceed a certain number specified by law, but are at the
same time deprived of all civil and political rights. They are thus placed in the same class with
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criminals and the insane.” 157 Those dispositions were, in fact, implemented to encourage the
ordination of Mexican priests and avoid mixing spirituality with politics.
The Pope referred to the Knights of Columbus, which he described as an organization
with a membership of active and industrious people who, because of their practical lives, open
profession of faith, and zeal in assisting the Church brought great honor upon themselves. The
Knights supported the National Sodality of Parents. The Sodality promoted Catholics’ right to
teach their own children, and to participate in the creation of formal education programs. They
also demanded that in those cases of children attending public schools, the educational programs
must include in their curriculum a sound and complete training in their religion, in this case
Catholicism.
The Pope also mentioned the Federation for the Defense of Religious Liberty, an
organization created in México only a short time before, as an example of those defending the
faith in a time when the Church was menaced by a veritable ocean of troubles. This Federation
soon spread its activities all over the country. Its members attempted to organize and instruct
Catholics so that they would be able to present a united invincible front to the enemy. 158 In
addition, the Pope recognized those activities of the Catholic Society of Mexican Youth and the
Union of Catholic Women of México. These two societies, over and above the work which was
special to each of them, endorsed and did all they could to promote the activities of the
Federation for the Defense of Religious Liberty.
The Pope proceeded to give his support to those already engaged in a fight in México,
pointing out that:
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without going into details about their work, with pleasure
We desire to call to your attention, Venerable Brothers, but
a single fact, namely, that all the members of these
organizations both men and women, are so brave that, instead
of fleeing danger, they go out in search of it, and even rejoice
when it falls to their share to suffer persecution from the
enemies of the Church. 159

Language asking for restraint and tolerance no longer prevailed. That, in turn explained
why the conflict developed into an armed movement.
On December 12, just a month after the publication of the Encyclical, the hierarchy of
American Bishops published a Pastoral Letter on México. The date had a special significance
for Catholics in México; it was the day they commemorated the revelation of the Virgin of
Guadalupe. The document criticized the religious policies implemented by the Mexican
government and compared the Mexican and the American Constitutions. The bishops concluded
that laws like those enacted in México could never be enacted in the United States. The letter
was signed by Cardinal Patrick Joseph Hayes of New York, Archbishop John Joseph Glennon of
Saint Louis, Archbishop Austin Dowling of Saint Paul, Bishop Joseph Schrembs of Cleveland,
and Bishop Francis Clement Kelley of Oklahoma. 160
The legal claims in that letter derived from a study made by a Catholic and the President
of the New York City Bar Association, William D. Guthrie, who prepared his opinion in
response to a request from Cardinal Hayes. Guthrie divided his work into five headings:
International Law; Separation of the Church and the State; Confiscation of Church Property;
Education; and International Relations. He concluded that “Mexico’s constitutional provision
and its presidential decree affecting the Roman Catholic Church were violations of long
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established rules of international law [he did not give a single example of such laws] and of the
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which are recognized in all civilized countries.” 161
The Nation published a reply to Guthrie’s study in an editorial which pointed out:
Certainly legislation analogous to that embodied in the
Mexican Constitutions of 1857 and 1917 could not be enacted
in the USA. We have, fortunately, never had an established
church which dominated our entire nation politically,
economically and spiritually. Mr. Guthrie is an eminent lawyer
but he should fortify himself in Mexican history… Does he not
know that the Mexican Catholic Episcopate unanimously
decried tolerance of other creeds as impious, disastrous and
anti-Catholic three quarters of a century after religious liberty
had been written into our own national charter? 162

The messages provided by the Pope and the American Catholic hierarchy brought to a
climax what had happened during the previous ten months. The Mexican government pursued
its campaign to enforce those dispositions written in the law, while members of the Catholic
Church kept disobeying them. Once the Catholic Church arrived at an open confrontation with
the Mexican authorities, the campaign already in progress since 1926 intensified. In addition,
Mexican Catholics had enough support outside the geographical boundaries of the country,
particularly in the U.S., to seek the direct involvement of foreigners, acting as individuals or as
institutions.

The Debate about México involved not only a Religious but a Political Issue in America
Mexican Catholics requested external assistance for what they called the preservation of
their faith, which they regarded as threatened by the actions of the Mexican government.
Catholics found a friendly reaction in the U.S. The publication of the Pastoral Letter intensified
a debate already under way. In America, not only Catholics but also members of other religions
161
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increased their participation in the debate on events in México. Politicians joined in, too.
Mexican Catholics had inadvertently revived long standing frictions between Catholics and
members of other religions, a matter fully exposed during the Democratic Convention in 1924.
That issue would influence domestic political events in the U.S.
On the Catholic side, two organizations played a key role trying to convince American
public opinion and the U.S. government that south of the border, a crime had been committed by
an immoral and tyrannical government. Those groups were the National Catholic Welfare
Conference (NCWC) and the Knights of Columbus (K of C). Their position represented just one
side of the debate. On the other side of the spectrum, members of Protestant denominations
(Methodists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, and Lutherans) as well as some Jews, politicians,
writers, labor leaders, and Freemasons expressed their opinions about the events in México.
The comparisons between México and the United States became a common topic in
American business and political arenas during the first half of the 1920s. Then, in early 1926, a
debate about religion and the role the government should play became part of that discussion.
Comparing the behavior of the Catholic Church in México and the United States, a Disciples of
Christ Minister and leading exponent of the Social Gospel, Alva Wilmot Taylor wrote: “The
Catholic Church in México is no more like the same church in the US, in either religious or
social practice, than the medieval church was like the modern. It is medievalism rooted into
national life that is just now going through the pangs of a rebirth into the modern world and its
surrenders its power with no more willingness than did that church of the Middle Ages” 163
In February 1926, Representative John J. Boylan of New York introduced in the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives a resolution asking to withdraw recognition
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from the Mexican government because of the religious persecution of American citizens in
México. Boylan requested information about the expulsion of American citizens from México
because of their religious beliefs. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg sent a reply to the
Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Representative Stephen G. Porter, on March 2,
1926. Kellogg pointed out that he received a copy of the resolution introduced to Congress by
Boylan and provided an answer mentioning three specific cases. First, three ladies Ms. Semple,
Ms. Evans, and Ms. Connelly working in a Catholic School, the Academy of the Visitation
situated in Coyoacán in México City, were expelled, but after the American Ambassador
interceded with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the latter overturned the order. After that, the
women decided to close the school and return to Mobile, Alabama. Another event related to the
expulsion of three teachers and Dr. J. A. Phillips an ordained Methodist Episcopal minister and
Principal of the Institute of the People a school located at Piedras Negras, Coahuila, opposite to
Eagle Pass, Texas. Once reported, the order was revoked and the minister returned to México.
The school was allowed to reopen because, although he was a foreigner and a minister of
religion, he did not teach. A third case related to five Mormon Missionaries, Elder Ralph E.
Brown, Owen V. Call, Daniel H. Higgenbotham, Alton S. Hays, and another person not
mentioned who were expelled by the local authorities in the States of Hidalgo and México within
a period of ten days. The authorities did not specify if it included leaving the country too. The
Secretary of State reported that in none of those cases had harassment or punishment of
American citizens occurred. 164

164

United States Department of State, Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States 1926 Volume II
“The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the House of representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs (Porter),”
March 2, 1926, File 812.404/306 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941), 702, 703; “Senate
Asks Papers on Mexican Dispute; Crisis Seen Passing,” New York Times, March 7, 1926, 26.

92

Not only American citizens got involved in deportation struggles; people from other
nationalities faced similar situations. In March 4, 1926, The San Antonio Evening News
published an article signed by Rev. Eugene Sugranes, C. M. F. reporting that Mexican authorities
first granted a passport to and then expelled an Italian priest named Saverio Vecchio, who
allegedly never exercised his ministry and had no authority over any church in Mexico. The
authorities even made Father Vechio pay his own way to the border. Along with him, authorities
deported other three other priests, ordeal-Father Miguel Pons, a Spaniard; Father Antonio Fabre,
a Frenchman, and a Passionist Father. 165
For some, those events reinforced their perspective of México as land of terror. One of
these was a special correspondent for the NCWC news services, Charles Phillips. In the fall of
1925, Phillips reported how “Mexican Catholics were living in a state of constant fear.” 166 In
March 1926, Phillips pointed out that what had happened to Catholic priests in México would
eventually involve Protestant ministers. For Phillips, the Mexican Constitution’s dispositions
related to religion went farther than those in Bolshevik Russia. He concluded that “the truth is
that these laws were aimed at the whole idea of religion and Christian civilization.” 167 Other
magazines published opinions with a different perspective. According to an editorial in The New
Republic, an anti-Mexican campaign proclaiming that México was confiscating American
property and driving out religion had been quite successful with the average American citizen.
The editorial maintained, however, that the campaign relied on false arguments. 168
Some Protestants agreed that the press overstated the degree of religious persecution. On
April 1, 1926, Methodist Bishop George Amos Miller wrote an article entitled: “Is There
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Religious Persecution in Mexico?” In it, Miller analyzed the events in México and concluded
that the press exaggerated the mistreatment of some American citizens south of the border.
According to Bishop Miller’s perspective, “the only people who have real reason for anxiety
concerning ecclesiastical matters in Mexico were those refusing to comply with the law of the
land.” 169 In the same article, Miller pointed out that President Elías Calles, speaking of members
of Protestant religions, recognized their contribution spreading Christian beliefs, respect for the
legal dispositions, and avoidance of involvement in political matters. Miller repeated that
statement on May 5 in Washington “at the open meeting of the board of bishops of the Methodist
Episcopal Church, held in the Foundry Methodist Episcopal Church.” 170
Catholics, however, did not share Miller’s opinion. A Catholic-oriented magazine, The
Commonweal raised the flag against “liberal journalism.” The Commonweal criticized opinions
printed in other magazines like The New Republic, The Christian Century, and The Nation. For
The Commonweal, those articles of opinion about the conflict could be considered as paid
advertisement by the Mexican Government. The editorialist for The Commonweal called that
kind of analysis an aberration and inexcusable, but he did not stop there and put some
responsibility in the Catholics themselves, mentioning that:
the American Catholic body is itself largely responsible
for the miss-apprehension of Mexican Affairs that exist round
about. Far too little has been said in its name, by authoritative
scholarship… Only occasionally has an effort made to grasp
the social, educational and spiritual needs of the Mexican
people…while the aberrations of liberal journalism are
inexcusable, it must be admitted that they could hardly have
been so gigantic if there had existed side by side with them an
enlightened, charitable, Catholic mind about Mexico. 171
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While the debate between members of different religions in the U.S. continued, other
events involving American Catholic priests in México unfolded during 1926. Reverend F. J.
Krill was threatened by government officials in the eastern State of Veracruz with arrest,
allegedly because of his religious beliefs. Rev. Krill went to talk with the authorities explaining
his situation; after that they decided to allow him to remain in México. 172 The situation of the
Apostolic Delegate to Mexico, Bishop of Puerto Rico and West Indies, Archbishop George
Joseph Caruana, however, involved different circumstances. The Mexican government accused
Caruana of false declarations at the moment of his arrival. According to official sources, he
falsely stated his birth, profession and religion, as well as the purpose of his visit. Caruana said
in his defense that the immigration inspector asked him only about his profession, which
Caruana acknowledged as teaching without hiding any other. 173 On May 12, Caruana received a
notification from the Mexican Secret Police, announcing that he must leave the country within
six days. The American Ambassador to Mexico asked the Mexican Authorities to reconsider
that decision. The request was denied and the order prevailed. On May 16, the Apostolic
Delegate, who had arrived on March 5, had no other choice but to leave the country through
Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, from where he returned to Washington. 174
On June 16, 1926, the Director of the Social Action Department of the NCWC, Reverend
John A. Ryan, wrote: “the assumption of fact relied upon by American liberals who defend those
tyrannical provisions of the Mexican Constitution are supported by no specific evidence. No
instances are cited of opposition by the Mexican church or clergy to political or social or
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economic reform measures undertaken by the Mexican government.” 175 Following that pattern
Reverend Ryan stated that:
nothing in the nature of physical opposition has ever changed
against the Mexican clergy. Nor I have seen any pastoral letter
or statement by a priest cited in proof of the general charge that
the Mexican clergy have opposed the social or political reforms
of the Mexican government during the last half century. Even if
the clergy had offered opposition by speech or writing it would
not, on the principles of liberalism, justify governmental denial
of fundamental liberties. 176

Rev. Ryan failed to mention that, in December 1925, the Archbishop Mora Del Río
addressed those attending the National Catechistic Congress. The Congress was held from
December 8th to 12th for the purpose of organizing a group of Mexican Catholic Youth. Mora
Del Río also encouraged pastoral letters, tracts and lectures, petitions to the Chamber of
Deputies, popular manifestations, and all form of action urging the authorities to change the
religious legislation. 177
Reverend Ryan also neglected the words written in the Pastoral Letter signed by Pope
Pius XI on February 2, 1926 or how Church officials had a very active role in politics during the
Porfiriato or their involvement in Madero’s coup d’état and the support provided by the Church
to Victoriano Huerta.
At the end of July 1926, the Mexican Catholic hierarchy called for the suspension of
religious services. Catholics blamed the Mexican government for ordering the suspension.
Despite the lack of evidence for that claim, even today most Mexican Catholics still believe the
Mexican government ordered the suspension of religious services.
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Inside the United States, some believed the Mexican government was responsible for that
suspension. Confusion spread, and American Christians put aside their differences and
supported the Catholic Church. Late July 1926, members of the Protestant religions expressed
their support for the Mexican Catholics. An Episcopalian weekly magazine, The Living Church,
published a plea to all Americans, Episcopalians, and Protestants to join Roman Catholics in
opposing the Mexican government. The Living Church requested that Episcopalians fall in their
knees the next Sunday and earnestly pray to God to guide all who had responsibility for Christian
work of any form in Mexico and to overrule the present persecution. For members of the
Episcopalian Church, what happened in México was no longer an issue between the Pope and the
Mexican government alone. It represented a threat against Christianity. 178 Thus American
Catholics got some temporary companionship in their crusade against the Mexican government.
Meanwhile the General Secretary of the NCWC, Father John J. Burke, wrote that the
government of México had decided to crush the Catholic Church in Mexico by every means
within its power. Father Burke mentioned that, “to know those provisions of the Mexican
Constitution, and the acts of the Mexican government and its agents, is to know that they are
absolutely irreconcilable with justice and the rights of man. They tell of warfare against religion,
a deliberate endeavor to destroy its roots.” 179 In what could be read as an invitation to
Americans to get involved in the conflict developing in the adjacent nation, Father Burke stated
that:
the Catholic Church in Mexico is fighting for the
fundamental principles upon which our country is founded.
Can we look with indifference on their defeat in a neighboring
country? Can we view with indifference the vicious attack
upon them by a government which has its own way to power
178
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through the support of our own? 180

On August 7, 1926, Director of the Legal Department of the NCWC, William F.
Montavon published an article criticizing President Elías Calles’s early defense of the religious
dispositions enacted in México. After calling the Mexican President a tyrant, Montavon
classified those provisions relating to religion in the Mexican Constitution as barbarous and
unchristian 181
In spite of his previous failures on the topic, Representative John J. Boylan did not give
up his campaign to portray himself as a defender of the Mexican Catholic. [In reality, he was an
enemy of the Mexican government]. On August 3, 1926, Boylan went public, asking: “How
long can the administrations in Washington afford to resist the pressure of the American people
and the whole world to clearly and frankly define its position?” 182 He accused the American
government of collusion with the Mexican government, which did not respect life, rights of
property and religious liberty.
Boylan’s words offered a splendid opportunity for those already campaigning in the U.S.
in favor of Mexican Catholics, such as the president of the newly created Association for the
Protection of Religious Rights in Mexico, Former Judge Alfred J. Talley of New York. He
represented an organization with a membership of allegedly 200,000 followers in New York
City. That group “was designed to give the facts of a situation that has for its background the
most atrocious religious persecution of modern time.” 183 In that capacity, Talley “publicly
[demanded] that the American Government cease recognition of Mexico and [prevented] the
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denial of the rights of Catholics.” 184 This action did not represent the first time Judge Talley had
jumped into Representative Boylan’s bandwagon. On March 31, 1926, Talley, as a member of
the Catholic Club of New York City, a group with a membership of 1,000 people, submitted to
the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives two affidavits sworn by persons
who provided him with information about the kidnapping from a convent of twenty-one
Carmelite nuns. These nuns were threatened with confinement in a house of ill fame. They
avoided such punishment by bribing a guard, who allowed them to escape. 185 The story
appeared to be fabricated for public consumption, even including a happy ending.
The Nation published a reply to Talley’s demands for ceasing recognition of the Mexican
government. The editorial expressed sympathy with the protesting Mexican bishops but refused
to support Judge Talley. According to The Nation,
it is not the business of the Washington government to tell
Mexico what its laws should be; Judge Talley would be the
first to resent any suggestion that foreigners should dictate our
laws, and he ought to know better than to suggest that we
dictate to others. If Mexico were as large and as strong as France
in the days of her violent anti-clerical laws, Judge Talley would
not dare suggest such interference. What he wants us to do is to
bully Mexico. 186

In the meantime, members of Protestant Churches in México adopted a conciliatory
approach. During early August, the Pastor of the Union Church, one of the three principal
Protestant churches in México, Reverend Dr. William Evans Thomas, expressed the opinion
“that the laws, fundamental as well as regulatory, concerned Mexicans only and not
foreigners.” 187 A few days later, The New York Times reported that Reverend Thomas
announced he “[would] leave for the US… Dr Thomas [recognized] that the law must be
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enforced as written and that therefore it is impossible for American-born preachers to function
longer without violating the fundamental and regulatory laws.” 188
That conciliatory attitude was share by other Americans who wanted to have a first hand
look of events happening in México. During early August, a party of American Protestant
ministers and writers headed by Alva W. Taylor traveled to México on a so called Good Will
Mission. They met with government officials as well as members of the Catholic Church and
other religions. The group found two conflicting views about events in México. On one side,
Catholic priests mentioned “the Constitution attacked the divine origins of the Church, its ends,
its ministers and its properties” 189 On the other, Mexican Protestant ministers said: “we are
going ahead, putting our whole minds, souls and bodies into the work. We feel the handicap of
the regulations, but different laws can not be made for different people. ..The government is
treating us exactly as treats other people. But we are not suffering because we are obeying the
law.” 190
While members of the Good Will Mission visited México, authorities announced that the
same rules already under way for the Catholic Church’s belongings and priests would apply to
members of any other religions without distinction. 191
Visits, meetings, or the extension to others of the rules already implemented had no
immediate effect over the parties involved in the conflict. Animosity prevailed on both sides.
Extreme positions prevailed; unofficially an armed revolt was already underway. On August 11,

188

“Bishops of Mexico Discuss Peace Plan to Offer to Calles,” New York Times, August 18, 1926, 1.
“Mexicans Answer American Queries,” New York Times, August 7, 1926, 2.
190
Alva W. Taylor, “Mexico’s Church War,” Christian Century Vol. XLIII, No. 39 (September 30, 1926): 1199.
191
“Law to Apply to Protestants,” New York Times, August 9, 1926, 2.
189

100

1926 Archbishop Ruiz y Flores declared that the Army had executed thirty Catholics, two of
them priests. 192
That kind of news inflamed those on both sides of the question. An article in The Nation,
entitled The Mexican Church Goes on Strike, by Carleton Beals argued that those regulations
opposed by the Church were something other countries had already accepted. He pointed out
that the Church tried to inflame the fanaticism and fear through threats of excommunication. 193
Soon, a couple of readers provided a reaction to those assertions. A librarian at Saint Louis
University, Henry H. Regnet, S. J, sent a letter to the editor of The Nation asking for an apology
for what he considered an insult to readers’ intelligence. On the contrary, A. J. Petty from
Newark, New Jersey, supported Beals’ assertions. Petty emphasized that México was trying to
put an end to the tyranny, landlordism, and the educational and political hegemony of the Roman
Church. According to Petty, religious schools tended to fan the flame of narrow sectarian spirit
and to keep alive the religious bigotry that was a source of discord and a menace to the most
sacred rights of the individuals. 194
Members of non-religious organizations jumped into the debate. The President and the
Vice-president of The American Federation of Labor (AFL), William Green, and Matthew Woll,
stated that the American labor movement shared non responsibility for the actions by the
Mexican Labor Unions, in support, of the measures against the Catholic Church. Labor Unions
in America separated political action from religious beliefs. They did not join forces with either
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the Church or the Mexican government. American labor encouraged both sides to look for
adequate levels of tolerance in order to find a solution to the conflict. 195
Calls for tolerance had no influence on some Catholics. During early August, Reverend
Thomas Shannon made a comparison, in The New World, between what happened in Russia and
the events underway in México. Shannon criticized Bishop Miller’s article dismissing reports of
religious persecution in Mexico. According to Shannon, the Methodist Church would assume
the same attitude than the Catholic Church if it were deprived of all its belongings and property
as well as of freedom to exercise religious services. 196 This did not represent the only critique to
Bishop Miller; in September 1926, The Catholic World published an editorial comment
providing observations about the same topic. The piece asked if the Methodists would obey the
law. It also questioned whether the Methodist doctrine held that the State was superior to the
Church. The article wondered how much freedom for the Methodist Church Miller was willing
to give surrender. The article then focused on the real issue of the disagreement, putting aside
spiritual considerations and going straight into earthly matters; it directly asked Bishop Miller:
“Are you hoping that the Catholic Church will be eradicated in Mexico and that you may come
in and take her place? Is that the reason you are enduring the yoke of a gang of acknowledge
infidels and atheists?” 197
The editorialist of The Catholic World asked for a more conciliatory attitude. Perhaps for
him, as for other Catholics, the struggle involved which religion would control the Mexicans’
conscience. In that struggle, the Catholic Church had some advantages, including a well
organized group of laymen working alongside the priests.
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In the United States, the Knights of Columbus represented the leading voice among
secular Catholics supporting the Mexican Catholics. The Knights of Columbus took an active
role in urging the American government for a change in its policy toward México. The Knights
of Columbus declared their animosity toward the Mexican government openly and demanded
that the American government dispatch a remonstrance to the President of México for his
impious policy against the Church. 198 In August 1926, at their annual convention in
Philadelphia, the K of C voted unanimously to request President Coolidge to lift an arms
embargo imposed against nongovernmental factions in México. During the same meeting, the
Knights also authorized
[their] Supreme Board of Directors to access [their] membership
to the extent of $1,000,000 for a campaign of education
to the end that the politics of Soviet Russia shall be eliminated
from the philosophy of American life and the ideals of liberty
of conscience and democratic freedom may extend to [their]
afflicted fellow human beings beyond the Río Grande.199

The Knights had no doubt “this system in Mexico has been created under American
auspices and sustain by American executive authority… Representatives of [Elías] Calles have
insulted and degraded and expelled American citizens, and called upon the President and the
State Department to put an end to this ignominious contempt.” 200 The Knights’ membership also
agreed to ask for an appointment with President Coolidge to express their point of view about the
Mexican situation. On August 13, emissaries of the Knights failed to obtain assurances from
Secretary Kellogg about a change in the U.S. policy toward Mexico. 201
President Coolidge met with the Supreme Knight James A. Flaherty and four other
members of the Supreme Council of the Knights of Columbus on September 1, 1926. The main
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topic of the meeting was the religious conflict in México. President Coolidge answered that he
would make a decision about their request after he met with Ambassador Sheffield.
After the meeting Supreme Knight Flaherty called a press conference. In the conference
Flaherty, apparently influenced by Coolidge’s attitude, changed the Knights’ initial position
toward México. According to Flaherty, the Knights opposed a lifting of the arms embargo, while
showed support for continued recognition of [Elías] Calles’ government. Flaherty concluded
that the Knights considered the Mexican situation as consequence of those policies implemented
during the years of Presidents Wilson and Harding. Consequently, it could not be attributed to
Coolidge’s administration. 202
On September 8, President Coolidge made a public statement assuring that the United
States government would keep a “hands off” policy in the religious conflict in México, which he
considered the a Mexican domestic issue.
[T]he controversy between the Church and [Elías] Calles
government is solely a Mexican internal question which
can not figure in international relations. The only interest
of the United States has in this difference is the protection
of American rights in there. The government sees no way
by which it can carry out the request of the Knights of
Columbus.” 203

For the time being, diplomacy prevailed as the main tool of negotiation in U.S.-México
relations. On September 9, The Knights of Columbus got an official notification that their mail
to Mexico had been banned because their attacks on the President of Mexico. The United States
Postal authorities in Washington were cited as the source informing about the proscription. 204
This did not help to change the Knights’ attitude. Consequently they continued their activities
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related to the religious problem in Mexico. They were not alone; many other laymen and
members of the Church shared their attitude.
The campaign against the Mexican government continued to a point that unfair
comparisons were made. The Catholic World criticized American newspapers for devoting so
much space to complaints about the atrocities committed by Mussolini’s regime while failing to
see a tyrant far more violent than Mussolini at the door steps of America. 205 For the editorialist,
“what [was] in progress in Mexico [was] not a persecution of the Church; it [represented] rather,
- to borrow a phrase from Cardinal O’Connell, - a defiance of the first principles upon which
human government must rest, and a denial of the fundamental rights of citizens.” 206 The apology
for Mussolini was somewhat predictable, given that the negotiations that culminated in the
signing of the Lateran Treaty had already begun in 1926. As a result of this Treaty, the Vatican
State was created in 1929. The Duce had become a more sympathetic figure for the Catholic
Church, while the Mexican authorities represented the despicable role of enemies of the faith.
The Catholic hierarchy played a pragmatic game. The editorialist for The Catholic World forgot
that news related to the Mexican religious conflict had been widely covered by American
newspapers and magazines of opinion.
In early September of 1926, the Anti-Fascist Alliance of North America expressed the
support of its 500 delegates for the policies related to religious matters implemented by President
Elías Calles. 207 Months later, the support for the Mexican government came from the other side
of the aisle. The Imperial Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan, Hiram Wesley Adams, stated that “the
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government of México [was] entirely right in this religion question, for a State–controlled
Church is better than a Church-controlled State.” 208
Supporters of the Church, however, did not refrain from complaints against the Mexican
authorities. Bishop of Oklahoma, Francis C. Kelley accused the Mexican government of
destroying the Catholic Church. Kelley mentioned that those in charge of the government
arrived there as a result of false elections. 209 This did not represent the first incursion of Bishop
Kelley into Mexican issues. In 1923, after the United States government gave diplomatic
recognition to President Obregón, Kelly sent a letter to the State Department demanding an
explanation and the assurance that Obregón had agreed to respect the Catholic Church in
Mexico. Once Kelley knew there was no specific assurance related to that matter, he threatened
to lead a Catholic boycott against the financial institutions doing business with the Mexican
government. 210 The threat never materialized.
Kelley denied the charges that the Catholic Church owned between one and two thirds of
the Mexico’s wealth, as President Elías Calles asserted. Trying to defend his point, Bishop Kelly
made a comparison between the possessions own by the Baptist Church in the U.S. and the
alleged property of the Catholic Church in México. First, Bishop Kelley mentioned that, after a
century of existence, the Baptist Church’s membership was 7.5 million adherents who attended
services provided by 50, 000 ministers in 60, 000 churches. The annual income of the Baptist
Church represented around 30 million dollars, and its productive holdings reached a value of
around 100 million dollars. Kelly pointed out that nobody accused this religious institution of
having excessive wealth. On the other hand, Kelly wrote that the Mexican Catholic Church with
208
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15 million followers, had five thousand clergymen providing spiritual support in 10, 000
churches. Its estimated annual income reached a total of 15 million dollars while the value of
properties, most of them unproductive, reached a total of 30 million dollars. According to
Bishop Kelley, these figures spoke for themselves. Kelley proceeded to emphasize that, at its
richest the Church in Mexico had less than a certain American millionaire made in the course of
his life and less than the endowment of three American universities. 211
Though accurate, Kelly’s figures could be misleading in the Mexican case. Kelley never
mentioned an undisputable fact. Since the earlier years of the Porfiriato the Church found ways
to avoid the dispositions written under the Reform Laws. “In order to get around these laws the
title to Church property was very often vested in the name of some prominent Catholic, the
understanding being that he was to hold it in trust for the benefit of the Church” 212 .
Consequently, when somebody analyzed the possessions owned by the Church in México, the
results would show an organization wrestling day to day in order to survive.
On November 5, 1926, The Knights of Columbus held a reunion in Chicago, presided
over by their Supreme Council. During the meeting, the Knights tried to define a plan for “the
expenditure of a $1,000,000 fund for the arousal of American public opinion against oppression
of Catholic worshipers.” 213 Without stopping there, James A. Fatherly added:
the Mexican Government has denied freedom of speech
and freedom of conscience, and has suspended the writ of
habeas corpus and denied the right to trail by jury. But since
it has been unable to break the will of the Mexican people by
such methods its agents are now resorting to murder, rapine
and cruelties, the like of which have never been witnessed on
the American Continent.214
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Flaherty also accused the Mexican government of communism. He stated that every
single dollar would be spend to fight that atrocity and “for our relief work among exiled priests
and nuns. That was the extent of our activities.” 215 The Archbishop of Philadelphia, Dennis
Cardinal Dougherty, contended that the Supreme Council’s work was proof that American
Catholics could not be disregarded. 216 The K of C had decided to take an active role in Mexican
matters.
The Knights attempted to involve American Catholics in Mexican issues. In early
December, the Mexican General Consul in New York, Arturo M. Elías sent a report to the
Mexican President. Elías informed that members of the K of C met in New York City on
November 28, 1926. The reunion was headed by Democratic Representative Loring M. [Milton]
Black [from the 5th District of New York]. Black mentioned that the spread of Communism in
México had become a threat for the security of the United States. A former assistant to the U.S.
Attorney General, identified in the Elias report as Mr. Crosby, stated that the educational
campaign supported by the K of C had as its main goal the spread of American values without
considering religious issues. The K of C tried to inform every American citizen, regardless of
religion beliefs, about the situation in México. Consul Elías affirmed that another member of the
Knights, Mr. Tobin told the meeting of the Knights that he attended the meetings with President
Coolidge and Secretary Kellogg. 217 Tobin said that Coolidge recognized the important service
the Knights were doing to the American Government in educating people about the real
conditions in Mexico. In the case of an armed intervention, the K of C would support U.S.
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Government’s actions. A Jesuit Father Carlos Heredia, acknowledged also the Knights for their
actions in favor of Catholicism and justice. 218
At the end of 1926, the relations between the Mexican authorities and the Catholic
hierarchy were tense, to say the least. Some American publications like the Chicago Tribune
and Liberty engaged in a campaign urging the U.S. towards a forcible annexation of Mexico.
The newspapers supported this demand on the basis that Mexicans were not exploiting their
natural resources and therefore Americans should. Liberty published a photo which purported to
portray “Catholics Withdrawing Deposits from the Bank of Mexico in Protest against the Seizure
of Church Property.” The image, however, did not match the text. It had been taken and
published in México eleven months before. The persons depicted were depositing instead of
withdrawing funds. 219
Due to the debate underway in the U.S., members of the League for the Defense of
Religious Liberty believed wide support was waiting for their cause north of the Río Grande. In
early December, Vice-president of the National League for Religious Liberty, René Capistrán
Garza, traveled to New York. He was searching for something more than spiritual support.
Capistrán asked the U.S. “to withdraw its support from the [Elías] Calles tyranny that oppressed
us [the Catholics].” 220 Claiming that the League had a membership of two million people,
Capistrán predicted an economic revolution in México and the downfall of Elías Calles’ regime.
He declared that they were fighting for religious liberty and freedom of choice for the parents
concerning the education of their children.
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Meanwhile, in the Southwest U.S. members of other religions were looking for solutions
to the problems affecting México and Hispanic Americans. From December 11 to 16, members
of 30 Protestant denominations, totaling 150 people, one third of them Hispanics, met in El Paso
Conference. The meeting took place under the auspices of the Home Missions Council of New
York City, and was held at the Mexican Presbyterian Church of the Divine Savior. Participants
concluded that a delegation of prominent ministers and laymen would visit México in January of
1927. Reverend Hubert C. Herring would head the delegation, later known as the Second Good
Will Mission. 221

1927: Some Calling for a Coup d’état, others Looking for an Understanding
Capistrán’s campaign in the U.S. did not stop in the Eastern region. In January, he went
to the Southwest. Capistrán and a group of former Mexican revolutionaries published a
manifesto in El Paso, Texas. In that manifesto, the rebels called on the Mexican people to take
arms, and named Capistrán as the provisional president of México. A Mexican émigré, an active
Catholic, and member of the Knights of Columbus, Joseph P. Gándara was appointed as military
control chief. Gándara would have the support of “generals” Juan B. Galindo, Nicolás
Fernández and Agustín Escobar, allegedly members of Francisco Villa’s Army during the
Mexican Revolution. 222 Capistrán’s proclamation did not turn things around. In México, the
Cristeros avoided any proclamation in favor of Capistrán as president. This did not represent an
obstacle for the self proclaimed president of México. Capistrán asked the American Catholic
hierarchy for pecuniary support, something he got in a very modest way.
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Capistrán traveled to Washington where he tried to convince Congressmen and
government officials to lift the arms embargo on the rebels. He also asked for a prohibition of
the sale of weapons to the Mexican government. Both requests were denied. Capistrán realized
that his campaign was in trouble. He went to San Antonio, Texas to met William J. Buckley.
The businessman offered to introduce Capistrán to Nicholas Brady from New York. One of the
most prominent laymen in America and a personal friend of Pius XI and Cardinal Gasparri, the
papal Secretary of State, Brady was the first non-ordained American to receive the title of Papal
Chamberlain. 223 According to Buckley, Brady would be able to provide the financial support
required for continuing the warfare against the Mexican government. Capistrán planned to ask
Brady for five hundred thousand dollars. However, before Capistrán’s return to New York,
Bishop Díaz Barreto began to lobby intensely against the members of the League. Consequently,
Capistrán never met Brady. 224 That represented a set back for the Mexican Catholics.
In the meantime, the Second Good Will Mission traveled to México to meet with
government officials and members of different faiths. A list of fifteen questions about the
religious conflict in México was submitted to the Catholic hierarchy before its meeting with
members of the Mission. Rabbi Isaac Landman, the editor of the American Hebrew Review, was
responsible of this set of questions. Bishop Díaz Barreto, who acted as the spokesman for the
Catholic hierarchy, responded to all the questions. The reply was well accepted by the members
of the American delegation. Rabi Landman speaking on behalf of the visitors, “said he hoped
that the unusual meeting of Jews, Protestants and Catholic Bishops would be a forerunner of
better relations among all creeds” 225
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Later, the group met with President Elías Calles. He recognized the spiritual nature of
the Mission and its efforts to learn the truth about the situation in México. The president’s words
became less conciliatory when he referred to the attitude of the Mexican Catholic clergy. He
accused clerics and reactionary forces of inciting ignorant men to a revolt against the Mexican
government. The president told members of the Mission that Catholic priests saw a possible
rupture of relations with the U.S. government as an opportunity to gain recognition for its efforts
against the Mexican authorities. Referring to U.S.-México relations, President Elías Calles
asserted that the problems then underway did not represent a conflict between the people of one
country against another. Rather, it was problem between the people of México and a small group
of American capitalists [the oilmen] trying to induce the Department of State to aid them by
force. These difficulties did not threaten in any sense the vital interests of either country. 226
After returning to the U.S., Hubert Herring wrote that “[Elías] Calles’ regime seeks to
break reactionary power of priests. The religious struggle in Mexico was as at heart not a
religious conflict but the struggle of the Mexican people finally to establish themselves as a free
Nation...” 227 Others disagreed with that opinion. On February 1, 1927, Rabbi Bernard Heller
sent a letter to President Coolidge mentioning that he had declined an invitation to be part of the
Good Will Mission because it represented a political maneuver, and would provide a one side
version of the situation in México. 228 Rabbi Heller did not offer any further explanation to
support his assertion. Some doubts about the real intention behind that Mission appeared when
Representative Edgar Howard, a Democrat from Nebraska, sent a message to Secretary Kellogg
questioning whether the U.S. government had supported the Mission. That question derived
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from what Howard learned about several lectures delivered in Nebraska by a member of that
Mission, Rev. W. M. Pysher of Kansas City Missouri. The acting Secretary of State, Joseph C.
Grew, denied that the government supported the mission. 229
Other repercussions of the Good Will Mission included some issues involving
Ambassador Sheffield. Pastor of the Washington Congregational Church, Rev. Paul G. Macy,
published an article in the Toledo Times. Macy denounced Ambassador Sheffield, calling the
Ambassador’s treatment of him and the group [the Mission] abominable. Immediately, the
Ambassador sent a note to Secretary Kellogg denying such charges. He added that none of the
members of the Mission even called at the U.S. Embassy in México. Sheffield also criticized
Carleton Beals, a member of the Mission. According to Sheffield the article “Mexico’s
“Bloodless Victory” written by Beals and published in The Nation on January 26, 1927, was
propaganda paid by Mexican authorities. 230
Those incidents became part of a debate at the U.S. Senate. Democratic Senator J.
Thomas Heflin of Alabama “spent three and a half hours attacking the Catholic Church and the
Knights of Columbus for trying to drag us [the U.S.] into war with México.” 231 This attack
represented an old charge made previously by Heflin, and denied by James A. Flaherty. 232
Heflin got angry when Democratic Senator William Cabell Bruce of Maryland accused him of
reviving a religious controversy more than 600 years old. Heflin engaged in a heated discussion
not only with Bruce but also with Republican Senator James W. Wadsforth of New York and
Democratic Senator James A. Reed of Missouri. According to The New York Times, Heflin
“insinuated that Ambassador Sheffield had been party to a Catholic plan to force war with
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México.” Wadsforth replied that he “resented the innuendo that Mr. Sheffield, an honorable
American gentleman, has been faithless to his trust by divulging confidential dispatches” 233
Heflin said “he never dreamed of the insidious activity of the Pope who controls weak-kneed
Protestants, and… Archbishop Hayes controls the Republican and Democratic candidates in New
York. The Al Smith crowd will vote the Democratic ticket when they can use it, but will trade
with Republicans.” This entire allegation covered the real political purposes of Senator Heflin.
His main goal was to control the Democratic Party. He stated that he was tired of New York
trying to run the Democratic Party, adding “we can win [presumably the presidency of the
country] without New York, and nominate a candidate outside that state. New York is s a
liability to our party.” 234 Behind this debate was a combination of xenophobic and religious
issues as well as the urban-rural conflict. During the 1920s poverty increased in the rural areas
while the cities flourished. Consequently, many people migrated to the cities. “With the rise in
agrarian poverty and the loss of ambitious farm youths to the urban factories went a decline in
rural morale.” 235 Because of that disparity, some living in cities developed a sense of superiority
over those still living in the rural areas. For 1924, that rivalry was transplanted to politics where
struggles between rural and urban Democrats over the divisive
issues of the Ku Klux Klan, Roman Catholicism, and
prohibition increased the self-consciousness and
aggressiveness of both factions even as it weakened the whole
party; and in the increased militancy of its camps lay a source
of future strength for the entire party.236

But for the meantime, spiritual matters and faith became an excuse to conduct a battle for
political power.
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A Thoughtful Debate between John A. Ryan and Norman Thomas
The debate over the mission and the one at the U.S. Senate were part of many debates in
which the Mexican conflict became a mean to express domestic political discrepancies. At a
more thoughtful level was a private epistolary debate between the Director of the Department for
Social Action of the NCWC, Rev John A. Ryan, and the socialist and Co-Director of the League
of Industrial Democracy, Norman Thomas. The debate took place during February and March
1927. Some excerpts from the debate show how a member of the American Catholic Church
tried to justify the behavior of the Mexican Catholic Church. Ryan claimed his lack of
information, something hard to believe coming from a person like him. Thomas supported his
assertions on the basis of the writings of Carleton Beals, Ernest Gruening, Protestant
missionaries and Mexican socialists. Taking into account that neither Ryan nor Thomas had
lived in México; the debate showed the level of influence that publications had over leaders of
opinion.
Despite the Catholics’ campaign to present themselves as victims of Mexican
government’s intolerance, the past behavior of the Catholic Church in México could not be
erased. An example was provided by Thomas’ words: “I am still of the opinion that, at least
until very recently, the record of the [Mexican] church is very far from conforming to the
standards of the National Catholic Welfare Conference in matters of political or economic
justice” 237 Rev. Ryan answered: “…it is not a fair question or a fair test. The only fair question
as to the facts [not the principle] of the situation is whether the Mexican Church has opposed
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political or economic reforms in the last half century. I challenge you to produce the evidence
which would justify an affirmative answer [to this question].” 238
Evidently Ryan knew he had some advantage, considering Thomas hardly could be
considered an expert about Mexican issues. Thomas had no other choice but to admit that he did
not rely on first hand information. Basing his conclusions on readings and the testimonies of
people living in México, Thomas concluded “that the Mexican Church by its acts of omission
and commission has exploited the people in varying degree but with fair consistency from the
time of the Spanish Conquest at least down to the fall of the Huerta government.” 239 Ryan
replied on March 3. He acknowledged offenses of both kinds (omission and commission)
committed by the Church during the eighteenth century. Since the enactment of Constitution of
1857, Ryan said: “I am impelled to believe that in the period since intervening the Church has
possessed very little power for exploiting the people…If you have any reliable information or
can refer to any reliable source [about that] I shall be genuinely grateful to you for making me
acquainted with them.” 240 Ryan stated that, because the power of the clergy had been broken in
1857, a landed aristocracy was born and consequently the misery of the Mexican peon increased.
“The condition of the masses was far worse in 1910 than it had been in 1810…” 241 This
argument was very well elaborated coming from somebody alleging a lack of knowledge about
México. Reverend Ryan, however, avoided mentioning how, during Porfirio Díaz’ government,
the Catholic Church consolidated its economic power. From 1876 to 1910, Church’s wealth
increased to 100 million pesos.
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Thomas provided a straightforward answer a couple of days later. “Granting that the
landed aristocracy which grew up after 1857 was as bad as or worse than the Church,” he wrote,
was it not on the whole allied with the Church?” 242 There was only one answer to that question:
yes. The Catholic Church, however, would never accept that. Consequently Rev. Ryan looked
for an escape, proceeding to deny such charges. He tried to divert the reality about the Church in
México and showed a little bit of his intolerance toward other religions in the US.
I am inclined [to] think that the proper answer is in the
negative, since the bishops and the clergy of México were
deprived of the power they once exercised in that country and
even under Díaz were merely tolerated. My impression is that
they exercised less influence upon the government than have
several Protestants in this country exercised upon our
American Government through the anti-Saloon League.243

The arguments of Reverend Ryan, and those made before by Bishop Kelley, exhibited the
animosity of some members of the Catholic Church toward other religions. During the next
years, the debate about the religious issue would emerge as a polarizing factor within the United
States. One of the reasons for such disagreement relied on the already mentioned events
developing in México which day after day attracted more Americans who became interested in
events there. Soon two groups had been created. One, formed mainly by Protestants, supported
the actions of the Mexican government. Another, formed by Catholics and supported by
businessmen, clamored for U.S. intervention in México to stop the measures implemented there
or even to overthrow the government. The struggle, however, had nothing to do with faith. It
was a battle for earthly power. The Catholic Church was defending its religious monopoly in
México
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The Struggle Continued Far Beyond Words
The Mexican government pursued its policy of expelling those Catholic priests refusing to
obey the law. That attitude provided an excellent excuse for the Church to proclaim itself as a
victim of intolerance and persecution. According to the Catholic hierarchy, this started when the
Apostolic Delegate Monsignor Filippi was expelled in 1923.
Although the Mexican government tried to tell its side of the story in the American press,
members of the Church were more effective managing press relations. Catholics took advantage
of their role as victims of government’s intolerance. Every single event related to priests,
members of Catholic congregations or businessmen, (even when they did not necessarily belong
to the Catholic faith) became a good excuse to magnify the protests and take the message abroad.
National and foreigners priests were forced to leave the country. They portrayed themselves as
victims of government intolerance toward Catholicism.
By the end of 1926, around two hundred foreign priests had been “invited” to leave the
country. They would not be the only ones; soon the Mexican prelates also would be asked to
leave. In early January 1927, the Mexican government imprisoned Bishop Díaz Barreto and five
other high-ranking members of the Mexican clergy as well as a large number of members of the
National League for the Defense of Religious Liberty. They faced charges of rebellion,
encouraging other Catholics to take violent actions, and distributing pamphlets containing
writings with derogatory epithets against the Mexican government. 244 Bishop Díaz Barreto
escaped from prison, and, on March 11, he appeared in the Church of Our Lady of Esperanza on
West Broadway, in New York City preaching a sermon entitled: “The real attitude of the
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Mexican government toward the Catholic Church.” 245 Priests continued their “victimization”
campaign.
While Catholics refused to obey the enacted rules, members of other religions considered
it better to fulfill the requirements. At the beginning of January 1927, Rev. W.B. Beauchamp,
Bishop of Georgia and México, announced that all property holdings of the Methodist Episcopal
South Church in México, including schools and hospitals, had been registered with the Mexican
Government. The value of those belongings amounted to one million pesos. 246 Reverend
Beauchamp asserted that members of his religion were not in México for profits but just to
provide services.
The struggle between the prelates and Mexican authorities did not abate. In April 1927,
eight members of the Mexican Catholic hierarchy, three archbishops and five bishops, got a
request from government officials to report to the judiciary authorities in order to explain their
participation in the armed movement. That action derived from a statement made by Archbishop
Mora Del Río to the Minister of the Interior, Adalberto Tejada. The archbishop said: “that he
maintained the right of the Catholics in Mexico to fight against tyranny, peaceful if possible, but
with arms in an extremity.” 247 Consequently, José Mora Del Río, Archbishop of México;
Leopoldo Ruiz y Flores, Archbishop of Michoacán; Pedro Vera y Zuria, Archbishop of Puebla;
José de Jesús Manríquez y Zarate, Bishop of Huejutla; Salvador Uranga, Bishop of Cuernavaca;
Ignacio Valdespino y Díaz, Bishop of Aguascalientes; Gerardo Anaya, Bishop of Chiapas; and,
José María Echeverria, Bishop de Saltillo, had only two options. They could attend the request
of the judiciary tribunals in México to answer about their support for the Cristero Revolt or be
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deported. On April 22, with Mexican authorities threatening to imprison them, the eight prelates
boarded the train to Nuevo Laredo and went into exile to the U.S. 248
On American soil, the Mexican clerisy established their headquarters in San Antonio,
Texas under the leadership of Archbishop Mora Del Río, Monsignor Ruiz y Flores and Bishop
Díaz Barreto. They represented the moderate wing within the Mexican prelates. They tried to
separate from the extremist group headed by Archbishop González y Valencia, residing in Rome.
During the spring of 1927, Archbishop Gonzalez issued a Pastoral Letter giving his implicit
support to the members of the League for the Defense of Religious Liberty and their actions.
Those residing in San Antonio, however, had no intention yet to surrender and declare defeat to
the Mexican government.
Bishop Díaz Barreto traveled to Rome to meet Cardinal Gasparri. During the meeting
Díaz Barreto explained how, in his opinion, the Cristero movement had no future. Díaz advised
Gasparri to end any support provided by the Church to the Cristeros. Under Bishop Díaz’ new
proposal, the search for new leaders to head the rebellion against the Mexican government would
be a first step. According to Díaz Barreto, only two people could fulfill that position: the
nephew of the late dictator Porfirio Díaz, Félix Díaz, or a former advocate of Victoriano Huerta,
Nemesio García Naranjo. 249
On January 27, 1927, The Knights of Columbus held a meeting in Washington D.C. The
main speaker was a Los Angeles lawyer, Joseph Scott. His speech accused the Mexican
government of representing Bolshevism and openly being enemies of freedom and religion.
Making a comparison between the U.S. Constitution and the Mexican charter, Scott concluded:

248
249

Taracena, La Verdadera Revolución Mexicana: 1925-1927, 226.
Quirk, The Mexican Revolution and the Catholic Church: 1910-1929, 204, 205.

120

“we should have as a neighbor a government with our own ideals of religious liberty and
political freedom.” 250 The statement echoed Guthrie’s allegations made in December 1926.
The Knights tried to offer their advocates first hand information about events in México.
Consequently, the K of C supported the travels of some writers to the neighboring country.
Capitan Francis McCullagh was one of these writers. After visiting México for six weeks in
1927, McCullagh wrote a book titled Red Mexico: A Reign of Terror in America. 251 The book
was full of epithets against the Mexican president. McCullagh classified the Mexican President
as a “bewildered and half-savage dictator who hates the United States and detests the English
language.” 252 Captain McCullagh even blamed President Wilson for supporting the socialists
[sic] in power in 1914. In that year, Wilson sent troops to México to get rid of Victoriano
Huerta. Years before the publication of his book, McCullagh had criticized people of his own
faith. In 1925, he blamed Catholics around the world for doing nothing about events in México.
He accused American Catholic newspapers of excluding news from México, pointing out they
might have been acting under the influence of the State Department which, like all Foreign
Offices, preferred moral suasion to open denunciation. 253
In 1928, McCullagh attacked the whole American press because of its lack of coverage of
events in México. He presented himself as the owner of the truth. Without mentioning its name,
McCullaugh criticized a great New York paper which refused to publish his articles.
Consequently, he wrote: “there is no protection for the individual against that tremendous
propaganda machine which exists in America, growing stronger every year, and which may be
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suddenly turned some day by its manipulators against liberty and Christianity and in favor of
Heaven knows what puritanical, sentimentalist or suicidal folly.” 254
McCullagh exhibited very limited access to readings on the American press and about the
opinion of the Mexican president toward the United States. Between 1926 and 1928, the daily
press and magazines of opinion had widely covered the religious conflict in México.
In relation to the attitude of the Mexican president toward the United States, McCullagh
was wrong. Some excerpts of that press coverage will help to show McCullagh’s flawed
interpretation. On October 28, 1924, Elías Calles attended a banquet given by the American
Exporters and Manufactures Association in New York. During that event Elías Calles said: “I
invite capitalists and industrials of good will – not aggressive and piratical capitalists- to assist
me in the reconstructive development of a people” 255 In February 1927, Elías Calles confirmed
that attitude during an interview given to Isaac F. Marcosson of The Saturday Evening Post.
Elías Calles considered opposition to Mexico’s economic development from within the US as an
absurd. México’s growth would require more capital and consumption of goods. The natural
market from which to acquire them would be the U.S. Since Europe was building a powerful
coalition to take out the U.S.’s world market predominance, the future of the U.S. rested in a
strong coalition within the Western Hemisphere. Because of that Elías Calles, made sure that
México did not reject American investments and offered protection to those properties of
American citizens on Mexican soil. 256
During late summer 1927, in the middle of the crisis with the U.S. government over the
petroleum laws, the Mexican President stated in his message to Congress: “… relations with the
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United States are fundamentally important in our national life for obvious reasons based upon
proximity and the extensive commercial relations of the two countries.” 257 Elías Calles had
some disagreements with the U.S., but he was perfectly aware of reality.
Financing doubtful works such as Red Mexico did not necessary generate support for the
K of C. Even Rev. John A. Ryan disagreed with that class of “violent statements found in
Knights of Columbus’ pamphlets and in reported utterances of certain individual Catholics… I
have never had any sympathy with that kind of procedure…” 258 Opinions like this did not stop
the activities of the Knights.
The struggle between Mexican Catholics and Mexican authorities continued. Both sides
accused each other of wrongdoings. Political and ecclesiastic hierarchies tried to justify their
actions blaming each other while the general population became victims of intolerance and
stubbornness. The American press provided extensive coverage.
The news reported that government troops imprisoned and, without a trial, executed one
of the Cristeros’ main leaders, Anacleto González Flores. Consequently, Catholics decided to
take revenge. On April 19, 1927 a group under the leadership of priests [José Reyes] Vega,
[Aristeo] Pedroza, [Jesús] Angulo, a lawyer named [Miguel Gómez] Loza and a bandit
[Victoriano Ramírez] nicknamed No. 14 attacked a train near to the city of Guadalajara in the
Western State of Jalisco, slaying or burning alive 100 people. The Mexican government
vehemently accused the Mexican Episcopate as intellectually responsible for this action. 259 The
Papal Delegate residing in the United States, Monsignor Fumasoni-Bondi denied those charges.
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Fumasoni accused President Elías Calles of using his political power to blame the Church for the
religious conflict in México. 260 Backing Fusamoni’s assertions, the Jesuit priest Carlos Heredia
denied any involvement of the Mexican prelates in the train incident. Also, Bishop Díaz Barreto
stated that “out of [his] knowledge of other things the [Elías] Calles government has done, it may
well that it has already killed or is about to kill the three priests named and is this cold-bloodedly
attempting to justify itself.” 261 As mentioned before, eight members of the Mexican Catholic
hierarchy needed to abandon the country following this event. Five days after the assault, Diaz’s
predictions became a reality; the Mexican authorities announced the execution of one of the
priests directly involved in the robbery while twelve more rebels died during the fighting. 262 It
looked like rational thinking had abandoned both sides. Many more lives would perish before a
solution arrived.
The debate about who was responsible for such kind of actions prevailed for a long time.
In 1966, Vicente Camberos Vizcaíno, in Francisco El Grande: Francisco Orozco Jiménez,
Biografía, accused the Mexican government of trying to present the event as a common robbery
to discredit the members of the rebellion. According to Camberos, the main goal of the assault
was accomplished; the movement got three hundred thousand pesos to continue fighting. He
concluded: “only fifty three soldiers were killed while setting fire to the train.” 263 Camberos
showed Catholic piety at his best.
During 1927, newspapers reported how extreme positions prevailed. In December 1927,
when things began to look different and rational behavior reappeared, a group of American
women belonging to the National Council of Catholic Women sent a letter to President Coolidge.
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This organization criticized the recently appointed Ambassador Morrow’s policy and
Lindbergh’s mission to México as an example of condoning persecutions. 264 These kinds of
attitudes did not help to accelerate an agreement, and represented an example of the prevailing
attitude among some American Catholics.
On April 23, 1928, Martin Conboy, a lawyer and prominent New York Catholic, sent a
letter to the editor of The New York Times. Conboy commented about a speech delivered days
before [April 15] by the Mexican Minister of Education, José Manuel Puig Casauranc. Puig
invited Mexican Bishops to a dialogue to end the differences. The Times reported that the end of
the religious conflict was near. Conboy, however, believed recent events did not fulfill those
expectations. To support his assertion, Conboy mentioned the punishment of Catholics in
México. Conboy stated that “with nuns turned out of their convents homes, the soldiers of
[Elías] Calles are no gentler than the soldiers of Islam.” 265 (Once again the resounding echo of
those words pronounced 833 years earlier by Pope Urban II, Otto of Lagery, became part of the
debate). To demonstrate how miserable things were in México, Conboy mentioned that:
“twenty-three priests were killed, most of them tortured, from the first of the year to the first
week of March.” 266 More stories about Catholics victims of violence went around.
Opponents of the Church pointed out that it was no bastion of tolerance. Ernest Gruening
wrote in The Nation how in México the terms Protestant and Jew were commonly used as
epithets. Members of the clerisy employed them interchangeably with atheistic, Bolshevistic and
Masonic. 267 Catholic priests openly denied tolerance toward members of other religions.
Gruening stated how “incredible as it may appear to persons in the United States, Protestant
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missionaries have within the last three years been set upon by mobs and killed for no reason
other than that of their faith and calling.” 268 Gruening mentioned the attitude of priests like
Bishop Miguel de la Mora of San Luis Potosí, who preached sermons in which he stated that
from “his new position of vantage towering above México, Christ would defy His enemies as He
had defied the Jews who had crucified Him.” 269 The attitudes revealed by Gruening prevailed
for many years in México; up to the 1960s, children attending catechism lessons still listened to
such comments.
Such events received very narrow coverage in the United States. On the other hand, even
the funeral of a Mexican clergy got wide exposure. Time published an article titled Death in
Mexico. 270 The piece focused on the sermon delivered by Archbishop of San Antonio Arthur
Jerome Drossaerts during the memorial services of the Bishop of Aguascalientes, Rt. Rev.
Ignacio Valdespino. Drossaerts referred to a series of murders and assassinations committed by
people connected to the Mexican government. Drossaerts emphasized cases concerning other
priests killed, Catholics caught and tortured, villages burned, rape, murder, and happenings of a
like nature. 271 With that framework, the words of the Archbishop of San Antonio fit perfectly
with the content of his sermon. Drossaerts stated that:
Liberty is being crucified at our very door and the United
States looks on with perfect indifference. Despotism seems to
have become popular amongst us. Are we not sending endless
goodwill parties to Mexico? Are we not courting the
friends and favor of the very men whose hands are simply
dripping with the blood of their innocent victims? . . The
ominous silence of the American press and pulpit is not
understandable. . . 272
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Drossaerts assertion was false. The U.S. government had followed closely the Mexican
conflict. American press had published information and analysis on the topic. Lay organizations
like the K of C had developed an intensive campaign to present their side of the story. Maybe
Archbishop Drossaerts felt such disappointment because the U.S. did not invade Mexico or
President Coolidge did not make any official announcement against the Mexican authorities and
taking Catholics’ side.
American Catholics became convinced that what happened in México represented a
threat against humankind. Catholics leading spokesmen refused to give any credit to different
opinions coming from members of other religions, and they lost objectivity, classifying those
writing or expressing a different point of view about the events in México as opportunistic or coopted by the Mexican authorities. Catholics alleged that defenders of Mexican policy adopted
such opportunistic positions to establish Protestant denominations or sects, as the Catholics
called them.
What first appeared as a debate about a foreign issue developed strong roots inside
American soil and became an issue in the next presidential election.
The direct involvement of American government in Mexican issues, in one way or
another, promised to offend either Catholics or Protestants. It looked like a dead end for
President Coolidge. If he openly supported the Mexican government, American Catholics would
immediately translate it into the presidential campaign. Coolidge would be seen as anti-Catholic,
and one of the potential Democratic candidates was Alfred Emmanuel Smith, a Catholic. On the
other hand, if the American president explicitly rejected those dispositions about religion
implemented by the Mexican government, members of the Protestant churches would regard it as
pro-Catholic. President Coolidge played the cards of domestic and foreign policy masterfully

127

but the seeds of hatred had been planted in American soil, and would bear fruit during the
presidential campaign of 1928

128

Chapter Four
RELIGION AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN AMERICA
During the 1920s, the divergences between Catholics and Protestants in the U.S.
represented a problem underlying the debate over Prohibition. When the religious conflict in
México openly erupted in 1925, it served as an open field to test their positions and gradually
move into American ground. Engaging in a debate about a religious foreign issue would allow
members of different faiths to measure the reactions among public opinion, followers, and
American authorities. Sooner than expected, members of all religions and their religious leaders
mixed religious beliefs with political preferences. Catholics and Protestants each tried to elicit
the direct involvement of President Coolidge in the conflict. It represented more than a desire to
have peace. Both groups wanted to take advantage in whichever stance of a possible stance the
American president would take. Coolidge refused to take a stance. In the mean time, members
of the Democratic Party began to work in favor of the nomination of a Catholic, Alfred
Emmanuel Smith as the presidential candidate for the 1928 elections.
Alfred E. Smith was Governor of the State of New York during four terms, from 1918 to
1920 and from 1922 to 1928. He earned a national reputation as a reformer concerned with
social welfare and efficiency of government. He sponsored measures related to child labor,
advocated measures to curb the use of injunctions against labor organizations, favored programs
providing low-cost housing, strengthened the system of public education, supported the creation
of public parks and recreational areas, reorganized the administrative structure of the state
government, and overhauled the tax structure. 273
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Those actions made of him a prominent figure in the Democratic Party during the 1920s.
In 1924, Smith faced William McAdoo for the Democratic presidential nomination. In an
intense competition McAdoo had the support of the southern and western delegates, most of
them Protestants, backing Prohibition and at least had some sympathy for the KKK.
Northeastern delegates, many of whom were Catholics, supported Smith because of his stance
against Prohibition. The KKK issue became a strong point of disagreement. Smith’s supporters
demanded that an explicit condemnation of the KKK be included in the Party platform;
McAdoo’s supporters preferred not to include that explicit condemnation. The final vote went in
favor of not including that condemnation. 274
The Democratic Convention became so divided that neither of the two candidates got the
two-thirds of the votes required to win the nomination. Delegates voted 103 times before the
Democrats broke the deadlock and decided to turn into a corporate lawyer and diplomat from
West Virginia, John W. Davis, as their candidate. On the surface, what kept the election so close
were the delegates’ polarizing positions toward the KKK and Prohibition. Beneath the surface,
however, many of those opposing Smith’s candidacy did so because they considered having a
Catholic in the White House unthinkable.
Four years later, that issue was taken into the Senate. Thomas J. Heflin, a Democratic
Senator from Alabama, delivered a vicious attack against Catholics. Heflin mentioned that
during the 1924 Democratic Convention he saw Roman Catholic delegates demanding a
condemnation of the Ku Klux Klan as part of the Party platform. Hefflin strongly opposed that
action because of the division it would have among party membership. In the end the
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proposition was defeated by four votes. A divided Democratic party needed to turn to a
compromise candidate who performed very poorly in the general election. 275
Rivalries due to different approaches to faith prevailed in the U.S. where Roman
Catholics accounted for 16.6% of the total population. An example of that kind of disputes was
published by the Times in early April, 1924. At a breakfast with members of the New York
Police department, William D. Cunningham of Ellenville, Ulster County, New York, a former
Judge of the Court of Claims and a Republican, claimed it was impossible for a Roman Catholic
to attain high public office because of his faith. Immediately he got a reply from Judge J. Harry
Tiernan of Richmond County, New York, denying such assertion and providing the example of
Governor Smith as a Catholic who had achieved public office. Tiernan added that Catholics
would resent rejection of the candidacy of Governor Smith for the Democratic nomination for
president solely because of his religion. 276 Considering that kind of dispute, it came as no
surprise that such disagreements prevailed during the Democratic Convention.
During the next years, different opinions emerged about the religious issue and the
possible candidacy of Smith for the Democratic nomination. Members of Protestant religions,
Catholics, Democrats and Republicans, all expressed opinions not necessarily determined by
religious or political affiliation. The arguments did not involve only Smith’s religious faith but
also focused on his opposition to Prohibition.

A Preamble of Incoming Events
A number of groups opposed Smith as the Democratic presidential candidate. The KKK
threatened that if Smith or any other Catholic won the nomination, their six million members
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plus other sympathizers of the Klan would vote against him. 277 Hiram Wesley Evans, the
Imperial Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan, accused the Catholic Church of openly engaging in
political activities during the Democratic National Convention of 1924, where hotel lobbies and
corridors of Madison Square Garden were packed with Catholic priests. Evans also expressed
his intolerance toward the Catholic Church as a political organization and indeed toward any
individual member of that faith participating in politics. 278 At the end of 1926, Evans
specifically attacked Smith, calling him a bad citizen by repealing the Mullan-Gage law in New
York. 279 The Mullan-Gage law was the state version of the Volstead Act related to the
enforcement of prohibition by the states. “The Prohibitionists argued that New York did not
have the right to repeal it and if did it would amount to the nullification of the Eighteenth
Amendment.” 280 Smith argued that the “repeal would… transfer prosecution of prohibition
cases to the Federal courts. It would do away with double jeopardy of State and Federal
prosecution for the violation of laws enforcing the Eighteenth Amendment.” 281
Smith tried to convince those opposing the measure
that this repeal does not in the slightest degree lessen the
obligation of peace officers of the State to enforce in its strict
letter the Volstead act…that the repeal of the Mullan-Gage law
would not and cannot by any possible stretch of the
imagination bring back into existence the saloon.282

But his political rivals like William Jennings Bryan did not agree with the repeal and said that
the “Governor Smith has simply dishonored his office and disgraced himself: He cannot lead the
nation back to wallow in the mire.” 283
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Those charges represented part of a campaign implemented against Governor Smith.
Months before Smith welcomed the papal Legate, Giovanni Vincenzo Cardinal Bonzano, and
other priests, in transit to Chicago to attend the Catholic Ecumenical Council to be held during
the spring of 1926. Because of that Smith was accused of disloyalty to the U.S. by a section of
the KKK in San Angelo, Texas. The Klan stated that Smith officially recognized the Catholic
Church while the U.S. Government did not. 284
The KKK and Bryan did not stand alone in opposing Smith’s candidacy. The whole
range of Protestant opinions from strict Lutheranism to permissive Unitarianism spoke out
against Smith. Leaders of Lutheranism especially warned their followers against electing a
Catholic as President. Unitarians complained that members of their Church had been persecuted
in Roman Catholic countries, and consequently they wanted to ban the election of a Catholic as
President. Episcopalians acted as the moderates opposing Smith. 285 Other religions took a more
direct approach and rejected the possibility of a Catholic as president; some Methodists and
Baptists in Georgia, South Carolina, Arkansas, Texas, and Louisiana developed an intense
campaign through their newspapers trying to show the danger of having a Catholic as head of
state in Washington. Smith’s opponents took different positions. Some argued that, as a
Catholic, Smith had the Constitutional right to run for the high office, but they owned a similar
prerogative to reject him because of his religious faith. Others went farther and warned that once
a Catholic arrived in the White House, the country would be in total submission to Rome and the
Pope. The Next step would be to persecute all those refusing to accept Catholicism. 286
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In New York, the President of the Anti-Saloon League and Methodist Episcopal Bishop
Adna Wright Leonard of Buffalo invoked Smith in a meeting with Cardinal Bonzano. Leonard
believed that Smith’s faith banned him from the White House. For Leonard, “no Governor
[could] kiss the Papal ring and [get] within gunshot of the White House and no nullificationist
(sic) Governor ever [would] become a leader of a Constitution loving people.” 287 Leonard did
not stop at Smith. Echoing the KKK, Leonard proceeded to ask for Anglo-Saxon unity against
foreigners - particularly Latinos – who, he maintained, represented a big problem due to lack of
law enforcement. Government officials allowed Latinos to enter into the country illegally.
Leonard argued that in time “the Anglo-Saxons would see to it that the ideal of a Latino world
were not attained in the U.S., but the ideals of a free, Christian land.” 288
Contrary to Leonard’s expectations, his words got a negative reply. Protestants and
members of both parties criticized his attitude. They considered Leonard’s statement an example
of bad taste and judgment. The President of Columbia University, Nicholas Murray Butler, a
Protestant himself, called those kinds of expressions totally un-Christian and un-American.
Butler added it was “one more evidence of the character of the fight that was before those who
proposed to promote real rather than nominal temperance, to maintain a high standard of
Christian morals and Christian conduct and to protect at all cost the fundamental principles of
American Government and American life.” 289 Sharing Butler’s opinion, Republican Senator
David A. Reed of Pennsylvania deplored Leonard’s attitude. 290
These disagreements represented a religious rivalry that would not disappear in the near
future from American political life.
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The Marshall Letter
During early 1927, the controversy surrounding Smith’s religious beliefs reached a turning
point. On March 23, The New Republic published an article titled “A Catholic President?” The
author of the piece called on Smith to declare his position on the conflict between the state and
the Church in México and wondering how it would effect his actions as president as well as to
his policy toward México. 291
At that point, Smith already knew about another document questioning how his
Catholicism would affect his presidency. “On the morning of March 25, all of New York papers
and many journals in other cities carried in full or in abstract” 292 an article entitled “An Open
Letter to the Honorable Alfred E. Smith.” Written by a New York attorney and Episcopalian
layman, Charles C. Marshall, it was later printed in The Atlantic Monthly. Smith considered it
“the first time the qualifications of a man for public office were openly challenged because of his
adherence to a particular religious belief.” 293
There were contradictory accounts of how Smith reacted to the letter. In his
autobiography, Smith reported that he “promptly determined to make open answer to it and
publish [his] reply in the same magazine.” 294 In Emily Smith Warner’s biography of his father,
she quoted one of her father’s closet allies, Judge Joseph Proskauer. According to Proskauer, the
publisher of The Atlantic sent a communication to Smith in March 1927 with an advance proof
of the letter to be published in the magazine’s April issue. The editor believed Smith might wish
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to prepare an answer. When one of Smith’s leading advisors, Belle Moskowitz, showed the
document to Smith, he refused to prepare a reply. 295
Consequently Mrs. Moskowitz requested Judge Proskauer to come to Smith’s
headquarters at the Biltmore Hotel. Proskauer asked Smith “are you going to start work on your
answer to this?’ ‘I’m not going to answer the damn thing,’ [Smith] replied angrily.” 296
Proskauer insisted on the need to answer. The letter held that, because of his religion, Smith
would be unable to be sworn in as president of the United States. The discussion made Smith
recognize that “the Marshall letter raised questions of theology. At no time in my life have I
ever pretended any fundamental knowledge of this subject…” 297 According to his daughter,
Smith added, “I never heard of these encyclicals and papal bulls and books that [Marshall] wrote
about.” 298 After that, he requested that Proskauer, a Jew, answer the letter. Proskauer declined.
Finally, Smith recognized the necessity of preparing a written reply. Knowing his limitations,
Smith asked for help from Proskauer and Father Francis P. Duffy, who worked together to
prepare a draft which they submitted to Smith. Once a final version was ready, Smith sent the
document to Cardinal Hayes to check it for points of doctrine. 299
The answer, entitled “Catholic and Patriot: Governor Smith Replies,” was published in
the May issue of The Atlantic Monthly. Marshall’s letter and Smith’s reply help to understand
the differences between Protestants and Catholics not only in the American domestic political
arena but also in the religious conflict in México.
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At the beginning of his letter, Marshall made positive remarks about Smith’s public
performance. Marshall then got to the core of his argument.
…there is a note of doubt, a sinister accent of interrogation,
not as to intentional rectitude and moral purpose, but as to
certain conceptions which your fellow citizens attribute to you
as a loyal and conscientious Roman Catholic, which in their
minds are irreconcilable with that Constitution which as
President you must support and defend, and with the principles
of civil and religious liberty on which American institutions
are based. 300

Marshall pointed out that “to this consideration no word of yours, or on your behalf, has yet been
addressed.” 301
Smith firmly replied: “you imply that there is a conflict between religious loyalty to the
Catholic faith and patriotic loyalty to the United States… no such thing as that is true. [Working
as an elected officer] since 1903 I have never known any conflict between my official duties and
my religious belief.” 302
Further, Marshall asked which of the two powers Smith would obey as president, those
established under the guidance of the Pope or the ones written in the U.S. Constitution. Marshall
quoted the Encyclical The Christian Constitution of the States, by Pope Leo XIII which read:
“over the mighty multitude of mankind, God has set rulers with power to govern, and He has
willed that one of them [the Pope] should be the head of all.” 303 After that Marshall questioned
if Smith would accept that the jurisdiction of the state should prevail over religious authorities?
If Smith accepted both teachings, how he would reconcile them?
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Smith responded first with a question and then an assurance: “What is this conflict about
which you talk? … But in the wildest dreams of your imagination you can not conjure up a
possible conflict between religious principle and political duty in the United States, except on the
unthinkable hypothesis that some law was to be passed which violated the common morality of
all God-fearing men.” 304 Smith then quoted Cardinal [James] Gibbons, Archbishop [John]
Ireland, and Bishop [John] England and referred to situations in which the discussion went
around the prevalence of one power or another. Smith later stated he had not exercised any
favoritism toward Catholics. He had appointed public officials on the basis of merit and not
because of religious beliefs. 305
Marshall brought education as a third issue. Marshall mentioned a case from Oregon in
which “the Supreme Court had invalidated a law forbidding parents to educate their children at
church schools.” 306 Then Marshall stated that:
Nothing can be clear to the American mind than that the plain
political teaching of Pope Pius IX and of Pope Leo XIII, as set
forth in their encyclical letters, is inconsistent with the peace
and safety of the State within the meaning of those words as
used by the Supreme Court of the United States in its great
decision. That it is ‘not lawful for the State to hold in equal
favor different kinds of religion’; that it is not universally
lawful for the State and the Roman Catholic Church to be
dissevered and divorced; that the various kinds of religion in
theory have their place in the State, not by natural right but by
favor; that dogmatic intolerance is not alone the incontestable
right of the Roman Catholic Church, but her sacred duty; that
in the case of conflicting laws of the State and the Roman
Catholic Church the law of that Church shall prevail, are
propositions that would make up a strange textbook for the
instruction of American youth. 307
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Smith answered that he and his children went to a parochial school. They were never
taught discrimination, intolerance or “that the laws of the State could be flouted.” He concluded
“that the notion that any group of Catholics would teach such ideas is unthinkable.” 308
A fourth topic of Marshall’s letter referred to the institution of marriage and its
jurisdiction. Marshall wrote: “marriage is wrested from the State and appropriated to the Roman
Catholic Church, its exercise reposing ultimately in the Pope. [Marshall cited the doctrine of
Pope Pius IX], the Church proceeds in disregard of the law and sovereignty of the State, and
claims, at its discretion, the right to annul and destroy the bond of the civil contract.” Marshall
concluded by asking Smith: whether “such proceedings were consistent with the peace and
safety of States?” 309
Smith’s responded that in the case of marriage annulments,” the decree merely defined
the status of the parties as communicants to the Church. Your Church refuses to recognize the
ecclesiastical validity of divorces granted by the civil tribunals.” 310 Consequently there was no
difference in the attitude of both Churches and their decrees in relation to the general laws of the
United States.
It would have been impossible to skip the Mexican religious conflict in a debate like this.
Marshall invoked “the official opinion that…William D. Guthrie prepared as a request of the
Roman Catholic Hierarchy of America.” 311 Guthrie challenged the right of the Mexican
government to deny juridical personality to the churches. Guthrie claimed those dispositions
represented a violation of international law. Guthrie wrote “to project American opinion that the
Mexican Constitution is intolerable because it invades the prerogatives of the ecumenical and
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universal Roman Catholic Church.” 312 Guthrie wrote that Catholics did not request an armed
intervention “ because it is unlawful and unreasonable, but because history admonished them of
the horrors of the civil war and the danger of inviting interference by foreign powers and
arms…” 313 Marshall later pointed to the encyclical The Christian Constitution of States in
which Pope Leo XIII wrote:
the only begotten son of God entrusted all the truths which
He had taught in order that it might keep and guard them and
with lawful authority explain them, and He commanded all
nations to hear the voice of the [Roman Catholic] Church as if
it were his own, threatening those who would not hear it with
everlasting perdition. 314

Marshall concluded by asking Smith: “what authority you ascribe to that voice?” Smith
responded that he had not read Mr. Guthrie’s brief; and appealed to the text of the Pastoral Letter
published on December 12, 1926, which disclaimed an armed intervention in México. In an
attempt to strike a balance, Smith asserted: “I recognize the right of no church to ask armed
intervention by this country in the affairs of another, merely for the defense of the rights of a
Church. But I do recognize the propriety of Church action to request the good offices of this
country to help the oppressed of any land…” 315
After that, Smith made a closing statement recognizing his beliefs in the worship of God
according to the faith and practice of the Roman Catholic Church but he also made clear that:
[he] recognized no power in the institution of [his] church to
interfere with the operations of the Constitution of the United
States or the enforcement of the law of the land … [he]
believed in the separation of the Church and the State,… in
the support of public school,… in the right of every parent to
choose whether his child shall be educated in a public school
or in a religious school supported by those of his own faith, …
in the principle of noninterference by this country in the
internal affairs of other nations and that we should stand
312
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steadfastly against any such interference by whomsoever it
may be urged. In his spirit I join with fellow Americans of all
creeds in a fervent prayer that never again in this land will any
public servant be challenged because of the faith in which he
has tried to walk humbly with his God.316

In general terms, Smith’s reply received very favorable comments from politicians and
members of other religions. Democratic Senator Robert F. Wagner of New York declared that
the response represented a great step to clear the air in an issue that had threatened political
tranquility for many years. “The governor’s letter, Wagner predicted, will remove forever
religious rancor from political affairs.” 317 That sentiment was echoed in the words of
Ambassador James W. Gerard, a Protestant himself, who considered the document “a fine,
manly and convincing letter that will serve as a final end to the question of loyalty of Catholics
to our Government.” 318 For others, like Dr. Nathan Krass, a Rabbi, “the governor had accepted a
great challenge and met it victoriously…The governor had stated he owes allegiance to Rome
only in spiritual matters, that is to say, on questions concerning creed.” 319 For the Rector of
Saint Luke’s Episcopal Church in New York, Rev. Dr. William T. Walsh, “Governor Smith’s
statement that he believed in absolute freedom of conscience for all men…was of a more far
reaching effect than anything the Governor had said politically.” 320
Other parties, however, questioned Smith’s response. Some critics pointed out, Smith’s
reply had a limited impact because it did not reach the general public. Others criticized the
answer, not because the quality or the clarity of its content but due to the writing style. Critics
pointed out that “ undoubtedly it made an impression on the quality folk who read the Atlantic
Monthly and on many others who saw excerpts quoted in newspapers, but it did not penetrate
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into those regions, mainly in rural America, where it would have done the most good.” 321 It was
an undeniable truth.
The New York Times reported on an editorial published in The Christian Herald, written
by The Herald’s editor in chief Rev. Dr. Daniel A. Poling, who found Smith’s letter an honest
and acceptable answer. Poling nevertheless opposed Smith’s candidacy not because of his
religion but because he was anti-prohibitionist. Further, Poling made “a sharp distinction
between that part of the Governor’s answer written by him and the ecclesiastical answers
furnished by Father Francis P. Duffy. The latter, the editorial declared, were not convincing.” 322
The Christian Century established a similar pattern.
Governor Smith is not a high authority on the theory or the
history of the Catholic Church [something Smith himself
recognized]. His technical advisor Father Duffy was a high
authority but he was not in a position to make a disinterested
pronunciation. A letter intended to clear the way for a
Catholic to the presidency of the United States is not the place
where one must look for dispassionate and accurate status of
the relations of the Church and the State. 323

Both Smith’s adversaries and people working close to him concluded that the assistance
Smith received from Catholic priests was a mistake. Smith’s Secretary of State in New York,
Robert Moses, believed that “Marshall’s challenge should have been answered by Smith in his
own forthright idiom rather than the loftily intellectual riposte pieced together by his advisers…
it wasn’t Smith. It lacked his natural brevity, roughness, downrightness and instinct for the
jugular.” 324
Smith had another opinion about that. For Smith, the reply represented a success, it
“brought a new volume of mail to the Albany post office that taxed it to the utmost of its
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capacity… nothing in it [the reply] had ever been successfully challenged and that observation
did not come to me from people of my own faith alone, it comes from fair-mined, reasonable,
liberal and intelligent people.” 325 Smith’s optimism, however, did not match the events of his
presidential campaign. Bigotry and a nasty crusade headed by members of the KKK, other
religions, and even advocates of the Democratic Party would prevail.

The 1928 Presidential Campaign: for some Religion did not represent the Main Issue but…
In spite of the problems with his Catholicism and anti-prohibition stance, Alfred E. Smith
had a clear advantage in the race for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1928. Smith’s
advantage did not deter Senator Thomas James Walsh of Montana from entering the race in early
1928. Walsh’s decision to participate had nothing extraordinary except that another contender
jumped into the contest. The process of nominating the Democratic presidential candidate,
however, presented an unusual situation. In a country where most of the population professed
Protestantism, by the first time two Catholics were seeking the presidential nomination of a
major political party.
Despite professing the same faith, Smith and Walsh did not share similar points of view
about other matters. Smith proposed the end of prohibition and had received support from the
Tammany Hall machine. Walsh had nothing against Prohibition. He came from a barely
populated state and had no connections to questionable political organizations. “The choice
between a wet, Tammany Catholic, and a dry, rural Catholic suggested the possibility of a test to
see whether Prohibitionist and Protestant Democrats, especially in the South, would support a
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Catholic who did not symbolize the wet, machine-run metropolis.” 326 Nonetheless, Walsh had
some political liabilities. He lacked Smith’s charisma. Walsh supported McAdoo during the
1924 Democratic Convention, and his rivals denounced him “as a mere stalking horse for the Ku
Klux Klan.” 327 In the end, Walsh’s candidacy did not grow strongly enough to defeat a more
charismatic candidate supported by a better organized political machine.
During the convention at Houston, in June 1928, Smith became the Democratic
presidential candidate. Smith’s candidacy polarized opinions in America. Allan J. Lichtman
summarized those attitudes in Prejudice and the Old Politics: The Presidential Election of 1928.
For anti-Catholics Protestants, Smith’s nomination presented
the chance to join a noble crusade against a tangible menace.
For Catholics a Smith victory seemed likely to enhance their
prestige, whereas his defeat threatened the status they had
already achieved. For civilian libertarians, the nomination of a
Catholic provided a means of gauging the tolerance of
protestant America. For all Americans, the fusion of religion
and politics offered and endless source of fascinating
speculation and dispute.328

Smith certainly confronted a nasty campaign. Opposition emerged not only from the
Republican Party but also from Protestant Democrats, mainly in the South. Methodist Episcopal
Bishop James G. Cannon, together with the leader of the Temperance Board of the Southern
Baptist Convention, Rev. Arthur J. Barton, organized the Committee of the Anti-Smith
Democrats of Virginia. Cannon, also the President of the Anti-Saloon League, rejected Smith
candidacy while maintaining his party loyalty. Cannon had a bitter confrontation with Wayne B.
Wheeler, who controlled the Anti-Saloon League from Washington, over Wheeler’s proposition
to constitute a third party as an alternative to Smith’s candidacy. 329
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Besides Cannon and Barton, members of other churches engaged in a crusade to impede
Smith from arriving at the White House. The leaders of this group included the editor of The
Christian Register, Albert Diefenbacher; a pastor of the Calvary Baptist Church in New York
City, John Roach Stanton; the secretary of the board of Temperance, Prohibition and Public
Morals of the Methodist Episcopal Church, North, Rev. Deets Picket; the moderator of the
general Assembly of Presbyterians, Hugh Walker; and the convention of the Lutheran Editors of
America. 330
During the campaign, both sides focused on Prohibition as the reason for their
disagreements. Their actions, however, demonstrated that prohibition served as a proxy for
religious rivalries. One aspect of the campaign against Smith became an anti-Catholic campaign
divided in three different dimensions. The first element consisted of scurrilous propaganda; the
second involved emotional appeals from the Protestant press and clergy; the third included
arguments founded on a scholarly analysis of what the nation could expect from sending a
Catholic to the White House. General Manager of the Fellowship Forum James S. Vance
synthesized the reason of the struggle in a single phrase: “Protestant Americanism versus Rum
and Romanism.” 331
According to Lichtman, even if Catholic Church leaders yearned for the election of Al
Smith, they were wise to refrain from courting Catholic support for the governor of New
York. 332 Nevertheless, Smith’s opponents charged Catholics with mobilizing support for Smith.
At the end of October 1928, The New York Times reported that Bishop Cannon accused Catholics
of acting not as individuals but as members of their Church supporting Smith’s candidacy.
Cannon quoted editorials printed in Catholic publications to proof his assertion. One of these
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publications was the official organ of The Catholic Missionary Union, The Missionary edited in
Washington, D.C. under the direction of Cardinal Hayes. In its October issue, The Missionary
published a prayer for Smith’s success. In the same piece, the editorialist asked Catholics if they
realized what life in America would be when it became fashionable to be Catholic. The editor
next affirmed how the day wonderful would be when Americans woke up to discover the end of
400 years of an oppressive, dull, and sad atmosphere of a detested sect. Cannon also questioned
the official organ of the Dioceses of Buffalo, N.Y., The Union and Times. In an article printed
on October 4, the editorialist qualified as a fallacy the assertion that America was a Protestant
country. “Once a Catholic became elected as President the drowning man, represented in the
Protestant Church, would quickly sink from view. The remnants of Calvinism, Lutheranism,
Wesleyan teachings and Episcopalism would die as their sects.” 333
Cannon’s complaints did not rest long without an answer. The editor and manager of The
Union and Times, Rev. Edward J. Ferger denied any action by the Catholic Church attempting to
stir up intolerance, while associates of Cardinal Hayes denied that the editorial meant any
intrusion into politics. 334
It is hard to refute that religion represented a key issue during the campaign. In places
like Tennessee, members of the Democratic Party found it difficult to sign up new members,
because people were reluctant to be linked with a Catholic candidate. 335
In spite of his efforts, Smith failed to put aside confrontations based on religion. Smith
found a hostile environment in Oklahoma City. The levels of animosity were so high that,
contrary to his advisers’ opinion, Smith decided to speak frankly about the matter. On
September 20, 1928, Smith delivered a speech outlining not only his political record in New
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York but also refuting those attacks based on his religious beliefs. Smith mentioned that
religious pluralism had characterized his governorship: “in the Cabinet of the governor sit
fourteen men. Three of the fourteen are Catholics, ten Protestants, and one of the Jewish
faiths…” 336 To assure his campaign was not conducted on religious basis, Smith declared:
I do not want any Catholic in the United States to vote for me
because I am a Catholic. If any Catholic in this country
believes that the welfare, the wellbeing, the prosperity, the
growth and the expansion of the United States is best
conserved and best promoted by the election of Mr. Hoover, I
want him to vote for Hoover and not for me.
But on the other hand, I have the right to say that any citizen
of this country that believes I can promote its welfare, that
believes I can promote its welfare, that I am capable of
steering the ship of State safely through the next four years,
and then votes against me because of my religion, he is not a
real, pure, genuine American. 337

Regarding separation between State and Church, Smith reminded “the Democrats… that [they]
belong to the party of Thomas Jefferson, whose proudest boast was that he was the author of the
Virginia statute for religious freedom.” 338
Historians still debate the role played by the Republican Party and its candidate Herbert
Hoover. Hoover always denied any involvement in the accusations against Smith. Lichtman
quoted Hoover’s words during a press conference the day after Smith’s speech in Oklahoma,
saying that he suffered from the whispering campaign far more than Governor Smith and that
religious intolerance was primarily a manifestation of the internal politics of the Democratic
Party. Lichtman, however, expressed some doubts persisting about the sincerity of those words.
In short, the evidence shows that Republicans mounted no
campaign against anti-Catholic agitation, even within their
own ranks. The party organization neither disciplined those
who pandered to religious bigotry nor attempted to police
their activities. Until forced by circumstance, Herbert Hoover
refused to denounce religious bigotry forcefully; his
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justifications for this restrain seem implausible when
juxtaposed against personal vilification of Smith that was
sanctioned by the Hoover campaign. Fragmentary evidence
further suggests that the Republican leadership deliberately
set out, covertly, to exploit Protestant opposition to the
election of a Catholic president.339

In his autobiography, Smith argued that the Republican Party was involved in attacks full
of religious bigotry and personal vilification. Smith quoted a letter written by the Vice Chairman
of the Eastern Republican National Advisory Committee, George H. Mosses, to an editor of a
newspaper in a small town in North Carolina. According to Smith’s account Moses sent to a
person named Zeb Vance Walser an article for newspaper publication. Moses described the
piece as “red hot stuff,” and asked Walser to print it in some North Carolina papers, and asked
for copies. 340 Articles with derogatory information about Smith went to newspapers around the
country in a campaign to show that Smith had opponents in each city and towns.
The extreme degree of intolerance led to ridiculous statements. In his autobiography
Smith wrote that:
I was talking to a prominent citizen of Georgia who told me
that in certain churches in that state they had pictures of me
attending the ceremonies incident to the opening of the
Holland Tunnel under the Hudson River between New York
and New Jersey, and he expressed himself as surprise to think
that opponents of mine were able to convince large numbers
of people that the tunnel was actually to be constructed not to
New Jersey but into the basement of the Vatican in Rome in
the event of my election. 341

Smith also related that “one man made the deliberate statement over the radio that a
convent in New Jersey was purchased by the Catholic Church as the American residence of the
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Pope in the event of [Smith’s] election.” 342 That imaginary purchase was supposedly to establish
Papal headquarters to control the U.S. government.
Some people suggested extreme measures to end the bigotry. For example, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, the candidate for Governor of the State of New York, recommended that “persons
responsible for the literature against Governor Smith on religious grounds should be put on ships
and sent out of the country and that imprisonment was too mild a punishment for them.” 343
In spite of the doubts stated by Litchman, nothing links any of these episodes to Hoover.
“The presidential campaign between Al Smith and Herbert Hoover brought out the intellectual
best in the two men and the worst in their supporters… Neither candidate directly attacked the
other…Hoover refused to conduct his campaign through debate or to mention Smith’s name in
public.” 344
In the end, Smith lost the election by a margin of 6.4 million votes. Smith got 40.8% of
the popular vote and 87 electoral votes against Hoover’s 444. The old traditionally compact
Democratic South splintered. The Upper South, together with Florida and Texas, voted for the
Republican candidate. Smith got the Southern States of Alabama, Georgia, Arkansas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and South Carolina plus Massachusetts and Rhode Island in the East.
Not long after the election, analysts began debating the role religion played in it. In
1931, political scientists Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly concluded that “although the
majority of Methodists and Baptists were opposed to Smith, it cannot be accurately said what
proportion of them based their opposition to Smith on his religion alone…Competent observers
in the South and the West have assured us that prohibition was in many cases a smoke-screen for
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bigotry.” 345 In an appendix, Peel and Donnelly quoted the conclusions of statistical studies
elaborated by economist Irving Fisher, in 1928, and sociologist William Fielding Ogburn in
1930. According to Fisher, religion’s feeling was aroused in the campaign, helping Hoover
because the country was predominantly Protestant. According to Fisher, a state was Protestant or
Catholic on the basis of which religion had the majority of church members. Of the thirty two
Protestant states, only two swung to Smith. Six of the fourteen Catholics states actually swung
toward Hoover” 346 Ogburn affirmed that “prohibition sentiment was three times more decisive
an influence in the election than the religious issue.” 347 Ogburn’s statistical study, however,
focused on only 173 northern counties hardly enough to support a national pattern.
In 1950, Edmund A. Moore wrote that “although the defeat of Smith was caused by a
combination of forces and factors, his religion played a large though not wholly calculable
part” 348 Six years later on the basis of a statistical analysis, Ruth C. Silva stated that “there was
no statistically significant association between the index of Smith’s gain and either Protestantism
or Catholicism.” 349
Writing in 1979, Lichtman argued that
of all possible explanations for the distinctive alignments of
1928, religion is the best… Regardless of their ethnic
background, their stand on prohibition, their economics status,
and other politically salient attributes, Catholics and
Protestants split far more decisively in 1928 than in either
previous or subsequent elections…Both Protestants and
Catholics responded to religious tensions of 1928.350
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Once the elections concluded, the domestic religious friction settled down but did not
end. Americans of different faiths continued to be immersed in the religious conflict south of the
border. The Catholic hierarchy abandoned its radical position and engaged in negotiations with
Mexican and American authorities. During the presidential campaign, President Coolidge
avoided taking sides and appointed Dwight W. Morrow as U.S. Ambassador in México. In the
middle of the presidential campaign, Coolidge and Morrow were able to open the door for
negotiations between the Mexican government and the Catholic Church. The Church was
represented by the American Catholic hierarchy with the unofficial participation of the U.S.
government. Catholic priests had other things to do besides devoting their efforts to campaign in
favor of Smith’s candidacy.
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Chapter Five
THE TIME OF THE RADICALS BEGAN TO END WHILE REASON EMERGED
While candidates in the United States contested an election in which religion divisions
came to the fore, the religious conflict in México raged on. In responding to the situation in
México, the American government played its cards very well. President Coolidge’s policy of
restraint regarding the religious conflict in Mexico yielded positive outcomes. Coolidge kept
pressure on the Mexican government in order to stop the implementation of the Oil Laws
affecting property rights of American citizens in México. Ambassador Sheffield played the
hardliner role up to the point where his presence represented an obstacle for any further progress
related to the oil and religious problems. At the same time, President Coolidge stood firm
against pressures from U.S. Catholics. He refused to favor any of the belligerents in the Mexican
conflict.
Despite the points of contention between their countries, President Coolidge officially
kept an open and friendly relationship with President Elías Calles. That attitude would provide
room for President Coolidge in domestic politics. No matter how high the level of bitterness
reached during the months to come, Coolidge continued with his quiet but effective method of
negotiation.
At home, the religious issue did not get out of hand in the presidential campaign of 1928.
Protestants were not going to oppose the dispositions under Article VI of the American
Constitution. Religious differences had a minor influence on the outcome of the election.
Mexican religious conflict, however, would require more time and different skills.
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A New Era in the U.S.-México Relations
In September 1927, President Coolidge took a very important step toward the resolution
of the religious conflict between the Catholic Church and the Mexican government as well as the
oil controversy between the Mexican government and American oil companies. Coolidge
appointed Dwight W. Morrow as American Ambassador in México. Some U.S. critics expressed
their disagreement with that nomination, arguing that Morrow had no experience as a diplomat
but only as financier. El Universal Gráfico, El Universal and Excelsior, major Mexican
newspapers printed comments skeptical of the nomination but expressing hope for an
improvement in the U. S.-Mexican relations. 351
Before leaving Washington, Morrow took the advice of Judge Morgan J. O'Brien and
Cardinal Hayes, and met with the General Secretary of the National Catholic Welfare
Conference, Father John J. Burke. 352 As result, Morrow got a broad perspective of how to
approach the religious conflict in México. The meeting was the beginning of private and
unofficial negotiations between representatives of the American government with leaders of the
Catholic Church. Before addressing México’s conflict between Church and state, Morrow
needed first to find a solution to another conflict: the oil problem.
Morrow arrived in México City on October 23. Six days later, he presented his
credentials to the Mexican president. On November 3, Morrow had the first of many breakfasts
with President Elías Calles. A mutual empathy developed between them. The dialogue was
open and frank, taking negotiations of the oil problem and the religious conflict into new stages.
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During the next two weeks, Morrow met with government officials and Mexican
businessmen searching for more first hand information. After his first official meeting with Elías
Calles, the U.S. Ambassador wrote, “the President expressed the hope that I would feel free at all
times to come directly to him, stating that he was not a diplomat, and that he thought many of the
matters as to which there were differences of opinion between the two governments could be
readily adjusted in personal meetings, but that diplomatic notes tended to separate further the
Governments.” 353 The meeting represented the beginning of a new era for the U.S.-México
relations. Undersecretary of State, Robert E. Olds pointed out in a letter to Morrow: “I can not
help feeling that you are on the right track and have already made real progress. At any rate it
delights us all, to see the old method of long-armed dealing scrapped, and the contrary method of
direct personal contact tried.” 354 Morrow had turned things around in a single reunion.
Morrow was aware of a new attitude of the Mexican authorities related to the oil
problem. During the opening session of Congress, on September 1, 1927, President Elías Calles
stated that: “Mexico was willing to listen in a spirit of justice and equity to any concrete case
which might be presented.” 355 With that in mind, ten days after their first meeting, Morrow had
another conference with the Mexican president. During the meeting, they explored several
alternatives to end the oil controversy. Those options were related to a decision of the Mexican
Supreme Court to an inquiry presented by the oil companies related to the retroactivity of the
law. The Mexican president stated that a final decision would take at least two months.
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The verdict, however, took less time than expected. On November 17, the Mexican
Supreme Court struck down the provision in the Petroleum Laws that established time limits on
foreign concessions. In December, the Mexican Congress revoked the retroactivity of such laws.
The Mexican Congress also recognized the validity of foreign concessions on which the
concessionaries had made positive acts toward improvement prior to 1917. In two months, U.S.México relations shifted from night to day.
President Coolidge pointed out in his State of the Union Address of 1927:
We have lately had some difference with Mexico relative
to the injuries inflicted upon our nationals and their property
within that country. A firm adherence to our rights and a
scrupulous respect for the sovereignty of Mexico, both in
accordance with the law of nations, coupled with patience and
forbearance, it is hoped will resolve all our differences without
interfering with the friendly relationship between the two
governments. 356

With One Problem Solved, Taking Care of the Next
With one problem solved, Morrow continued negotiations with the Mexican President
and the Catholic hierarchy in the United States to find a solution to the religious conflict. At
Morrow’s a suggestion, Olds met with the General Secretary of the NCWC, John J. Burke, a
couple of times at the end of December 1927. The results were unsuccessful. Burke rejected
Olds’ proposition to go to México for a meeting with President Elías Calles. After that, in his
role of General Secretary of the NCWC, Burke submitted a letter to Chairman of the NCWC
Administrative Committee, Edward Joseph Hanna the Archbishop of San Francisco. In the
letter, Burke rejected any possibility of engaging in direct negotiations with the Mexican
government. Hanna answered to the contrary. Consequently, Burke adopted a more open
attitude. In early January 1928, in an interview with Olds, Burke agreed to have an appointment
356
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with the Mexican president to discuss possible solutions to the religious conflict. Olds first made
the necessary arrangements for a second meeting between Father Burke and Ambassador
Morrow. That meeting took place in January 1928, in La Habana, Cuba, where Ambassador
Morrow was attending the sixth Pan-American Conference. 357 Morrow gave an account of this
meeting in a letter to Secretary of State Kellogg. Morrow stated that “Father Burke again called
on me for the purpose of discussing the religious situation in Mexico. As a consequence of these
talks Father Burke requested [Morrow] to ascertain whether President [Elías] Calles would
receive him if he asked for an interview and came to Mexico for that purpose.” 358 This
represented a first step on a long road to reconciliation.
Despite some leaks mentioning possible talks between representatives of the American
Catholic hierarchy and Mexican authorities, the negotiations to seal the meeting between Elías
Calles and Burke took place in general terms with a great deal of secrecy. Even a key player in
the Mexican government’s campaign in the American press, the Mexican Consul in New York,
Arturo M. Elías, remained unaware of events leading to that meeting. On February 13, 1928,
Elías sent a telegram to the private secretary of President Elías Calles, Soledad González. The
Mexican Consul commented that the American press had been publishing news reports stating
that the Catholic Church was looking for an agreement to end the religious conflict in Mexico.
The press suggested that Ambassador Morrow was the intermediary attempting to arrange a
meeting between President Elías Calles and members of the Catholic Hierarchy. Reports also
named Father Burke as a possible mediator. According to Elías, Father Burke, who had been in
México, was capable and astute. Elías wrote that Burke was one of the American priests
responsible for as yet unsuccessful a campaign spreading among American public opinion lies
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about the situation in México. Having failed to accomplish their primary goal, warned Elías, the
priests were attempting to show the Mexican government as weak and willing to accept any
proposal coming from the priesthood. Elías, without providing evidence, blamed the Jesuits for
that campaign and the appointment of Father Burke. 359
Obviously, Consul Elías did not have precise information, and Father Burke did not
belong to the Jesuits but to the Paulist Congregation. The Jesuits did, however, exercise some
influence in resolving the conflict through the role played by Father Edmund Walsh. Moreover,
the Consul did not know about the most recent activities of Morrow, the State Department, and
the Mexican authorities. In February 1928, President Elías Calles had already discussed with
the Ambassador the possibility of the meeting with the Paulist Father. Consul Elías’ negative
opinion of Father Burke may have derived from some articles on the religious conflict in Mexico
the priest had published in The New York Times years before. In one of them, Burke questioned
the legality of the Constitution of 1917 because the authors of the laws had not been elected
through popular vote. Burke described the conflict as a struggle of Plutarco Elías Calles and his
government against the Roman Catholic Church of the whole world. 360 In another article, Burke
wrote: “by confiscating all buildings used as churches, schools, benevolent institutions, parish
records and constructions and denying the right to acquire others, it reduces the exercises of the
religion ministers to absolute dependency of the federal and village officers and subject the
ministers to the tyranny of even village authorities.” 361
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Leaks about the Morrow-Burke meetings and the possibility of an interview with the
Mexican President represented a temporary obstacle for the U.S. Ambassador’s proposals. As a
first reaction, the Mexican president “felt that no good purpose could at that time be served by
Father Burke coming to Mexico.” 362
Besides these doubts, Morrow’s efforts encountered other obstacles from Rome because
Pius XI continued playing a double game through Cardinal Secretary of State Enrico Gasparri.
On one hand, the Pope authorized members of the American Catholic hierarchy to engage in
negotiations with the Mexican government. At the same time, Catholic layman and other priests
not only disseminated strong critiques against the Mexican authorities but also proposed
tribunals of supposedly public opinion to judge them.
In February 1928, a Catholic laymen and founder editor of The Commonweal, Michael
Williams, published both a letter addressed to the Irish writer George Bernard Shaw in August
1927, as well as Shaw’s answer. Williams, who worked for the bishops' National Catholic War
Council, precursor of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, and later, the National
Conference of Catholic Bishops, 363 wrote that he went to Rome and after two months there he
got a document from Cardinal Gasparri which, according to Williams, stated that the “Holy Sees
regards the present situation of Catholics in Mexico as the worst persecution ever known explicitly declaring it worse than those suffered by the Church under Nero, Domitian, [and]
Caligula…” 364 Williams also mentioned that “the Pope says the reason why the secular world
does not know the truth about the persecution is the success of the Mexican government in
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suppressing the news about it. Foreign journalists confined to Mexico City are under the
absolute control of [Elías] Calles.” 365 In the same article, Williams pointed out that he asked for
publication of this letter to a syndicated news agency, which name he omitted to mention, but the
agency refused to publish because it was considered as Catholic propaganda. Then Williams
quoted Shaw’s answer mentioning “that he [could not] imagine what the American press [was]
thinking of in refusing to publish what [was] practically an interview with the Pope” 366
Williams finally acknowledged that he offered the document he got from Cardinal Gasparri to
The New York Times. The piece was published [in a polish version in which the Pope never
mentioned Nero or Caligula or that all foreign journalists in México were under control of the
Mexican authorities] on Sunday, October 2, 1927. 367 After that, Williams proceeded to add that
only the major newspapers in the country had covered the religious conflict. Most of the
newspapers, reviews and magazines did not. “The same statement [was] true of the American
religious press, except of course the Catholic press.” 368 Williams did not stop there. He
suggested the creation of a
non-sectarian, non-governmental Commission of Inquiry
concerning the Religious Problem in México…such a
Commission could determine in the court of public opinion
whether the Mexican government [was] right in accusing the
Catholic clergy …and the American public would be able to
judge whether or not that government [was] justified in the
369
measures put into effect against the Catholic Christians.

Williams was not alone in his position; Bishop Díaz Barreto assumed an attitude similar
to him. Díaz wrote an article published on January 11, 1928 in The Commonweal. In that piece
Díaz Barreto pointed out that: “the position of the bishops remains precisely the same [as in
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1926]… we demanded, in the name of the Catholic people of México the abrogation of certain
clauses in the Constitution and the reform of others.” 370 An analogous statement appeared in
another article Díaz Barreto published in April 1928 in The North American Review attacking the
Mexican authorities. He made a comparison between the American legislation and the principles
of the Catholic Church. Looking for support in his struggle, Díaz declared that: “the philosophy
which animates anti-religious legislation in México is as much opposed to American political
ideals as is to Catholic principles, and is in fact the source, on the Mexican side, of all difficulties
which have arisen between the two countries.” 371 This was good rhetoric, except that Bishop
Díaz’ statement missed something. The American Constitution established religious tolerance
for members of all faiths, something the Catholic Church did not accept. In México, Catholics
demanded a return to a monopolistic approach to faith similar to the one it had exercised for
more than three centuries. The differences between the governments of México and the United
States rested on issues other than religion. Díaz, closed his article playing on the fear card that
the “same philosophy is being constantly spread through Latin America and constitutes a menace
that can not be ignored by any lover of peace or good government.” 372 Morrow nevertheless
continued his efforts to find a solution to the Mexican religious conflict.

Entering Into a New Stage
In March 1928, Morrow finally convinced President Elías Calles to meet with Reverend
John J. Burke. Burke would come to México as official envoy of the Papal Delegate Archbishop
Pietro Fumasoni-Biondi. Fumasoni was in charge of the Mexican affairs for the Vatican. On
370
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March 29, 1928, Burke sent a letter to the Mexican President. In the opening statement, Burke
said: according to information provided to me by people who I considered well informed, your
intentions in any sense were directed toward the destruction of Church’s identity or even disturb
its spiritual activities; your only goal had been the enforcement of the dispositions written under
the Mexican laws and the Constitution. Father Burke explored the possibility that, without
disobeying the prevailing law, the Mexican priests could find a way to exercise their religious
activities and later make some changes in the Mexican legislation. 373 This opinion differed
from Father Burke’s early statements written in his article published in The Forum in August
1926. In that piece he stated:
to know those provisions of the Mexican Constitution, and
the acts of the Mexican Government and its agents, is to
know that they are absolutely irreconcilable with justice and
the rights of man. They tell of warfare against religion, a
deliberate endeavor to destroy its growth; to pull out its roots.
Our whole national life has been a protest against such
iniquity. It is abhorrent to every human individual of fair
play. 374

There is no recollection of whom or who was responsible for Burke’s new attitude. It
could be a result of the advice of Archbishop Hanna or a consequence of the meetings with Olds
and Morrow. Whatever influenced this change did an excellent job. The ground had been set for
a possible solution to the religious conflict. The next step would be to start the negotiations.
During early April, Father Burke and the legal advisor of the NCWC, William Frederick
Montavon traveled secretly to México City. Ambassador Morrow accompanied them to the Port
of Veracruz on the East Coast. On April 4, 1928 they met with the Mexican President for six
hours. At the end, Ambassador Morrow reported that “President [Elías] Calles and Father Burke
appeared to make an excellent mutual impression one on the other and were able to discuss the
373
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situation in a broad and liberal way and without rancor.” 375 The following dialogue provided an
example:
[When Burke asked President Elías Calles], why does the
government keep the churches closed? [Elías] Calles replied,
the Mexican government has never forbidden priests to
officiate or closed any church. They can be opened tomorrow
if priests obey the Mexican law requiring members of all
professions including the clergy, to register. The trouble is
that your highest authority, the Pope, has forbidden the priests
to obey the laws of México. Therefore, it is the Church which
is responsible for the lack of religious ceremonies in
Mexico-not the government. 376

Morrow considered the meeting a success, and he pointed out: “They exchanged letters
which, if they had been ratified by Father Burke's superiors, would have led to a prompt
resumption of public worship in the churches and might well have laid the basis for a later
modification of the objectionable laws. 377 Years later, Josephus Daniels provided the best
summary of what happened. “The preliminary talk, he wrote, did not look as if agreement was
near, but the truth was that [Elías] Calles was looking for a way out without surrender, and so
were the leaders of the Catholic Church.” 378 The leaders of the groups in conflict had realized it
represented a no win game, but they needed to convince or force the extremists on both sides
before reaching an agreement.
At the end of the summit, the Mexican president delivered a letter to Father Burke,
pointing out that the Mexican laws had no intention to destroy Church’s identity or interfere with
its spiritual activities. Elías Calles added that he would always be open to hear, without
prejudice, any complaint about injustices derived from excesses committed by those trying to
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enforce the laws. 379 With that letter in his bag, Father Burke returned to the United States,
“instead of the matter being reported promptly to Rome by cable, as had been anticipated, it was
delayed to get an opinion from the Mexican bishops on a possible method of settlement.” 380
Bishop’s opinion would be a setback for Father Burke’s expectations.
The Mexican bishops were slow in changing their attitude. They always tried to win
everything in one move. At the end of April, under the leadership of Leopoldo Ruiz y Flores, a
group of ten Mexican bishops held a conference in San Antonio, Texas. During the meeting, the
bishops discussed the proposal presented by Burke. In general terms, they approved the content
of the document but objected that the Mexican authorities did not totally satisfy their demands.
They asked for changes in the Mexican Constitution but left the final decision to the Holy See.
Days later, Bishop Díaz Barreto publicly ratified that position at the silver jubilee of the Catholic
Alumni Sodality of Philadelphia. Díaz Barreto emphasized that “The Church will make no
compromise on principles... at present there are no signs of either the clergy or the people giving
up the fight to gain freedom.” 381 Bishop Díaz’ attitude represented an example of a desire to win
all at once.
Father Burke, however, tried to keep negotiations alive. He sent a letter to President
Elías Calles “in which [Burke] expressed the hope that the President might give additional and
more explicit assurances than those contained in his letter of April 4th.” 382 As soon as
Ambassador Morrow knew about that epistle, he called Robert Olds and explained it would be
quite difficult to get a sudden change in México’s president’s proposal. Morrow recommended
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that Burke return to México, this time with Archbishop Ruiz y Flores. Olds got in touch with
Burke, who gladly accepted the idea. That part represented the easiest component of the deal;
the other part would require a major effort to convince the Mexican president to meet with an
official of the Mexican Catholic Church. Elías Calles did not forget how the bishop had
repeatedly made derogatory comments towards the Mexican government. In spite of that,
Ambassador Morrow took the proposal to President Elías Calles. As expected, the Mexican
president initially rejected the idea. He argued “it would be impossible for him [Ruiz y Flores]
to come without getting into discussions with Mexican prelates and with prominent Catholic
laymen in México, and that publicity would consequently result.” 383 Elías Calles also mentioned
the presence of some extremists, small in numbers but powerful enough, who opposed any
settlement. For them, the visit of Ruiz would represent an “opportunity to impede the work that
Father Burke was trying to do” 384 Burke maintained that, without the presence of Ruiz y Flores,
he had no reason to continue the negotiations. With the dialogue in such a fragile state, Morrow
had no other choice but to visit President Elías Calles again. Morrow asked Elías Calles for a
more flexible attitude and to accept the participation of the Archbishop in the talks. In the end,
Elías Calles reluctantly agreed to Morrow’s request. The next step was to keep Ruiz’s visit in
secret.
Not all Catholic Americans had decided to adopt a conciliatory attitude. People like the
Archbishop of San Antonio Arthur J. Drossaerts continued to criticize his government for the
lack of action against the Mexican authorities. 385
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In the mean time, the Mexican president, accompanied by Álvaro Obregón, traveled to
the city of Celaya, in the central state of Guanajuato. There, on April 15, the Minister of
Education José Manuel Puig Casauranc delivered a speech inviting to the bishops to reconcile
with the Mexican authorities. The Catholic hierarchy welcomed those words. At the same time,
in another part of that city, a group of Catholic fanatics deliberated about how to kill Obregón.
They considered poisoning and bombs. In the end, the members of the plot decided to wait for a
better opportunity. 386 Without knowing about the plot, the Mexican authorities returned to
México City, where negotiations with Church authorities looked promising.
In the middle of May, Burke, Montavon, and Ruiz y Flores arrived in Laredo, Texas,
where a private train car was waiting for them. There they met the representative of the Mexican
President, M. F. Smithers, and traveled to México City. The Mexican authorities tried very hard
to keep Ruiz’s visit a secret. There were no public interviews or press releases. The group met
only with the Mexican President, the American Ambassador, or somebody else involved in the
conferences.
On May 17, they met with the Mexican President in his official residence at the
Chapultepec Castle. The prevailing mood during the talks promised that a new era would come.
Some clarifications were required at the beginning, but reason prevailed. By the end, it seemed
that the conclusion of the religious conflict was near. Opening the conference, Father Burke
presented the suggestions reached by the Mexican Bishops during their gathering in San
Antonio. President Elías Calles answered that he could not comply with those proposals. He did
concede that the Church could name the priests to be registered by the government. Taking into
account that position,
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Archbishop Ruiz expressed himself as willing to address a
new letter to President [Elías] Calles in substantially the
form of the letter written by Father Burke to President [Elías]
Calles on March 29, 1928, with the important addition that a
special reference was made to a public speech made by Dr.
Puig Casauranc, Minister of Education, on April 15, 1928, at
Celaya, which speech had been pleasing to the Church.387

Next, the Archbishop suggested a similar answer to the one previously sent by Elías Calles to
Burke, “and that when the proper authority [presumably the Pope] had been received the two
letters should be made public and the priests should be directed by the proper authorities to
return to their churches.” 388 Everybody agreed with that proposal, but the clerics needed to send
a message to Rome for final approval. Predicting that kind of outcome, Ambassador Morrow
had arranged with under-secretary Olds to be available the whole night waiting for a telegram in
case any agreement came out. As soon as Olds received the communication signed by Burke, he
took it to the office of the Papal Delegate. Fumasoni sent the message to Rome and waited for a
reply. Archbishop Ruiz y Flores believed an immediate reply that allowed opening the churches
on May 27 to celebrate the Feast of the Pentecost. Everything seemed a matter of patience;
nobody in México expected a delay in the reply from the offices of the Holy See.
What happened next represented a serious setback for everybody searching for a solution.
Who ever delayed the decision did not take into account how many people would perish in the
months to come. The Church’s negotiators Burke, Ruiz y Flores, and Montavon had decided to
stay in México until an official approval came from Rome; instead they got an order to return to
Washington and proceed immediately to Rome. The message added that the only one allowed to
travel there would be Archbishop Ruiz y Flores. Father Burke was put aside as a negotiator of
the agreement. On his way to Rome, Archbishop Ruiz revealed the purpose of his travel in an
387
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interview in Paris. He emphasized that: “reconciliation between Church and State in Mexico
may be effected soon, through Papal intercession. 389 That declaration worsened the situation in
México where, a couple of days earlier, members of the National League for the Defense of
Religious Liberty had sent a telegram to the Pope in which they rejected any possible agreement
to end the conflict. Archbishop Ruiz’s statement had a negative impact on the Mexican
government. In notes later sent to Burke, the Mexican prelate would argue that his words had
been misinterpreted. Negotiations reached a point where favorable settlement looked unlikely in
the near future.
The Pope’s curia in Rome believed negotiations required a slow pace, and continued
playing politics trying to please everybody. Church officials speculated that delaying a final
decision would allow them to get better terms in future negotiations with Álvaro Obregón, the
intended future president of México. During early June, almost a month before to presidential
elections in México, Ambassador Morrow went to Washington. There the news coming from
across the Atlantic regarding the religious conflict in México was that “the subject [the proposal
for solution of the conflict was submitted] to the Congregation on Extraordinary Foreign
Affairs… The Vatican was very reluctant to authorize the delivery of the letter which
Archbishop Ruiz had prepared.” 390 The Vatican’s reluctance stemmed from the pressure
exercised by Mexican Catholic extremists who traveled to Rome and expressed their reasons for
opposing any settlement, the hope to get a better deal from Obregon’s government; and the
desire for more specific assurances than those provided in the Elías Calles-Burke letters. 391
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The Catholic Radicals Derail the Negotiations
Once the Mexican presidential elections were over, Morrow returned to México in early
July. He faced plenty of changes in the political environment. On July 1, 1928, Obregón had
been elected president for the second time. The Mexican authorities faced pressures from
adversaries and advocates. Priests inquired whether they could go back into the churches.
Prominent supporters of the government objected to what they called surrender to the Church. 392
Consequently, Elías Calles decided to make public all letters and documents related to the
negotiations. He wanted to show that there had been no surrender. Once again, Morrow’s
political ability kept the negotiations alive. He convinced the Mexican president that such a
move would be devastating for any possible future settlement. It would also hit directly Father
Burke, for whom Elías Calles felt special appreciation.
With Rome delaying any advance in the negotiations, Morrow continued working with
the Mexican authorities. On the morning of July 17, he got together with Obregón’s campaign
manager, Aaron Saenz. A meeting was set between Morrow and Obregón for that afternoon at
five o’clock. Saenz assured the American Ambassador that the newly elected president of
México had kept open communication with President Elías Calles regarding to the religious
conflict. Obregón expected the conflict would be settled before his inauguration. 393 While the
Mexican authorities and Morrow expected to end the conflict in the near future, others had
different plans. Before attending the meeting with the American Ambassador; Obregón went to
a banquet organized by a group of his supporters. During the event, a Catholic fanatic, José De
León Toral, assassinated Obregón. Suddenly, the entire negotiation process blew up. The
Mexican government stopped the negotiations. Morrow mentioned in his memoirs that a
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member of the Catholic Church in México predicted that the final agreement would take at least
another year. 394
After the assassination, Obregon’s followers pointed fingers at President Elías Calles and
the Minister of Commerce Luís Napoleón Morones, a political rival of Obregón. The
Obregonistas accused them of using a Catholic to commit the murder. In order to please them,
the Mexican president agreed that Obregonistas would conduct the investigation. The inquiry
concluded that De León Toral was a member of a Catholic plot, something that the Church
denied. Many years later, a key leader of the Catholic extremists gave another version. Other
members involved in the conspiracy were Concepción Acevedo de la Llata, a nun known as the
Madre Conchita, and a Catholic priest José Jiménez. Acevedo de la Llata was accused by those
conducting the investigation of being one of the main advisors to De Leon Toral. Jiménez was
charged of blessing the gun used by the murderer. After a trial, De León Toral was executed,
Acevedo was confined to prison, and Jimenez escaped. In 1932, Jiménez was arrest and charged
with conspiracy. The event remained a matter of controversy; Catholics denied their
participation in the plot. In 1964, however, James Wilkie interviewed the vice president of the
National League for the Defense of Religious Liberty, Miguel Palomar y Vizcarra. Palomar y
Vizcarra declared the assassination of Obregón was a well planed action. Palomar y Vizcarra
assured “the murder of Obregón was deliberated long before the action of José de León Toral
took place.” For Palomar y Vizcarra, the killing of Obregón was part of a war. Consequently
nothing was wrong with that action. Palomar y Vizcarra also recognized De León Toral as a
member of the League and also of the Young Men Catholic Association (ACJM). 395 These
kinds of claims left no doubt as to Catholic involvement in the assassination.
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In the middle of the turmoil, the Mexican priests gave an explanation to Morrow about
their participation and the role of Father Burke in the negotiations to end the religious conflict.
They also elucidated their allegedly support to the armed movement. On July 24, 1928, the
Bishop of Tabasco Pascual Díaz Barreto sent a letter to Ambassador Morrow, in which he stated
that
Father John Burke has informed me that you desire to know
who is the person authorized by the Holy See to represent
and to speak for the Church in Mexico. It gives me great
pleasure to advise you that his Excellency, Msgr. Peter
Fumasoni-Bondi, Apostolic Delegate to the USA, is also
Apostolic Delegate to Mexico, and further that in a letter dated
December 12, 1927, copy of which is attached, His Excellency
the Apostolic Delegate, appointed me to be the official liaison
between the Apostolic Delegate and the Bishops of Mexico.
Father Burke is the agent of His Excellency the Apostolic
Delegate. 396

In relation to accusations that the Church supported the armed movement, Díaz Barreto made
clear that the Catholic Church had nothing to do with the actions of those involved in the armed
movement. He mentioned that “in the Encyclical [Iniquis Afflictisque] the Holy Father approved
the League [for the Defense of Religious Liberty] which by legal methods alone would work
zealously, patriotically and with Christian courage to win for the Church the liberty in Mexico.”
But when
later, on its own responsibility, the League decided resort to
armed action to win the liberty of the Church. When things
reached this stage, the Pope deemed it has duty to give to the
Bishops of Mexico a clear and definitive instruction. This he
did in communication dated November 16, 1927, in which,
leaving Catholics as individuals entirely free, he instructed
the Bishops to have no part, physical or moral, direct or
indirect, in any armed action by Catholics under his direction
of the League. If the League thereafter persists in this action,
you will see that the Bishops have no part in it. 397
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On September 1, 1928, President Elías Calles went to Congress to present his State of the
Country Address. In his speech, Elías Calles mentioned that some people asked him to stay in
power for two more years as a measure to keep the country in peace. He nevertheless decided to
step aside effective on December 1. An interim president would be named. In an
“undiplomatic” reaction, Morrow leaned forward in the diplomatic box and applauded. “I
suppose,” he murmured to the British Minister, Esmond Ovey on regaining his seat after this
dramatic demonstration, “I suppose I ought not to have done that?” “No,” Ovey answered. “You
ought not.” 398 That mistake was a small spot in Morrow’s brilliant performance as diplomat
with no other significance than the anecdotic part.
After this announcement, Mexican authorities changed priorities. The Obregonistas and
Callistas focused on who would be the man temporarily in charge of the executive branch.
Negotiations to end the religious conflict became a secondary issue. Elías Calles decided to
break off negotiations, and leave the final decision to his successor. On September 25, the
Mexican Congress named the former Governor of the Northeastern State of Tamaulipas and then
Ministry of the Interior, Emilio Portes Gil, as the interim president of México. Portes Gil, who
took the oath on December 1, called presidential elections on November 17, 1929. Portes Gil
announced that on December 1, 1929 he would transfer power to the elected candidate. The
situation represented an opportunity for Catholic extremists to continue derailing the negotiations
of the religious conflict and even trying to create an international conflict for México.

Morrow Became the Target
Obregon’s assassination was a serious set back for the negotiations. Morrow, however,
was not discouraged and continued to work his diplomacy. Instead of using the common
398
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diplomatic channels and waiting for instructions from Washington, he took the initiative. If he
needed to consult with the State Department, he did not hesitate to spend literally hours talking
over the phone. Once in the field, he preferred to talk directly with the Mexican president,
Mexican ministers, or business leaders. The political turmoil prevailing in the Mexican domestic
politics did not prevent President Coolidge for recognizing the positive results of Morrow’s
diplomacy. During Coolidge’s State of the Union Address of 1928, the US president
emphasized:
Our relations with Mexico are on a more satisfactory basis
than at any time since their revolution. Many
misunderstandings have been resolved and the most frank
and friendly negotiations promise a final adjustment of all
unsettled questions. It is exceedingly gratifying that
Ambassador Morrow has been able to bring our two
neighboring countries, which have so many interests in
common, to a position of confidence in each other and of
respect for mutual sovereign rights.399

In México Morrow’s activism did not make him popular with either side of the conflict.
Those extremists considered ambassador’s activities an act of interventionism in domestic
matters. In December 1927, members of the Anarchist Movement published in the newspaper
Avante an article plenty of epithets titled “El Nuevo Embajador Mr. Morrow.” The anarchists
accused the ambassador of being a representative of business interests from Wall Street. The
anarchists stated that Morrow came to México with two main goals: to change those articles of
the Mexican Constitution affecting Americans properties and to consolidate Mexican
dependency from the United States.400 Others went farther in their actions against him. In
September 1928, the U.S. Embassy got an anonymous message with the title of Atento Mensaje
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Del Pueblo Mexicano al Sr. Morrow. The author or authors of the pamphlet attacked the
American ambassador for his lack of understanding of the religious problem, his efforts to create
a Protestant society, and friendship with the tyrants Obregón and [Elías] Calles. The leaflet
concluded by inviting Morrow to leave the country immediately. 401
A few days later, the Mexican press published news related to what seemed to be a
confrontation between members of the Cristero movement and governmental forces in Huitzilac,
Morelos. It would have nothing extraordinary except that “coincidently” at the same time
Morrow was on his way to Cuernavaca, Morelos and almost got hit by a bullet. The Cristeros
clearly target Morrow. They planned to kidnap the American Ambassador, and to kill Elías
Calles or even the newly named President Portes Gil. Bishop Díaz Barreto informed to
Archbishop Ruiz y Flores about this events. Díaz Barreto believed that those events interfered
with the search for a solution. Díaz Barreto stated that the League was a headless entity with
many mouths talking without sense and a liver secreting great amount of bile. 402
The extremists were out of control, they no longer obeyed the leaders of the Catholic
Church. Their only goal was the surrender of the Mexican State; anything else would be a
defeat. On the basis of information from the State Department files, American Historian Francis
Patrick Dooley wrote about the threats of some Catholics against Morrow. According to
Dooley’s recount, on April 5, 1929 the State Department got a letter signed by members of the
League written in harsh language and threatening Morrow’s life. On April 10, J. Ruben Clark
from the State Department received the Jesuit priest Carlos Heredia, who accused Morrow of
representing the financers’ interests. Heredia also claimed the Church had some principles to
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defend in the religious conflict in México. After that, Clark and Arthur Bliss Lane met with
William Montavon to express their worries about the potential kidnapping or assassination of
Morrow by a Catholic extremist. Montavon granted that some Catholics were capable of doing
anything to get the U.S. involved in an armed conflict in México. After that meeting, Montavon
sent a telegram to one of the few bishops in favor of a settlement, Bishop Antonio Guizar y
Valencia, and asked Guizar y Valencia to condemn publicly the idea of any attack or threat
against Morrow. 403
Attacks on Morrow could serve different purposes other than to ignite religious
prejudices. Others used the issue to raise nationalistic sentiments and argue against foreign
intervention in political domestic affairs. José Vasconcelos, the former Minister of Education
under Obregón, and the rightist presidential candidate for the Anti-Reelection Party, accused
Morrow of being the mastermind behind the candidate of the newly born National Revolutionary
Party (PNR), Pascual Ortiz Rubio. Despite that accusation, Vasconcelos asked for Morrow’s
support for his candidacy, something Morrow did not provide. In 1939, Vasconcelos wrote a
book, El Proconsulado, devoted to criticize Morrow’s participation in Mexican political life.
The extremists’ position put the Catholic hierarchy in Rome in a dilemma. The Church
officials were well aware of how important was to reach an agreement to end the religious
conflict in México. The Church, however, needed to move cautiously. Catholic officials at
Rome accepted the participation of some of its members in the negotiations, but emphasizing
there was not an official involvement from the Pope or somebody close to him in such
discussions.

403

Dooley, Los Cristeros, Calles y el Catolicismo Mexicano, 177, 178.

174

Negotiations at a Dead Point…At Least on the Surface
On September 27, 1928, L’Obsservatore Romano published a denial of rumors that two
representatives of the Holy See had traveled to México. This publication did not refute the
Church participated in the negotiations to end the conflict, between Church and state in México
but just clarified that there was no direct involvement by the Pope or anybody close to him. 404
After several months in Rome, Archbishop Ruiz y Flores returned to the United States. During
the trip, Ruiz y Flores wrote a letter to the Mexican bishops, dated on November 5, 1928. The
document seemed more like a guideline for the surrender of the Mexican authorities than an
invitation to continue with negotiations. According to Ruiz y Flores, the Pope asked for a
meeting between members of the Catholic Church and representatives of the government of
Mexico to take place in Rome. The Pope, as Ruiz y Flores explained, thought that the Mexican
government needed to make changes in the Mexican Constitution and guarantee the security of
the members of the clergy. After that, the Holy See agreed to authorize the return of Church’s
services to México, as soon as he would get the assurance that religious freedom would
prevail. 405 Some misgivings about those words emerged. Antonio López Ortega, in Las
Naciones Extranjeras y la Persecución Religiosa, quoted that letter which contained words
attributed to the Pope blessing the Mexican Catholics, priests and everybody involved in the
dispute, even those fighting against the church. 406 However, at the Plutarco Elías Calles
Archives in México City there is a copy of a letter dated October 21, 1928, addressed by López
Ortega as Secretary General of the Unión Internacional de Todos los Amigos de la Liga
Nacional para la Defensa Religiosa de México (U.I.T.A) to the Bishop of Durango, José María
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González y Valencia. In that letter López Ortega, supposedly quoting Ruiz y Flores’ words,
mentioned that the Pope
did not disapprove the armed upraise… since all the pacific
means were exhausted. The Pope, also, acknowledge as an
achievement the actions against the government. The
government had been forced to make pleas –although
indirect- to reach an agreement . The Pope approved that,
even if an accord was reach, those involved in the armed
revolt can continue fighting until the government please their
demands. 407

The radicalization of some members of Church toward the Mexican conflict was real.
According to extremists, there was no alternative, the Mexican government needed to make
changes in the Constitution or the Church would not accept any more negotiations. On
November 22, 1928 the Apostolic Delegate, Fumasoni Bondi called Father Burke to a meeting at
his office. During the meeting, Fumasoni delivered a document to Burke in which the Holy See
asked for more favorable options than those contained in the letter the Mexican president sent to
Burke in April 1928. 408
The same day, without knowing the results of that meeting, Ambassador Morrow went to
visit the Mexican president. Morrow mentioned his recent talk with Father Burke, who
considered it viable to open a discussion about the points contained in the letter. Elías Calles
argued that it made no sense to engage in negotiations, since he had only a few days left in
office. Further, the domestic political situation would make it impossible, even for next
president Portes Gil, to discuss possible changes in the Mexican Constitution. Elías Calles
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agreed that Burke’s visit to México was a good idea, but that would be a matter which Portes Gil
would have to take the responsibility of deciding. 409
Emilio Portes Gil became the President of México on December1, 1928. It did not seem
likely that the religious conflict would end anytime soon. During early December, Morrow met
in Washington with Father Burke and Montavon. Burke mentioned the possibility of going to
Rome in February as a new effort to change the path of the negotiations. Morrow would not do
anything else unless Burke asked him to. 410 In fact, the Vatican had displaced Burke as the main
negotiator. The Church’s political figures were replaced by new actors. Since June 1928, the
Pope believed that some Catholics and Mexican priests were no longer operating on a religious
basis. They had adopted an extremist and inflexible political attitude, which represented a no
win game. The Pope decided to put what he believed were more open minds and individuals in
charge of the negotiations. The vice-president of Georgetown University, the Jesuit Father
Edmund Walsh, would take control of the negotiations. When Walsh met Morrow, he
introduced himself as Pius XI’s personal envoy. Since the spring of 1928, Walsh had been
engaged in a series of covert activities. A personal friend of Pope Pius XI, Walsh had contacted
the one-time Chilean Ambassador to Washington, Miguel Cruchaga Tocornal. Cruchaga
provided Walsh information about the situation in México based on his correspondence with a
Mexican bishop, whom he did not identify. Cruchaga and Walsh came up with new plans for a
settlement which were explained to Pius XI in June 1928. Father Walsh conveyed that the
Pope’s agreement with the need for a rapid solution to the conflict. Walsh introduced himself to
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Morrow as the Pope’s representative in charge of reporting to the Pope regarding the
development of the negotiations. 411
When Walsh went to Rome in June 1928, he needed to revise his plans. Events that
happened earlier that month, such as the report given by Ruiz y Flores to the Pope, made
necessary to add other ingredients to that solution proposed by Walsh and Cruchaga. On June 7,
1928 Pius XI had a meeting with Cardinal Gasparri and Under-Secretary of State for
Extraordinary Affairs, Monsignor Gongorcini-Duca. In that meeting, they analyzed a report that
Archbishop Ruiz y Flores had given the Pope the night before. 412 That report enclosed opinions
of all Mexican bishops living in exile in San Antonio, Texas. According to The New York Times,
the report did not “contain any suggestions as to the best method of overcoming the crisis, and
left it to the Pope to draw his own conclusions.” 413 Speaking for his colleagues, Ruiz y Flores
emphasized “that there never [had] been a more favorable time to settle the difficulties between
the Catholic Church and the Mexican government.” 414 Once Pius XI, Gasparri, and GongorciniDuca analyzed the information provided by the Mexican Archbishop, the Pope made a decision.
On June 8, “the Pope entrusted the Congregation on Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs with the
study of the minimum conditions that the Mexican government should grant to permit the return
of the Catholic Church to Mexico.” 415 During those days, the Pope also met with Walsh and
Cruchaga who provided him with a new proposal to solve the religious conflict in México. After
all that, the Pope decided to name Father Walsh to replaced Father Burke as the main negotiator.
The statement written by Archbishop Ruiz y Flores in November 1928 and the emergence of
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Father Walsh as the Church’s negotiator suggested that the Church was seeking a solution to the
religious conflict in México.
In early February 1929, after spending almost three months in Washington, Morrow
returned to México. Morrow had no hope for a quick solution to the religious conflict. Events in
Mexico during the first days of 1929 gave Morrow further cause for pessimism. On March 3,
1929, some members of the Obregonismo radical wing, the generals José Gonzalo Escobar,
Fausto Topete, Jesús M. Aguirre, and Francisco R. Manzo, headed a rebellion of about 20
percent of the Mexican Army against the government. Behind that uprising was a political issue.
During the days from March 1 to 4, 1929 gathered the members of diverse political forces in
México. The goal was to merge all those people sympathetic to the Mexican Revolution’s
principles into a single national political unity. As a result of the meeting the National
Revolutionary Party (PNR) was born. Some saw in the creation of this political party the
opportunity to launch their career into new stages. One of them was the former Minister of the
Interior Gilberto Valenzuela who expected that members of the new party would support his
candidacy to the presidency of México. Because the expectation was not fulfill, his supporters
decided to take the arms. The rebels, however,
asserted that the revolt was against the presidency of Portes Gil,
who they accused of crimes in office and of being a tool of
[Elías] Calles. It was to purge the nation of [Elías] Calles they
were fighting, they said. If [Elías] Calles quit the country they
would put down their arms and work again for the social and
economic independence of the nation.416

For President Herbert Hoover, who took the oath on March 4, 1928, the Mexican revolt
represented his first problem of foreign policy. 417 The rebels tried to buy arms and
ammunitions in the U.S. The U.S. government avoided intervening, and prohibited to sell arms
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to the rebels. Meanwhile in México, Portes Gil appointed Elías Calles, as Minister of War.
Elías Calles, as head of the Mexican Army, took nine weeks to defeat the rebels. The efforts and
resources directed to beat that rebellion distracted the Mexican Army. It allowed the Cristero
uprising to reignite. At the same time, the political campaign for the presidency had already
unofficially started, with Vasconcelos as the leader of those opposing the Mexican government.
Vasconcelos traveled around the country with a powerful message against the authorities,
claiming that what the country needed was democracy and that he was the only one able to
provide it. On January 6, 1929, Il Osservatore Romano published an article suggesting
Vasconcelos would be the kind of candidate Catholics could support. Less than a month later, on
February 3, Vasconcelos met with two representatives of the General in Chief of the Cristero
Army, Enrique Goroztieta, who offered the support of his troops to back Vasconcelos on the
presidency. 418
In the middle of all this, the Cristero Army decided to play every single card available to
defeat the Mexican government. The movement was in the hands of the radicals who determine
to fight for all or nothing. On February 7, during his travel to Tampico, President Portes Gil
received a letter signed by the legal team defending José De León Toral. In that document, the
lawyers asked for a presidential pardon for their client. As soon as Portes Gil arrived to
Tampico, he got another letter signed by a group of members of the National League for the
Defense of Religious Liberty demanding the exoneration of De León Toral; in case of a negative
answer, they threatened to derail the presidential train. The same day, the Mexican president
wrote a reply to the group of lawyers denying any clemency. He argued that the case had been
analyzed enough by different judicial tribunals, which had concluded unanimously that the
assassin deserved capital punishment. Two days later, De León Toral was executed by a military
418
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firing squad. On February 10th, returning by train to México City, Portes Gil became the target
of an attempted assassination. While passing through the State of Guanajuato, a bomb exploded.
The president, his family and members of the cabinet emerged unharmed, but some of the train
crew died. 419 The president blamed members of the aristocracy for supporting the rebels. He
threatened to confiscate properties belonging to those directly or indirectly involved in these
activities. In the end, the investigations concluded that some female members of the League in
Mexico City had paid a teenager three hundred pesos to set the explosives. 420
Morrow was kept busy during this time. Between February and early April, Morrow
faced requests from the Mexican government demanding assurances that the American
authorities would not allow the rebels to obtain weapons in the U.S. At the same time, Mexican
authorities asked for help in order to secure armaments from America.

At the End Reason Prevailed…Unofficially
During1929, the Catholic Church ended political disputes with two civil governments.
First, the Catholic Church and the Italian Government signed the Lateran Treaty in February.
Later, at the beginning of the summer, a Modus Vivendi ended the religious conflict in México.
In both cases, political pragmatism prevailed over other considerations.
On February 11, 1929 Cardinal Gasparrí in the name of Pope Pius XI and Benito
Mussolini in the name of the King of Italy Victor Emmanuel III signed the Lateran Treaty. The
treaty showed that officials of the Church could put aside considerations of freedom and
democracy in order to accomplish specific goals. The Treaty recognized the Catholic Apostolic
Roman religion as the only State religion in Italy and created a new fully sovereign and
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independent state called Vatican City. The government of Italy also recognized the person of the
Pope sacred and inviolable and approved religious teaching in public schools with text-books
approved by the Ecclesiastical Authority. 421
With one problem solved, Pope Pius XI decided to search for a solution to the Mexican
conflict. Taking into account that there was no official recognition from either the Mexican
government of the Vatican or from the Vatican of the Mexican government, negotiations needed
to be done unofficially. Father Walsh became the unofficial representative of the Pope.
Ambassador Morrow continued operating on personal basis as a mediator in the conflict.
President Portes Gil never “officially” engaged in the discussions.
During March and April, with the Mexican government battling the military uprising,
negotiations regarding the religious conflict appeared to be frozen. However, the search for a
solution to the religious conflict developed quietly on the surface but without pause underneath.
Catholic radicals continued showing their opposition to any possible ending other than the
surrender of the Mexican state. They tried to create an international conflict with actions such as
threats to Morrow’s life. At this point, however, some other people became involved in the
process. Two of them were the Mexican bankers and fervent Catholics, Agustín Legorreta, a
close friend of Elías Calles, and Manuel Echeverría. Both were tired of the extremists’ attitude
and decided to work in favor of a settlement. On April 23, “Echeverría pointed out to Morrow
that by this time a minority of the bishops were holding out against the majority who desired
peace.” 422 Echeverría decided to “send to Rome at his own expense Monsignor Antonio Guizar
y Valencia, Bishop of Chihuahua who desired peace and was prepared to tell the Roman officials
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that the position taken by the uncompromising bishops in Mexico was untenable and that they
should come to an arrangement with the Mexican government.” 423
With Guizar y Valencia traveling to Rome, Father Walsh coming to México, and Morrow
doing his job, on May 1, 1929, President Portes Gil gave an interview to the Associated Press
correspondent, Clarence Dubose. During the interview, Portes Gil praised the attitude adopted
by the Secretary of the Mitra of Oaxaca Father Villagómez who encouraged Catholics and
members of the Catholic Church to obey civil authority’s dispositions. Portes Gil also stated that
there was no religious persecution against members of any faith. When questioned if the
government would allow the reopening of the churches, the Mexican president stated: ‘the
government neither suspended the cult nor closed the churches; the priests did it without any
order coming from the civil authorities. Catholics continued attending those places and groups
of neighbors were in charge of the vigilance.” 424 Two days later, Archbishop Ruiz y Flores
declared in Washington that the problems originating from the religious conflict in México were
of such a kind that good will men could solve them. Taking into account Portes Gil’s words, the
Church and its priests were ready to work with the president for the well being of the Mexican
people. 425
The messages in the press did not end there. On May 8, Portes Gil recounted the reasons
behind the disagreements. He pointed out that some extremists took the conflict to the point it
had reached. Portes Gil invited Archbishop Ruiz y Flores to discuss the possibility of ending
how the religious conflict. 426
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Events in México lay behind that suddenly harmonious attitude. In the early days of
May, Father Walsh, accompanied by Cruchaga, had arrived in México. There is no documented
record of a meeting between President Portes Gil and Father Walsh. On May 4, in a meeting
with Morrow, Walsh announced that he “was prepared to stay for a month and would be in touch
with reactionary elements among the Mexican clergy; his presence, he said, was unknown to the
leading Catholics who have previously figured in the story.” 427 Once he knew Walsh’s
intentions, Morrow continued working with the Mexican authorities. Morrow maintained open
communication with Portes Gil, meeting several times to discuss official matters related to
agrarian and diplomatic problems unrelated to the religious conflict. According to documents
from the State Department cited by L. Ethan Ellis, the American ambassador persuaded the
Mexican president to make the remarks already cited.
On May 14, Ruiz sent a telegram to all thirty Mexican bishops, twenty of whom lived in
the U.S., inquiring if they approved a meeting with the Mexican president. Ruiz y Flores
mentioned that, as soon as he received their responses, he would submit them to the Vatican and
ask for instructions for a possible meeting with Mexican authorities. The archbishop would then
act once he got an authorization from the Vatican. 428
At that point, Morrow had already unofficially submitted to Ruiz y Flores a proposal for a
letter the priest would send to Portes Gil. The document, already approved by the Mexican
president, was written on the basis of the exchange between Elías Calles and Burke in April
1928. According to that, Father Burke explored the possibility that, without disobeying the
prevailing laws, the Mexican priests could find a way to exercise their religious activities and
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later make some changes in the Mexican legislation. While the Mexican President assured that
the Mexican government had no intention to destroy Church’s identity but to preserve those
dispositions written in the law. Morrow requested that Ruiz y Flores obtain approval from the
Vatican and then proceed. In the meantime, the Mexican ambassador in Washington, Manuel
Tellez, “had been authorized by President Portes Gil to begin closer negotiations on the Mexican
religious controversy with Archbishop Leopoldo Ruiz y Flores.” 429 During those days Morrow
went to Washington to attend the wedding of his daughter Anne, to Charles Lindbergh. There
Morrow met Ruiz y Flores, expressing his worries about the position adopted by the Church
asking for a change in the Mexican laws as the basis for a solution to the religious conflict.
Morrow reiterated that the best way to approach to the matter would be on the basis of the Elías
Calles-Burke exchange. 430
During the last days of May 1929, the negotiations looked as if they were making no
progress; behind the scene, however, efforts continued. On May 31, L’Osservatore Romano
published an article in which the Secretary of State of the Vatican, Monsignor Gasparri,
expressed his thoughts about the religious conflict between the government of México and the
Catholic Church. Gasparri said he encouraged Catholics to abide by México’s laws. He stated
that the Church had no choice but to accept the demands of the Mexican Government. His
Holiness and the ecclesiastical authorities in México had no other alternative but to accept a
friendly solution to the religious conflict; otherwise they would be responsible before God
because of their negligence. The Church, however, would accept the dispositions written on the
laws on cults if the Mexican government agreed to make some modifications in such laws on the
basis of the instructions [not mentioned in Gaparri’s piece] given by the Holy See and the
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opinions of the Archbishops and Bishops of the Mexican Diocese. 431 Meanwhile, Morrow
warned Bishop Ruiz y Flores against continued demanding an immediate change in the laws.
For Morrow to follow that path “would end the possibility of negotiation and make it useless for
him to continue active in the matter. Morrow continued to urge use of Burke or Montavon,
representing what he called the conservative faction to balance Father Walsh’s influence
representative of the so-called radical element.” 432
The bad news for the Catholic radicals did not stop at the end of May. On the first day of
June, Pope Pius XI announced the appointment of Archbishop Ruiz y Flores as Apostolic
Delegate to Mexico ad interim, and ordered him to go to México for discussions about the
religious conflict. 433 Then on June 2, the Cristero Army suffered a serious lost. Its General in
Chief, Enrique Goroztieta was killed in action by federal troops while members of his staff were
held as prisoners. His death did not represent the end of the armed rebellion, but the Cristeros
never recovered from that military defeat. The end of the conflict approached.
On June 9, Morrow returned to México, but this time he did not arrive alone. He had
two companions: Leopoldo Ruiz y Flores y Pascual Díaz Barreto. Before arriving in México
City, the priests were met by Walsh and Cruchaga who took them “to the home of the Embassy’s
Naval Attaché, remaining there in seclusion, seeing only Morrow and Walsh and leaving only for
conferences with the President.” 434
Before the talks between Portes Gil and Ruiz-Diaz started, Walsh tried to impose his will
on the negotiations. Walsh visited Morrow on June 10, indicating that the bishops had brought
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no definite plan of action. Walsh proposed a plan that Morrow told him contained so many
specific demands as to kill its chances of success. Walsh had no other option but to accept
Morrow’s recommendation and discuss the proposals with the Mexican priests. After conferring
with them, Walsh returned to Morrow’s office and reported their acceptance of the principles of
the Elías Calles-Burke exchange of April 1928. 435
The day after their arrival, the priests went to the National Palace in downtown México
City and asked for an appointment with President Portes Gil, who at that moment was three
miles away in a meeting with Ambassador Morrow which lasted for forty five minutes. 436 The
priests, however, did not leave empty handed. They obtained an appointment with President
Portes Gil for June 12. According to the transcript taken by Portes Gil’s private secretary, during
the first meeting Archbishop Ruiz y Flores launched into recriminations related to the measures
implemented by the Mexican government during the past years. These statements caused Bishop
Diaz Barreto to interrupt and kindly suggest to his colleague that there was no sense in
continuing to argue about events of the past. Díaz Barreto requested that Portes Gil open the
Churches while praying to God to find ways to end the conflict. From then on, the
conversation’s tone changed and a frank dialogue prevailed. At the end of the first meeting,
Portes Gil provided the priests with a draft of a possible agreement. Portes Gil asked Ruiz y
Flores and Díaz Barreto to study the document for discussions in a future meeting. 437 On the
evening of June 13, the priests returned to hold conversations with the president which lasted for
almost an hour and a half. They announced that the talks were going into the right direction. 438
In spite of those public pleasant images, negotiations did not go exactly smoothly. According to
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Walsh’s account, the Mexican president adopted an unnecessarily brusque, hard, and cold
attitude. 439
Taking into account the way negotiations proceeded and the position of the radicals on
both sides trying to break the negotiations, Morrow concluded that he had no choice but to
intervene directly, it unofficially. On June 15, according to The New York Times, “Morrow held
a conference for an hour with President Emilio Portes Gil concerning the negotiations now going
on for settlement of the controversy with the Catholic Church.” 440 During the talk, the American
Ambassador submitted a proposed statement, somewhat more explicit and less abrupt than the
original one, which at the end with minimal changes became the document known as Modus
Vivendi. Portes Gil, who did not know abut this new proposal, “grudgingly agreed to have this
translated for study. 441 Previous to this meeting, Morrow had discussed the document with
former President Elías Calles who agreed with the terms contained in it. After his visit to the
President, Morrow went meet with Ruiz y Flores and Diaz Barreto and provided them with a
copy of the document he had presented to Portes Gil. Morrow also gave a statement which Ruiz
y Flores might make in reply to the presidential pronouncement. 442
Once Ruiz y Flores, Díaz Barreto, Walsh, and Cruchaga analyzed Morrow’s document,
they had no other choice but to accept its terms. They sent a telegram to the Vatican urging its
approval. The reply from Rome arrived on June 20 with two major requests. One asked total
amnesty for those involved in the conflict. Another demanded the restitution to the Church of its
real estate. After reading that, Morrow went to talk with Ruiz y Flores. Ruiz y Flores stated that
amnesty implied the right of the priests to return to their Churches. Restitution meant the
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possibility that the Church could use its belongings. 443 Meanwhile Portes Gil also made some
changes in the document, which at the end where accepted by all parties involved in the
negotiations.
Finally, on June 21, 1929, both parties accepted a settlement. The Mexican president
announced to the press he had met several times with Archbishop Ruiz y Flores and Bishop Díaz
Barreto and that they accepted the dispositions established under the Mexican Constitution. The
bishops agreed that members of the Catholic Church would return to perform their religious
duties. Separately, Archbishop Ruiz told reporters that he praised the respect and good will of
the Mexican president during the talks. Ruiz announced that the Mexican priests would return to
their religious activities according to the prevailing rules. 444 The final result of the agreement
was known as the Modus Vivendi, which in any sense represented an official document or
recognition of the Mexican government to the Catholic Church as an official entity. The
agreement was written in a couple of white sheets without official seal. At the bottom appears
the signature of the President of México whose name was written only as E. Portes Gil. In the
document, Portes Gil first pointed out his conversations with Ruiz y Flores and Díaz Barreto,
while proceeding to recognize their patriotism, and desires to resume public worship according
to the laws. Portes Gil mentioned that it was not the purpose of the Mexican Constitution, nor of
the laws, or of the Government of the Republic to destroy the identity of the Catholic Church or
of any other or to interfere in any way with its spiritual functions. Later, Portes Gil proceeded to
submit the core of the agreement in three paragraphs mentioning:
1. - That the provision of the law which requires the
registration of ministers does not mean that the government
can register those who have not been named by the
hierarchical superior of the religious creed in question or in
accordance with its regulations.
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2. - With regard to religious instruction, the constitution and
the laws in force definitely prohibit it in elementary or higher
schools, whether public or private, but this does not prevent
ministers of any religion from imparting its doctrines, within
church confines, to adults or their children who may attend for
that purpose.
3. - That the constitution as well as the laws relating to the
country guarantee to all residents of the Republic the right of
petition and therefore the members of any church may apply to
the appropriate authorities for the amendment, repeal or
passage of any law 445

The agreements offered a way to end the conflict. After almost three years, the doors of
the churches reopened. The Catholic Church hierarchy realized they had no choice but to accept
the Modus Vivendi as the only means to return to operating. On the other hand, those involved
in the armed conflict had no other alternative but to surrender. The representatives of the
Catholic Church during the negotiations publicly expressed their satisfaction with the results
achieved. Archbishop Ruiz y Flores sent a telegram to Father John J. Burke mentioning that:
“the work of reconciliation …started by you in the name of the National Catholic Welfare
Conference [had] been crowned with a document officially signed as the first step toward
definitive solution.” 446
Participants agreed that Morrow involvement was crucial to the achievement of a
settlement. After praising Portes Gil’s attitude during the negotiations, Walsh stated that
Ambassador Morrow, acting as a private individual, was absolutely non-partisan and won the
esteem and gratitude of the negotiators on both sides. The Chief of the Division of Mexican
Affairs at the Department of State, Arthur B. Lane, also made a point of Morrow’s unofficial
status. He pointed a conversation with the Mexican Ambassador at Washington that:
Mr. Morrow had acted in this religious question purely in
a private capacity and that if any officials of the Department
of State had transmitted messages on the subject, they were
445
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only acting as the personal agents of Mr. Morrow and not as
officials of the Department of State. Mr. Tellez said that
he understood this and said that he realized Mr. Morrow
had done a great deal to modify ex-President Calles' point
of view with regard to the religious question in general.447

Morrow’s intervention earned congratulations from Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson
on behalf of the President and himself. “Without the assistance you have rendered,” wrote
Stimson, “the adjustment could not and would not have been made, at least for some time to
come…the way in which you have brought to the two governments the present friendly good
will from a condition of near hostility, is a high achievement in the history of our diplomacy.” 448
Not all the acknowledgments to Morrow came in a private way. The Washington Post
recognized the key participation of Walsh and Burke in the negotiations and explicitly mentioned
that the: “settlement of the three-year-old controversy between the Mexican government and the
Catholic Church in Mexico has been brought about to a large extent through the efforts of
American Ambassador Dwight W. Morrow, who has worked tirelessly on the problem since he
came to Mexico in an official capacity.” 449
Despite that reconciliation, not everybody was pleased. Catholic radicals persisted
charged that the settlement resulted from the betrayal of some members of the Church who
decided to join the enemy. After three years of fighting, Catholic radicals came away empty
handed. For them, what was signed represented a provisional agreement. According to Miguel
Palomar y Vizcarra, after the agreement, there was no alternative for the Cristeros but to end the
fight. Palomar y Vizcarra blamed Fumasoni-Bondi, Ruiz y Flores and Díaz Barreto for acting
according to the wishes of the White House. In doing so, they became enemies of the armed
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revolt and engaged in partnership with Morrow and Portes Gil. 450 These charges ignored that the
priests engaged in the negotiations did so with the blessing of Pope Pius XI. Palomar avoided
putting part of the blame on the Pope. For advocates of the Cristero movement, the Modus
Vivendi was a sell out and represented a small accomplishment not necessarily in favor of
Catholicism. That “small accomplishment” involved the efforts of representatives from three
very different states and produced a tangible agreement. Behind the State-Church conflict laid
four hundred years of struggles that often worked to the detriment of the Mexican people. It
does not matter if it was called a product of official or unofficial diplomacy; the Modus Vivendi
concluded a revolution that lasted for three years. The agreement established the basis for
relations between the Mexican state and the Catholic Church for the next sixty years. Many
problems appeared during those years, but never again did they result in a revolution. The time
of the radicals began to end, and reason emerged.
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CONCLUSION
Diplomatic relations between the United States and México during the 1920s was
important not only because they demonstrated, for both, how foreign policy influenced domestic
politics and how internal political affairs framed international relations, but also because they
shaped the relationship between the two countries for the rest of the 20th Century. Also, events
during the Harding, Coolidge and Hoover presidencies confirmed not only William Appleman
Williams’ argument that American policy was not isolationist, but also that it could be described
by what Joan Hoff called independent internationalism. By that, Hoff meant a policy
characterized by the amalgamation of ideological and economic considerations. While the U.S.
avoided “entangling” alliances, it actively engaged with other countries in pursuit of American
interests.
American relations with México provided an example of this approach to diplomacy.
The three main issues in U.S. - México relations in the 1920s addressed in this thesis were: the
conflict between the American oil companies and the Mexican authorities, the domestic armed
rebellions in México, and the religious conflict between the Mexican government and the
Catholic Church. In each one, the U.S. government played an important role in reaching a
solution. Diplomacy proved an effective tool to solve the problems of American companies’ oil
rights in México. The American government initially reached a settlement through the General
Claims Convention or the Bucareli Agreements in 1923. Later, in 1927, due to the enactment of
a new Petroleum Law, the dispute between the Mexican government and American oil producers
reached a peak, and the participation of Ambassador Morrow ended the conflict. American
involvement to end the religious conflict in México provided another example of how the U.S.
actively took part in international affairs. American Ambassador in Mexico, Dwight W.
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Morrow, was the leading figure in achieving a final settlement in both the oil and the religious
conflicts. Seeking a stable Mexican government, the U.S. consistently supported the officially
recognized government throughout the 1920s.
On the Mexican side, presidents, Obregón Salido, Elías Calles and Portes Gil, approached
diplomacy with a great sense of what can be call nationalistic pragmatism. They understood that
México was coming out of a civil war and engaged in a process of economic and political
reconstruction, which encountered internal opposition that some times required the use of the
army to settle down. In that new approach toward improving the living conditions of the
Mexican population, the participation of foreign capital was required in the short term.
Consequently, the oil sector became an important source of government’s revenues to finance
development programs. Presidents Obregón and Elías Calles did not try to ban, as some
claimed, the participation of foreigners in the Mexican economy; rather they tried to set rules
according to Mexican priorities. Sometimes their position toward foreigners seemed to be
radical. However, they always kept open the channels of communication and negotiation, or
searching for a resolution to the disputes. With respect to religion, a similar approach was
implemented. The Mexican authorities did not intend to destroy the faith; they decided to pursue
a new set of ground rules for relations between the Mexican State and members of all faiths,
something that in the end was implemented by President Portes Gil. Those actions executed
under nationalistic pragmatism at times appeared looked as extremist and provided the wrong
impression to foreigners.
An example of the latter took place when Mexican policies led some in the U.S. to
demand that their government intervene in México to stop what they considered a draft towards
communism. American authorities answered with restrain, and diplomacy became the main tool
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to settle the disputes between both countries. Related to American interests in the oil industry in
México, the Mexican authorities tried to implement changes in the Mexican laws. Those
changes implied the retroactivity of the dispositions, related to foreign concessions. In America,
representatives of the oil companies engaged in an active campaign to portrait the Mexican
government as an advocate of communism while demanding the U.S. government to take
extreme measures to solve the problem. In response, President Coolidge implemented a hard
line policy through Ambassador Sheffield’s actions. However, a combination of the
ambassador’s poor performance and the Mexican government’s ability to maintain open an
unofficial channel of negotiations with members of the oil industry as well as direct
communication with authorities in Washington converted Sheffield into a liability.
Consequently, there was no other option but to replace Sheffield. At the end of October 1927,
Ambassador Morrow arrived to México. Morrow’s actions soon got results, and in less than two
months; the disputes over oil rights had been solved. The Mexican authorities accepted
Morrow’s proposals, and the Mexican Supreme Court struck down the provision in the
Petroleum Laws that established time limits on foreign concessions. The outcome proved the
efficacy of President Coolidge’s approach.
The American government not only engaged in those events related directly to American
interests in México, but also displayed an active interest in México’s domestic affairs such as the
armed revolts uprising during those years. The American presidents knew that weak
governments in México presented problems for the U. S. As far as the Mexican economy did not
consolidate, the threat of a new wave of immigrants coming to the U.S. would be a problem.
Also, a weak government in the neighboring country would not allow the healthy development
of American business there. By supporting the governments of Obregón Salido, Elías Calles,
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and Portes Gil in México, the U.S. supported its own international interests. Consequently, the
American government avoided supporting those who rebelled against the Mexican authorities.
In 1924, during the so-called De la Huerta Revolution, President Coolidge rejected the sale of
weapons to the rebels; he issued a proclamation limiting the sale of arms and ammunitions to
Obregóns’ the officially recognized government. President Coolidge adopted a similar approach
when the religious conflict developed into an armed uprising. In 1929 President Hoover, during
his first day in office, firmly opposed support for the armed movement started by members of the
Obregonismo radical wing against the Mexican government.
During the years of the religious conflict, President Coolidge maintained a policy of
restraint and refrained from direct involvement but opened the unofficial diplomatic channels to
negotiate with members of the Catholic Church and the Mexican government without engaging
in unilateral action. The religious conflict in México during the 1920s provided several lessons
related to political and diplomatic matters. From a political perspective, the conflict exemplified
the essentially political nature of the struggle between the Mexican state and the Catholic
Church. Some have tried to portray this disagreement as a dispute between the powerful
Mexican state and a weak Catholic Church, but this was not the case. The Church invoked the
preservation of an endangered Catholic faith to hide its real purpose: a return to old privileges.
The Mexican state tried to establish rules to define the prerogatives of each entity. The
provisions of the Mexican Constitution were similar for members of all religions. Only
Catholics argued against the law. Advocates of other creeds respectfully attempted to function
within the law. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, tried to define its role in the Mexican
post-revolutionary state as the only and official faith.
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The Catholic hierarchy’s efforts to gain support outside the borders of México, especially
in the United States, had the opposite effect to the one they expected. The activities of Catholic
priests and laymen in the U.S. played into anti-Catholic prejudice in the United States, already
stirred up by the potential presidential candidacy of Alfred E. Smith.
The American Catholic hierarchy and laymen openly favored the Mexican Church.
When they asked President Coolidge to intervene in the domestic conflict South of the border,
Coolidge refused. For him, the religious conflict represented a domestic issue that concerned
only to the Mexican people and their government. It was a clear example of how domestic
politics influence foreign affairs. Have Coolidge taken the Catholic’s side in the Mexican
conflict, he was in danger of creating a religious problem within the U.S. borders. By avoiding
taking sides in a foreign dispute, Coolidge avoided a situation that could lead to religious
disputes in America. In the end, religion did not even become a definitive issue in the outcome
of the presidential election of 1928.
Perhaps the most important consequence of the decisions taken during those years was
not their immediate impact but their middle and long term consequences. The agreement
between the Mexican state and the American oil companies allowed the latter to work in México
for the next eleven years until 1938 when the Mexican government nationalized the industry. It
also proved that it was possible to operate American foreign policy on the basis of an
amalgamation of ideological and economic considerations. For the Mexican government, the
accord provided a source of revenue, through oil taxes, to finance development programs. It
helped to start a new era for the Mexican economy. On the political side, American
government’s help toward the consolidation of the Mexican government set the basis for a
political system that lasted for almost seventy years and provided the Mexican population with
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peace and economic development. The agreements and negotiations of the 1920s shaped U.S.Mexican relations for the rest of the 20th Century. No matter how big the differences were,
always a channel of negotiation, official or unofficial, was open to discuss and reach a
settlement.
When President Coolidge avoided taking an official stand in the religious conflict of
México, he not only steered clear of a foreign dispute but also avoided exacerbating religious
differences within the U.S. His policy diminished the impact of religion on the outcome of the
presidential elections in 1928. Coolidge, and later Hoover, handled the religious conflict in
México in such a way that the figure of the U.S. president was never questioned as
interventionist. Those Catholic radicals who opposed any settlement focused their criticism on
Ambassador Morrow, who was able to take all the “blame” for the American participation in the
negotiations. In the end, it was Ambassador Morrow’s ability that persuaded members of the
Church and the Mexican government to reach an agreement. The resulting accord called the
Modus Vivendi, started a new era for both parties and demonstrates how the Catholic Church was
able to put aside spiritual considerations in favor of political pragmatism, something
demonstrated when it signed the Lateran Treaty with Benito Mussolini to create the Vatican
State. From then on, a new era started in the years to come in the relations between the Church
and the Mexican State. While not free from difficulties, those rules with some adjustments
prevailed up to 1992 when the Mexican authorities decided to establish diplomatic relations with
the Vatican State.
In conclusion, the informal American intervention in the controversy between the
Catholic Church and the Mexican state provided a case study of American independent
internationalism in the 1920s. Anything but isolationist, the Coolidge administration played an
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active role in foreign affairs. It did so not through alliances, but through informal channels,
always keeping an eye on American interests. Indeed the diplomacy of the Coolidge
administration in this instance proved skillful and successful. The incident offered a striking
example of how domestic determinants influenced foreign policy and, at the same time,
demonstrated how foreign policy could enter the American domestic political arena. Further, the
incident played an important role in shaping U.S.-Mexican relations for the rest of the twentieth
century.
The noted historian, Charles Joyner, has argued the case for local history by urging
historians to look for “large topics in small places.” In a similar vein, the American intervention
in the Mexican church/state crisis offers important insights into large topics of American history
from the perspective of a little known, but nonetheless significant, incident.
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